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This dissertation investigates the impact of health reform on both the supply and demand for 
health services.  The first essay analyzes the Massachusetts Health and Insurance Reform of 
2006 to determine the impact of employer mandates to offer health insurance to employees.  
This essay finds that employer mandates are extremely effective in preserving employer 
sponsored insurance coverage distributions, and that allowing more leniency on smaller firms 
results in higher take up rates of public insurance for employees in smaller firms.  The second 
essay investigates the extent of market power in specialty physician markets.  Whether 
physicians can exercise market power is becoming ever more salient in the face of health 
reform.  This essay finds evidence that physicians do have market power when bargaining 
with insurers, and that this market power could lead to higher prices in the private market if 
physicians are allowed to collaborate on health care provided through the public insurance 
market.  The last essay deviates a bit from health reform and analyzes income differences 
between persons with and without disabilities.  This essay finds that the inclusion of health 
insurance from both public and private sources as income results in a closing of the income 
gap between persons with and without disabilities over the last three decades, a reversal of the 
findings in past literature analyzing these two populations and their economic resources.     
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CHAPTER 1                                                                                                            
MANDATED INCENTIVES: THE IMPACT OF FIRM SIZE THRESHOLDS FOR 
EMPLOYER MANDATES IN MASSACHESETTS 
1.1 Introduction 
The state of Massachusetts passed sweeping health care reform legislation in 2006 with the 
Massachusetts Health Care and Insurance Reform Law (MHCI).  The reform aimed to expand 
access to health insurance coverage through a combination of insurance market reforms, 
individual and employer mandates, and access to health insurance subsidies through the state’s 
Commonwealth Health Insurance Connector Authority (the Connector).  A major policy 
dilemma faced by the federal government and states when attempting to ensure affordable 
access to health insurance is balancing increased access to public health coverage with public 
insurance crowd-out of the private market.  To preserve the traditional provision of health 
insurance by employers, the Massachusetts reform implemented firewalls to limit access to 
subsidies based on family income and availability of employer sponsored health insurance 
(ESI).  In addition to the subsidy access firewalls applied to individuals, the reform mandated 
that all employers over 11 full time equivalent employees (FTEs) offer and make a “fair and 
reasonable” contribution to health insurance coverage.  The definition of a “fair and 
reasonable” contribution differed by firm size, allowing more lenient requirements on smaller 
firms (11 to 50 FTEs).  The “fair and reasonable” contribution requirement for small firms 
allowed them to be in compliance with the employer mandate while simultaneously allowing 
their employees that were income-eligible for subsidies to choose between subsidized 
coverage and their employers offered plan.  While large-firms that complied with the “fair and 
reasonable” contribution requirement automatically barred all of their employees from 
accessing subsidized insurance, even if they were income-eligible.  This paper assesses the 
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difference in coverage distributions between lower-income small and large firm employees 
due the more lenient small firm employer mandate.   
This paper shows that the more lenient treatment of small firms provides a clear financial 
incentive – one not open to larger firms – for small-firm employers and their employees to 
work together to allow income-eligible employees to access subsidized coverage without 
affecting the actual cost or access to ESI they provide to employees who are not income 
eligible. For this reason, the different treatment of small firms is more likely to encourage 
small-firm employers and their employees to alter their existing health insurance contracts, 
resulting in a relatively higher share of their income-eligible employees enrolling in 
subsidized coverage and a relatively lower share being enrolled in ESI coverage than would 
have been the case had the MHCI treated small and large firms equally under the mandate. 
That is, there is a trade-off between allowing more leniency for small firms to comply with the 
employer mandate under the MHCI, and the goal of minimizing coverage shifts from ESI to 
subsidized health insurance. 
Using data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) and a triple-difference analysis, this 
paper shows the extent to which the MHCI generated differences in the take-up of subsidized 
coverage and ESI between small- and large-firm employees in Massachusetts. In doing so it 
assesses the degree to which the more lenient treatment of small firms under the MHCI 
increased the shift from ESI to subsidized coverage above what it would have been absent this 
different treatment. Previous analyses of the MHCI have primarily focused on health service 
utilization, health outcomes, cost, and source of coverage. This paper extends this literature by 
analyzing the difference in coverage distributions due to the interaction of the employer 
mandate requirements and access to subsidies criteria by firm size. Thus, this paper provides a 
richer perspective on the incentives embedded in the reform legislation that potentially alter 
lower-income employees’ pathways to health insurance coverage. 
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The differences in health insurance coverage distributions between small and large firms are 
not trivial. Since the enactment of the MHCI in 2006, employees of small firms have 
generated most of the new subsidized coverage take-up. Of every two newly covered small-
firm workers receiving a MHCI subsidy, one would have chosen ESI had he or she been 
subject to the more stringent large-firm employer mandate. Additionally, there are noticeable 
differences in the coverage distributions across exempt small firms, small firms subject to the 
more lenient mandate, and large firms subject to the more stringent mandate. Exempt firms 
have lower increases in the take up of ESI and higher increases in the take up of subsidized 
coverage compared to non-exempt firms while non-exempt display the same pattern compared 
to large firms. Not only do these results highlight the overall effectiveness of an employer 
mandate, but they also provide evidence that the stringency of the employer mandate has a 
significant impact ESI and subsidized coverage take up rates. 
These findings are the first to empirically show that treating income-eligible small-firm 
employees differently than similar employees in large firms will have a different effect on 
employees’ movement onto subsidized coverage instead of ESI. This has important 
implications for the ACA, which includes very similar reform elements with respect to 
subsidy access for workers and more lenient mandates on smaller firms. The similar employer 
mandate structure and access to subsidy criteria in both the MHCI and the ACA underscores 
the policy relevance of studying the extent to which the MHCI altered the previously existing 
pathways to health insurance coverage for lower-income workers. Additionally, the ACA’s 
employer mandate has been postponed until 2015 to allow firms more time to adjust their 
health insurance benefit packages. The removal of such a mandate serves to exacerbate the 
coverage shifts that would have occurred under the original ACA employer mandate. 
This chapter proceeds as follows: Section 1.2 provides an in-depth review of the relevant 
features of the MHCI; Section 1.3 provides an outline of my hypotheses; Section 1.4 discusses 
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the data used to empirically estimate the different treatment effects; Section 1.5 is a discussion 
of my identification strategy; Section 1.6 previews the robustness checks I perform on my 
baseline estimates; Section 1.7 displays the results of my estimation; and Section 1.8 
concludes with a summary of my results and a discussion of my findings. 
1.2 Massachusetts Health Reform 
Massachusetts was the first state to pass legislation to achieve near-universal coverage through 
“incremental universalism” in April 2006 (Gruber, 2008). Gruber (2010) described the 
Massachusetts Health Care and Insurance Reform Law of 2006 as a “Three-Legged Stool.” 
The first leg of the stool is comprised of insurance market reforms, which includes guaranteed 
issue, community rating, and a merge of the non-group and small-group markets. The second 
leg mandates that individuals obtain and maintain health insurance coverage and that 
employers offer health insurance to all full-time employees and make a “fair and reasonable” 
contribution to such coverage. The third leg of the stool provides subsidized and unsubsidized 
coverage through the state’s Commonwealth Health Insurance Connector Authority (the 
Connector) to Massachusetts residents, with subsidies available to individuals below 300 
percent of the FPL. The first leg aimed to reduce premiums in the small and non-group 
markets by merging the two and allowing for a larger risk base; it also sought to guarantee that 
individuals could obtain health insurance coverage despite pre-existing conditions. The 
individual mandate of the second leg serves to safeguard against adverse selection by not 
allowing healthy individuals to forgo coverage without a financial penalty, while the employer 
mandate of the second leg aimed to ensure that the traditional provision of ESI remained the 
primary source of health insurance coverage for the working population in Massachusetts. 
Lastly, the third leg of the stool offers publicly subsidized private health insurance plans in 
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order to provide individuals below 300 percent of the FPL who otherwise cannot obtain 
Medicaid or ESI an opportunity to purchase affordable health insurance coverage. 
The Connector began offering subsidized coverage to residents in the 100-to-300-percent FPL 
range beginning in February 2007. The requirement that individuals maintain health insurance 
coverage took effect on July 1, 2007 and imposed a penalty of $219 for non-compliance. This 
penalty was subsequently increased in 2008 to 50 percent of the lowest cost health insurance 
premium available each month through the Connector. The requirement that firms of 11 or 
more full-time-equivalent (FTE) employees offer health insurance to all full-time employees 
and make a “fair and reasonable” contribution to such coverage was finalized on June 29, 
2007. Thus, the main elements of the health reform law were in place at the start of the 2008 
calendar year. Massachusetts also expanded Medicaid coverage for children in families up to 
300 percent of the FPL as part of the 2006 reform, but chose not expand adult Medicaid 
(MassHealth) and kept eligibility for adults at 133 percent of the FPL throughout the health 
reform implementation. However, Massachusetts did increase enrollment caps for previously 
eligible adults on the MassHealth waiting list, which increased adult Medicaid enrollment 
from 1.3 million in 2006 to 1.6 million in 2008.1 I compared the average number of 
Massachusetts workers below 133 percent of the FPL enrolled in Medicaid for years 2000-to-
2005 to years 2006-to-2011 using CPS data and found that average adult Medicaid enrollment 
increased by roughly 22,500 from the period covering 2000-to-2005 to the period covering 
2006-to-2011, which indicates that the bulk of the increase in Massachusetts Medicaid roles 
came from the non-working poor. 
The individual mandate to obtain and maintain health insurance coverage can be met by either 
enrolling in Medicaid, enrolling in ESI, or obtaining coverage through the Connector. Workers 
                                                 
1 http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-State/massachusetts.html 
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above 133 percent of the FPL cannot enroll in Medicaid and must seek coverage through 
either their employer or the Connector. The Connector offers subsidized insurance coverage 
through Commonwealth Care to individuals below 300 percent of the FPL who are not 
eligible for MassHealth (Medicaid). Additionally, through Commonwealth Choice, the 
Connector offers unsubsidized coverage to any resident not qualified for MassHealth or 
Commonwealth Care. An income-eligible worker (between 133 and 300 percent of the FPL) 
and his or her dependents are allowed to access subsidies on the exchange if the worker’s 
employer either does not offer health insurance or offers coverage but contributes less than 33 
percent of the annual premium cost of an individual health insurance plan or less than 20 
percent of a family health insurance plan. Individuals eligible for subsidized coverage through 
the Connector receive subsidies on a sliding scale based on their FPL. In 2013 individuals 
below 150 percent of the FPL received fully subsidized health insurance; individuals between 
150 and 200 percent of the FPL could choose from a list of plans with monthly premiums 
between $40 and $81; individuals between 200 and 250 percent of the FPL faced monthly 
premiums between $78 and $138; and individuals between 250 and 300 percent of the FPL 
faced monthly premiums between $118 and $182.2 
The employer mandate can be separated into two distinct requirements, the first of which is 
the requirement to offer an ESI plan in which employer and employee contributions are tax 
exempt (section 125 plan). The second requirement is that employers make a “fair and 
reasonable” contribution to their employees’ health plans. Employers with 11 or more FTE 
employees who fail to offer a section 125 plan are subject to the “free-rider surcharge.” This 
penalty is assessed as a percentage of the dollars spent by the health safety net fund that can be 
attributed to a specific employer’s employees and dependents. The percentage is higher for 
                                                 
2 2013 premiums available through https://www.mahealthconnector.org.  
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firms of more than 50 FTE employees compared to firms of 11 to 50 FTE employees.3 
Employers can avoid the “free-rider surcharge” as long as they offer a section 125 plan, 
independent of whether or not they subsidize coverage. The Massachusetts Division of Health 
Care, Finance, and Policy (2013) notes that 93.9 percent of firms with 11 or more FTEs 
offered section 125 plans in 2011, but no firm has had to pay the “free-rider surcharge” since 
MHCI implementation because the employees in non-compliant firms have never breached the 
health care cost thresholds at which the fine is assessed. Thus, for the purposes of this paper I 
will assume that all firms are in compliance with the section 125 plan requirement. 
The second part of the employer mandate requires employers with 11 or more FTE employees 
to make a “fair and reasonable” contribution to their full-time employees’ health insurance 
premiums. The “fair and reasonable” contribution requirement does not apply to firms with 
fewer than 11 FTE employees, and its requirements differ for firms with 11 to 50 FTE 
employees as compared to firms with more than 50 FTE employees. There exist two basic 
criteria that comprise the “fair and reasonable” contribution requirement: 
1. The employer offers health insurance coverage and contributes at least 33 percent of 
the total annual single coverage premium cost. 
2. The employer offers health insurance coverage, and at least 25 percent of the 
employer’s full-time employees are enrolled in the offered plan. 
Firms with 11 to 50 FTE employees can meet the “fair and reasonable” contribution 
requirement by satisfying one of two criteria listed above. Firms with more than 50 FTE 
                                                 
3 For costs incurred in the range of $50,000-$75,000, firms sized 11-25 are fined 20%, firms sized 26-
50 are fined 50%, and firms with more than 50 FTE employees are fined 80%. For costs incurred in the 
range of $75,001-$150,000, firms sized 11-25 are fined 30%, firms sized 26-50 are fined 60%, and 
firms with more than 50 FTE employees are fined 90%. For costs incurred in excess of $150,000, firms 
sized 11-25 are fined 40%, firms sized 26-50 are fined 70%, and firms with more than 50 FTE 
employees are fined 100%. 
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employees can satisfy the “fair and reasonable” contribution requirement by either complying 
with both criteria listed above or demonstrating that at least 75 percent of their full-time 
employees are enrolled in the offered health insurance plan. Independent of firm size, any 
employers who fail to meet the “fair and reasonable” contribution requirement are fined $295 
annually per FTE employee. The Massachusetts Division of Health Care, Finance, and Policy 
(2013) notes that roughly 93 percent of firms sized 11-to-25 and 96 percent of firms sized 26 
and over were in compliance with the “fair and reasonable” contribution requirement in 2011. 
Additionally, Massachusetts collected $18.4 million from non-compliant firms in 2011, with 
22 percent of the contributions coming from small firms (11-50 FTEs) and 78 percent coming 
from large firms (51+ FTEs) (Massachusetts Division of Health Care, Finance, and Policy, 
2013). 
Combining the subsidy eligibility and employer mandate criterion results in the ability of 
small firms (11-50 FTEs) to satisfy the “fair and reasonable” contribution, while still allowing 
their income-eligible employees access to subsidies through the Connector. Small firms 
achieve this by demonstrating that at least 25 percent of the firm’s full-time employees are 
enrolled in the firm’s offered plan to which the firm contributes less than 33 percent of the 
total annual single-coverage premium cost. Large firms in compliance with the “fair and 
reasonable” contribution requirement categorically disqualify their income-eligible employees 
from accessing subsidies through the connector because they must meet the first requirement 
of contributing at least 33 percent of the total annual single coverage premium cost. This 
feature of the MHCI is made clear though Figures 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 which display the decision 
trees under the MHCI for exempt firms, small-firms, and large-firms, respectively. Figure 1.1 
displays the choices available to exempt small-firms. Due to their exemption there is no 
incentive to change their existing contracts with employees to allow their income eligible 
workers to access subsidies through the Connector. Figure 1.2 displays the choices available to 
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non-exempt small-firms. If these firms choose to alter their existing employment contracts, it 
is clear that allowing their income eligible employees to access subsidies is the dominant 
choice. Lastly, Figure 1.3 displays the choices available to non-exempt large-firms. The only 
way large firms can allow their income eligible employees to access subsidies to be not be in 
compliance with the “fair and reasonable” contribution requirement, thus the incentive to 
engage in such behavior is dependent upon the distribution of full time workers income within 
the firm. Therefore, under the MHCI employer mandate it is always a dominant decision for 
non-exempt small-firms to allow their employees the option to choose between ESI or 
subsidized Connector coverage, while large firms must weigh the cost incurred from fines of 
allowing their income eligible employees to access subsidies. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Decision Tree for Exempt Firms 
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Figure 1.2: Decision Tree for Small Firms 
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The mechanism through which small firms can allow their income eligible employees the 
choice between ESI and subsidized Connector coverage without affecting their economic 
welfare is that small-firms can require that their employees contribute a greater share of the 
premium contribution without any economic harm to the employee. The split between 
employer and employee contributions under the MHCI is completely artificial when the 
provision of health insurance is considered to be a part of the overall employees’ 
compensation package (Brown, 1980; Summers, 1989). Employers can require employees to 
contribute a higher share of the premium while passing back the increased contribution 
requirement in wages. The transfer of the premium contribution share from the employer to 
the employee maintains the plan’s tax-exempt contribution status due to the mandate on firms 
to offer section 125 plans or be subject to the “free-rider surcharge.” Therefore, small firms 
can be in compliance with the employer mandate to offer and contribute to their employees’ 
health plans while allowing their income-eligible employees to decide between their 
Figure 1.3: Decision Tree for Large Firms 
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employer-sponsored tax-exempt contribution plan or increased wages (taxed) and a subsidized 
plan. Under this scenario, the employee is no worse off economically than when his or her 
employer contributed a higher share of the premium, and the employee is free to choose either 
ESI or subsidized coverage along with increased wages that are taxed at the employee’s 
marginal tax rate. 
The existing literature covering the MHCI has not explicitly addressed the coverage impacts 
due to the different application of the employer mandate by firm size. The effect of the 
Massachusetts health reform with respect to health care service utilization, health outcomes, 
cost, and source of coverage have been investigated. The Massachusetts Division of Health 
Care, Finance, and Policy (2011) estimates that the percent of uninsured Massachusetts 
residents had fallen to 1.9 percent by September 2010, which is congruent with the finding of 
Long et al. (2009) of a significant decrease in uninsurance rates in Massachusetts. With 
respect to health services utilization, Long et al. (2012) find a significant increase in 
individuals reporting a usual source of care; Long and Stockley (2011) note a significant 
decrease in unmet medical needs; and Kolstad and Kowalski (2012a) find a significant 
increase in the use of primary and preventive health care services in conjunction with a small 
decrease in hospital admissions deemed preventable with quality outpatient care. 
Courtemanche and Zapata (2012) addressed the impact of the Massachusetts reform on self-
reported health status and find that Massachusetts residents are more likely to report their 
health as “very good” or “excellent.” Raymond (2009) cites that the federal government funds 
half of the $707 million annual cost of the MHCI. Kolstad and Kowalski (2012b) find that 
employers have almost fully adjusted real wages to offset the increased cost of health 
insurance post-MHCI implementation. 
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The MHCI drew a significant amount of attention in both media and academic circles and 
eventually became the inspiration and foundation for national health reform embodied in the 
ACA. Early research finds that the MHCI succeeded in substantially increasing health 
insurance coverage with little-to-no subsidized insurance crowd out of ESI (Long, 2010; 
Kolstad and Kowalski, 2012a; Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts, 2012). These studies 
find that in Massachusetts, both ESI and publicly subsidized insurance coverage increased 
subsequent to the implementation of the MHCI. The increases in both public and private 
coverage are congruent with the structure of the MHCI, which expands access to health 
insurance through employer mandates, individual mandates, and the creation of a subsidized 
health insurance option through the state-run Connector. The coverage shifts discussed in this 
paper differ from the concept of crowd out. In fact, the results presented in this paper support 
the previous findings of no crowd out, even among the income-eligible working population. 
Coverage shifts occur under the MHCI when a small-firm employee obtains a subsidy for 
health insurance when he or she otherwise would have obtained or maintained ESI under the 
counterfactual scenario in which small firms are subject to the more stringent large-firm 
employer mandate. Thus, the concept of coverage shifts embodies how pathways to coverage 
for lower-income workers have changed due to the implementation of an employer mandate 
that differs by firm size. 
A major achievement of the MHCI was to increase state-wide health insurance coverage rates 
by providing incentives for employers to offer coverage, employees to purchase coverage 
from their employer, and those without access to ESI to take-up either Medicaid or subsidized 
insurance. In light of these achievements and the planned implementation of “Massachusetts-
like” national health reform in 2014, it is important to further the health reform literature by 
investigating the extent to which pathways to health insurance coverage have changed due to 
specific MHCI policy parameters that have been built into the ACA. This paper achieves this 
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goal by using the interaction of the MHCI’s firm-size-dependent employer mandate and 
access to subsidies criteria to identify coverage shifts from ESI to subsidized insurance for 
small-firm employees. 
1.3 Hypotheses 
Traditionally, federal and state labor-market regulations have built in a firm-size-dependent 
component that imposes more lenient restrictions on smaller firms, and Massachusetts was not 
an exception when policy makers crafted the MHCI for implementation in 2006.4 This 
seemingly benign feature of the MHCI potentially affects a non-trivial fraction of 
Massachusetts workers in that the small-firm market sector accounted for 25 percent of 
private-sector-employed individuals and 74 percent of all firms in Massachusetts in 2012.5 
More lenient mandates on small firms can lead to asymmetric behavioral responses across 
small and large firms by allowing small firms to take advantage of exemptions. For the MHCI, 
this would manifest in noticeably greater numbers of small-firm employees joining the 
subsidized coverage rolls and significantly fewer small-firm employees taking up ESI relative 
to large-firm employees. 
The MHCI allows small firms to be in compliance with the employer mandate and still 
provide their income-eligible employees the option of either accessing subsidized coverage or 
choosing the firm’s ESI plan, without decreasing their employees’ economic welfare. This is 
not the case for large-firm employers. This structure provides an incentive for small firms to 
                                                 
4 For example, The Family and Medical Leave Plan exempts firms with fewer than 50 workers; the 
Americans with Disabilities Act exempts firms with fewer than 15 workers; the Worker Adjustment and 
Retraining Notification Act exempts firms with fewer than 100 workers; the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act exempts firms with fewer than 11 workers; the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
exempts firms with fewer than 20 workers; the Civil Rights Act of 1964 exempts firms with fewer than 
15 workers; the Fair Labor Standards Act exempts firms with fewer than 3 workers; and the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) exempts firms with fewer than 11 workers 
from regular programmed inspections. 
5 2012 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey-Insurance Component Summary Tables. 
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allow their income-eligible employees access to subsidized coverage through the Connector, 
which reduces the marginal costs of employing lower-income workers, thus placing the 
burden of health insurance coverage onto taxpayers. Furthermore, there were roughly 130,000 
income-eligible small-firm employees in Massachusetts in 2011 who could potentially access 
subsidies of up to $5,000 annually for a single-coverage health plan.6 Thus, allowing small 
firms to send their income-eligible employees to the Connector for subsidized coverage when 
they otherwise would have taken up ESI under a more stringent employer mandate may result 
in significantly higher costs to the state and federal government. 
The MHCI provides incentives for employers to offer insurance coverage and employees to 
take-up insurance coverage. Additionally, Massachusetts created a new state-run entity (the 
Connector), which offers subsidized coverage to income- and categorically-eligible 
individuals. These policy parameters should result in increases in ESI, subsidized coverage, 
and overall insurance rates. This result has been documented by several studies (Long, 2010; 
Kolstad and Kowalski, 2012a; Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts, 2012). Despite the 
overall increases in ESI, subsidized coverage and overall insurance rates, there exists an 
incentive for employers to get their income-eligible employees onto the subsidized coverage 
rolls in order to transfer the cost of health insurance from the employer and the employee to 
taxpayers. Massachusetts mitigated the extent to which workers could access subsidized 
coverage plans through the Connector by imposing several firewalls to accessing subsidies. 
First, the MHCI imposes income-eligibility criteria limiting subsidies to those with family 
incomes in the 133-to-300 percent of the FPL range. Additionally, the MHCI imposes a 
categorical requirement that individuals seeking subsidies either must not have access to ESI 
or have access, but the employer contributes less than 33 percent of the annual premium cost 
                                                 
6 Subsidies depend upon age, locality, and FPL. Subsidy estimate based on the annual unsubsidized 
premium cost for an individual health plan through the Commonwealth Choice program in 2013. 
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of an individual health insurance plan or less than 20 percent of a family health insurance plan. 
This categorical firewall prevents workers from taking up subsidized coverage when they have 
access to insurance through their employer. A small-firm worker can overcome this firewall 
much easier than a worker in a large firm can, due to the different application of the “fair and 
reasonable” contribution requirement for small firms compared to large firms. 
The difference in the application of the “fair and reasonable” contribution requirement for 
small firms compared to large firms creates an environment in which it is easier for small 
firms to be in compliance with the requirement, while the fine for non-compliance is the same 
for all firms larger than 11 FTEs.7 Firms with fewer than 11 FTE employees can choose to 
simply drop coverage altogether and allow all of their income-eligible employees access to 
subsidies, facing no penalty for doing so. As discussed above, firms with 11 to 50 FTE 
employees can be in compliance with the “fair and reasonable” contribution requirement and 
allow their income-eligible employees access to subsidies, while firms with more than 50 
FTEs cannot engage in such behavior and still satisfy the “fair and reasonable” contribution 
requirement. 
The different application of the “fair and reasonable” contribution requirement can be likened 
to a world in which different speed limits exist for trucks and cars, while the fine for speeding 
is identical for both vehicle types. In such a world a policy maker might change a universal 
speed limit of 30 miles per hour to one in which trucks are considered to be speeding if they 
travel above 30 miles per hour and cars are considered to be speeding if they travel above 50 
miles per hour, while leaving the penalty for speeding at $100 for both trucks and cars. In this 
world one would expect to observe an increase in the fraction of cars traveling between 30 and 
                                                 
7 The “free-rider surcharge” does vary by firm size, but no firm has been subject to the fine since the 
implementation of the MHCI, thus I will ignore this aspect of the law. 
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50 miles per hour relative to trucks because there is no financial penalty for car drivers who 
drive under the 50-miles-per-hour speed limit. Although the MHCI is more complex than this 
stylized example, the basic intuition is still relevant. Under the MHCI it is easier for small 
firms to take advantage of the incentive to send their income-eligible employees to the 
Connector for subsidized coverage than it is for large firms. Therefore, I would expect small-
firm employees to be more likely than large-firm employees to join the subsidized coverage 
rolls. Following the same logic, I would expect relatively fewer small-firm employees to take-
up ESI compared to large-firm employees. The hypothesis that small-firm employees will 
increase their take-up of subsidized coverage and decrease their take-up of ESI relative to 
large-firm workers leaves a theoretically ambiguous outcome for the impact on overall 
insurance rates between small and large firms. Empirical evidence is needed to determine 
which effect is larger in absolute value. 
1.4 Data 
I use Current Population Survey (CPS) data corresponding to years 2000-to-2011 to analyze 
the extent to which the different application of the MHCI employer mandate by firm size 
differently affected health insurance coverage distributions between small- and large firm-
employees. I compare Massachusetts insurance outcomes to insurance outcomes in a set of 
control states by firm size. The main control group consists of the Northeastern states: 
Connecticut; Washington, DC; Delaware; Maryland; Maine; New Hampshire; New Jersey; 
New York; Pennsylvania; Rhode Island; and Vermont. 
I limit the CPS data to private-sector workers of ages 18 to 64 who are between 133 and 300 
percent of the FPL, employed at work, and not receiving any SSI or SSDI benefits.8 This 
                                                 
8 FPL calculated by the author using family income, family size, and the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services poverty guidelines for each year. 
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limitation allows me to focus on the population that is income-eligible for subsidized 
coverage, thus isolating the relevant group of workers whose health insurance coverage choice 
would be affected by the firm-size-dependent employer mandate. I also look into the treatment 
effect in Massachusetts for workers above 300 percent of the FPL as a falsification test. 
The CPS does not assign firm sizes by FTE employee, but by the number of employees in a 
firm. In addition, its firm size gradations do not line up perfectly with the regulations in the 
MHCI. Ideally, firm size would be reported so that I could identify workers in firms sized 1 to 
10, 11 to 50, and more than 50. However, I can identify firms sized 1 to 10, 11 to 24, 25 to 99, 
and 100 or more. My main analysis defines small firms as firms sized 1 to 24 and large firms 
as firms sized 25 and over. This is an unavoidable data limitation, which poses a threat to my 
identification strategy. To partially address this issue, I investigated firm-size distributions in 
Massachusetts using the MEPS-IC. My baseline analysis of firms sized 1 to 24 compared to 
firms 25 and over assigns firms with 25 to 50 employees to the large-firm group, which is not 
congruent with MHCI regulations. According to the MEPS-IC, firms sized 1 to 50 in 
Massachusetts represent about 26 percent of all employees, of which 6 percent fall into the 25 
to 50 size group.9 Thus, most small-firm employees (80 percent) are represented by the 1 to 24 
size group. Also, the number of small firms sized 1 to 50 in Massachusetts represents roughly 
75 percent of all firms, of which 5 percent fall into the 25 to 50 category. Thus, most small 
firms (93 percent) are represented by the 1 to 24 size group. Despite the issues posed by the 
firm-size categories represented in the CPS, the relatively small percent of firms sized 25 to 50 
and the small percent of employees working in firms sized 25 to 50 serves to mitigate this 
                                                 
9 Using the CPS subsample of workers in Massachusetts between 133 and 300 percent of FPL who are 
not receiving SSI or SSDI benefits, I calculate the average percent of employees in firms sized 1 to 24 
over the years 2000 to 2011 to be 33 percent. 
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problem. Additionally, to address some concerns related to firm-size categories in the CPS, I 
check the robustness of my results to different definitions of small and large firms. 
Kolstad and Kowalski (2012a) noted and verified with the Census Bureau that the individuals 
in Commonwealth Care (subsidized Connector coverage) and Commonwealth Choice 
(unsubsidized Connector coverage) were coded as Medicaid recipients in the CPS. To identify 
individuals in the CPS with subsidized coverage I assign observations for individuals between 
133 and 300 percent of the FPL who report Medicaid coverage as receiving subsidized 
coverage, and individuals above 300 percent of the FPL who report Medicaid coverage as 
receiving unsubsidized coverage. Because my analysis focuses solely on income-eligible 
workers of ages 18 to 64, and because Massachusetts did not expand adult Medicaid 
eligibility, my analysis should capture the differences in subsidized Connector coverage take-
up between small- and large-firm employees. 
The Connector reported that of the approximate 42,000 individuals enrolled in 
Commonwealth Choice in 2011 (unsubsidized Connector coverage) at all income levels, about 
4,500 are small-firm workers and their dependents (Commonwealth Health Insurance 
Connector Authority, 2012). From CPS data, I estimate the average subsidized coverage 
enrollment for employees in firm sizes 1-24 from 2000 to 2006 at 18,604 individuals per year, 
and from 2008 to 2011 at 53,194. This represents an average increase of 34,590 from pre- to 
post-period. The increase of 34,590 workers in the 133 to 300 percent of the FPL range far 
outweighs the total reported value of 4,500 total enrollees (workers and dependents) from all 
income levels in Commonwealth Choice (unsubsidized coverage). Therefore, almost all of the 
increase in coded Medicaid coverage in my CPS sample of interest appears to be coming from 
subsidized Connector coverage, of which the Connector reports a total enrollment of 192,000 
in 2011. 
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As a robustness check, I also use CPS data corresponding to years 2003-2011 in conjunction 
with the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey - Insurance Component (MEPS-IC) summary 
tables from 2003-2006 to construct a synthetic control group to analyze the impact of the 
MHCI’s firm-size-dependent employer mandate on coverage distributions at an aggregate 
level. 
1.5 Identification Strategy 
To identify the extent to which more lenient mandates on small firms have increased the 
tendency of such firms to shift their workers onto government subsidized insurance rolls, I 
exploit the difference in how the MHCI treats small and large firms with respect to the “fair 
and reasonable” contribution requirement of the employer mandate. I demonstrate that when 
one looks specifically at the population for which substitution of employer coverage towards 
subsidized coverage might occur (among workers who are income eligible for subsidies), there 
is evidence of substantial differences in the source of health insurance coverage by firm size. 
Small firms are subject to far less stringent requirements on what constitutes a “fair and 
reasonable” contribution to health insurance, and they are also subject to smaller penalties 
resulting from uninsured employees accessing services through the health safety net. 
The main goal of this research is to assess the asymmetric impact of the MHCI’s firm-size-
dependent employer mandate on health insurance coverage distributions. The difference in the 
treatment of small and large firms under the MHCI generated a quasi-experiment within the 
state. Thus, I compare the effect of the firm-size-dependent employer mandate on small-firm 
employees’ coverage distributions relative to large-firm employees within Massachusetts. 
Assuming that other states which have not implemented widespread health reform laws are a 
valid counterfactual for Massachusetts; I can identify the difference in the MHCI’s treatment 
effect on small firms compared to large firms due to the different application of the employer 
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mandate. Furthermore, working under the assumption that the treatment effect on small and 
large firms would be identical if both firm sizes were subject to the more stringent large-firm 
employer mandate, I can identify the trade-offs inherent in applying a more lenient mandate to 
small firms. As noted above, I expect ESI take-up to decrease and subsidized coverage take-up 
to increase for small-firm employees relative to large-firm employees. 
To identify the impact of the firm-size-dependent employer mandate by firm size, I first focus 
solely on the subsample of 18-to-64 year-old workers who are between 133 and 300 percent of 
the FPL, who work in the private sector, and who do not receive any SSI or SSDI benefits. 
Massachusetts small-firm workers in this cohort have a greater ability to overcome the 
firewall to access subsidies than workers in large firms. Using this sample, I estimate a triple-
difference model, which allows me to compare the coverage outcomes in Massachusetts by 
firm size while controlling for the counterfactual situation in which Massachusetts did not 
implement the MHCI by using a set of reasonable control states. 
1.5.1 Triple Difference 
I first estimate the coverage impacts in Massachusetts using a difference-in-difference 
approach to verify that the income-eligible working population in Massachusetts did in fact 
experience increases in ESI, subsidized coverage, and overall insurance rates. I classify 
workers in my sample as either being enrolled in subsidized Connector coverage (coded as 
Medicaid recipients in the CPS), enrolled in ESI, or uninsured. I removed from my sample 
individuals who reported having both ESI and subsidized coverage, as well as any individual 
reporting a source of health insurance coverage that was not subsidized coverage or ESI (e.g., 
private non-group health insurance).10 Figures 1.4, 1.5, and 1.6 display the distribution of 
                                                 
10 This sample limitation resulted in a removal of 174 (6.69%) observations from Massachusetts and 
2,564 (6.28%) observations from the main Northeast control states group. 
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individuals by coverage type in Massachusetts compared to the Northeast control states for the 
sample of 18-to-64 year-old workers who are between 133 and 300 percent of the FPL, who 
work in the private sector, and who do not receive any SSI or SSDI benefits. The 
Massachusetts reform was passed in 2006, implemented in 2007, and finalized by the 
beginning 2008, thus I view 2007 as a during period in which the implementation of the 
MHCI was completed. Figures 1.4, 1.5, and 1.6 confirm that my subsample of income-eligible 
workers displays the previously documented result that there is no evidence of crowd-out and 
that the MHCI resulted in increases in ESI, subsidized coverage, and overall insurance rates. 
 
Notes: CPS data. The pre-period is 2000-2006 and the post-period is 2008-2011. The sample is 
restricted to workers age 18 to 64 who are between 133 and 300 percent FPL working in the private 
sector and not receiving any SSI or SSDI benefits. 
 
Figure 1.4: ESI: Massachusetts vs. North East (Income-Eligible Workers) 
 
 
 
 23 
 
Notes: CPS data. The pre-period is 2000-2006 and the post-period is 2008-2011. The sample is 
restricted to workers age 18 to 64 who are between 133 and 300 percent FPL working in the private 
sector and not receiving any SSI or SSDI benefits. 
 
Figure 1.5: Subsidized Coverage: Massachusetts vs. North East (Income-Eligible Workers) 
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Notes: CPS data. The pre-period is 2000-2006 and the post-period is 2008-2011. The sample is 
restricted to workers age 18 to 64 who are between 133 and 300 percent FPL working in the private 
sector and not receiving any SSI or SSDI benefits. 
 
Figure 1.6: Uninsured: Massachusetts vs. North East (Income-Eligible Workers) 
 
Table 1.1 displays the summary statistics for insurance outcomes and predictors of insurance 
outcomes in Massachusetts and the Northeast control states for the pre-period (2000-2006) 
compared to the post-period (2008-2011) calculated from the CPS sample of income-eligible 
workers (the during period of 2007 has been omitted). It is important to note here that income-
eligible workers in firms sized 1 to 24 comprise about one third of the total income-eligible 
working population in Massachusetts in all years (2000-2011). This corresponds to about 
130,000 small-firm workers that are income eligible for subsidized coverage in any given 
year. Thus, any dissimilar impacts on coverage distributions due to the firm-size-dependent 
employer mandate are non-trivial in that the different treatment impacts at a minimum one 
third of the income-eligible working population in Massachusetts. 
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Table 1.1 displays the pre-period and post-period summary statistics for FPL, firm size, 
educational attainment, race, age, sex, and family characteristics. Neither Massachusetts nor 
the control states experienced any dramatic changes in the insurance predictor variables when 
moving from the pre-period to post-period. It is worth noting here that the more lenient 
treatment of small firms under the MHCIs employer mandate should result in small-firm 
employment growth because the MHCI reduces the short-run costs of hiring income-eligible 
workers by allowing them access to subsidized health insurance coverage (Gourio and Roys, 
2012). I do not observe this outcome in the post-period for Massachusetts, and there are 
several confounding factors that may contribute to this finding. First, employment growth in 
the small-firm business sector requires additional investment and the creation of more small 
firms, which is a long-run concept. I only observe four post years, which is not nearly enough 
time to capture any small-firm employment growth effects. Second, the United States was in 
the midst of the “great recession” throughout the implementation and post-periods of the 
MHCI.11 This served to dampen all employment growth, especially in the small-firm market, 
due to relatively limited access to liquid assets and investment for creating new firms. Thus, 
future research should focus on the long-run implications of the MHCI and the effect on 
small-business growth, as I am unable to capture this phenomenon. The regression unadjusted 
difference-in-difference estimates for insurance outcomes reveal an increase in both ESI and 
subsidized insurance, and the sum of the increase for both ESI and subsidized coverage equals 
                                                 
11 I tested whether unemployment in Massachusetts responded differently to the recessions compared to 
the North-east control group over the following time periods: 2000-2012, 2000-2003 (minor recession), 
2004-2007 (no recession), and 2008-2010 (the “great recession”). I regressed a time trend, a 
Massachusetts fixed effect, and an interaction term of the time trend and the Massachusetts fixed effect 
on annual unemployment reported by the BLS and found that unemployment trends in Massachusetts 
did not statistically differ from those of the Northeast control states for any of the time periods listed 
above. 
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the increase in overall insurance rates. These results are in line with past analyses of the 
MHCI. 
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics 
                
  North East Massachusetts Difference 
in 
Difference   Pre Post Difference Pre Post Difference 
N 21,927 13,084  1,524 740   
Weighted Count 25,714,283 15,246,150  2,829,006 1,567,623   
Insurance Outcomes               
ESI 0.64 0.59 -0.05 0.61 0.68 0.06 0.12 
Subsidized 
Coverage 0.05 0.09 0.04 0.1 0.17 0.08 0.04 
Uninsured 0.31 0.33 0.02 0.29 0.15 -0.14 -0.16 
Insurance Predictors               
Age 37.21 38.09 0.88 37.15 37.1 -0.04 -0.92 
Male 0.51 0.52 0 0.47 0.44 -0.04 -0.04 
Family Size 2.81 2.71 -0.1 2.79 2.77 -0.02 0.08 
Married 0.44 0.41 -0.03 0.4 0.38 -0.02 0.01 
Dependents 
(indicator) 0.72 0.69 -0.03 0.69 0.68 -0.01 0.02 
Children (indicator) 0.48 0.44 -0.04 0.46 0.45 -0.01 0.03 
Median FPL 2.24 2.26 0.01 2.24 2.29 0.04 0.03 
Full Time 0.89 0.87 -0.02 0.85 0.84 -0.01 0.01 
Firm Size < 10 0.18 0.18 0 0.19 0.18 -0.01 -0.02 
Firm Size 10-24 0.14 0.19 0.06 0.13 0.16 0.03 -0.02 
Firm Size 25-99 0.17 0.12 -0.05 0.15 0.1 -0.05 0.01 
Firm Size 100-499 0.15 0.14 -0.01 0.16 0.15 -0.01 0 
Firm Size 500-999 0.06 0.05 -0.01 0.06 0.07 0.01 0.02 
Firm Size 1,000+ 0.3 0.31 0.01 0.31 0.33 0.02 0.01 
White 0.75 0.74 -0.01 0.8 0.8 -0.01 0 
 28 
Table 1.1 (Continued) 
Black 0.19 0.19 0 0.13 0.14 0.01 0.01 
Native American 0.01 0.01 0 0.01 0 0 -0.01 
Asian 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.07 0 -0.01 
Hispanic 0.18 0.22 0.04 0.18 0.15 -0.03 -0.07 
Less than High 
School 0.17 0.14 -0.03 0.19 0.1 -0.08 -0.05 
High School 
Diploma 0.43 0.41 -0.02 0.4 0.39 0 0.01 
Some College 0.26 0.27 0.02 0.25 0.29 0.04 0.02 
College Graduate 0.1 0.13 0.02 0.13 0.17 0.04 0.02 
Graduate School 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.01 0 
At least High School 0.83 0.86 0.03 0.81 0.9 0.08 0.05 
At least College 0.14 0.17 0.03 0.17 0.22 0.05 0.02 
Notes: CPS data. The pre-period is 2000-2006 and the post-period is 2008-2011. The sample is restricted to workers age 18 to 64 who are between 133 and 
300 percent FPL working in the private sector and not receiving any SSI or SSDI benefits. All data has been weighted by the March CPS Supplement weight.  
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To formalize the intuition from Figures 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 and Table 1.1, I estimate the 
following difference-in-difference model (equation 1.1): 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽(𝑀𝐴 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡)𝑖 + 𝛾(𝑀𝐴 ∗ 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔)𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖
′𝛿 + ∑ 𝜙𝑠
𝑠
+ ∑ 𝜏𝑡
𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖 
I include a during period for 2007 and a treatment period for 2008 to 2011.12 The 
identification assumption used for the estimation of equation 1.1 is that aside from the 
Massachusetts reform, no other factors differentially impacted the coverage outcome variables 
between Massachusetts and the control states. I estimated equation 1.1 for all three coverage 
outcomes (ESI, subsidized coverage, uninsurance) jointly using seemingly unrelated 
regression estimation. Each observation corresponds to a person i in state s at time t. 𝛽 is the 
difference-in-difference coefficient of interest. The matrix 𝑋𝑖 includes individual and family 
characteristics13, and 𝜙𝑠 and 𝜏𝑡 are state- and year- fixed effects, respectively; thus the 
difference-in-difference estimate is identifying changes within Massachusetts over time. The 
standard errors from this regression are clustered at the state level. 
Table 1.2 displays regression coefficients from the estimation of equation 1.1. The estimates 
of the parameters of interest (𝛽) are all significant at the 1-percent level. These estimates 
indicate an increase in both ESI and subsidized coverage in Massachusetts, and the sum of the 
coefficients from the ESI and subsidized coverage equations equals the increase in overall 
insurance rates.  
                                                 
12 Kolstad and Kowalski (2012a) also account for a during period in 2007 for their difference-in-
difference analysis of coverage distributions. 
13 The characteristics are age category, FPL category, sex, family size, marital status, full-time vs. part-
time employee, presence of dependents, race, ethnicity, firm size, and education. 
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Table 1.2: Difference in Difference Estimation (N=40,696) 
        
Variable ESI 
Subsidized 
Coverage Uninsured 
MA * Post 0.088 0.044 -0.132 
 (0.005)*** (0.006)*** (0.010)*** 
MA * During 0.091 0.079 -0.17 
 (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.016)*** 
Demographic Characteristics Y Y Y 
State Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
Notes: The pre-period is 2000-2006 and the post-period is 2008-2011. The sample is restricted to 
workers age 18 to 64 who are between 133 and 300 percent FPL working in the private sector and not 
receiving any SSI or SSDI benefits. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. *** indicates 
significance at the 1 percent level, ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level, and * indicates 
significance at the 10 percent level. 
 
This difference-in-difference estimation for income-eligible workers matches previous 
research that has used difference-in-difference techniques to analyze changes in the insurance 
coverage distribution for all Massachusetts residents due to the MHCI. The next step is to 
focus on the different treatment effects of a firm-size-dependent employer mandate in 
Massachusetts. Figures 1.7, 1.8, and 1.9 display the trends in insurance outcomes in 
Massachusetts and the Northeast control states by firm size (1-24 vs. 25+) for the sample of 
workers of ages 18 to 64 who are between 133 and 300 percent of the FPL and who work in 
the private sector but do not receive any SSI or SSDI benefits. During the pre-period (2000-
2006), large-firm employees were more likely to have ESI than small-firm employees, but 
small and large firms in Massachusetts move together. The same holds true for ESI in the 
Northeast control states. Large-firm workers were also more likely to be insured in the pre-
period and about equally likely to have public coverage compared to small-firm workers. 
Additionally, the general trends for subsidized coverage and uninsurance rates for the pre-
period match reasonably well. It is important to note here that uninsurance rates for workers 
between 133 and 300 percent of the FPL in Massachusetts are between 10 and 25 percent 
post-reform. This is relatively high compared to the overall uninsurance rate of 2 percent, thus 
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lower-income workers in Massachusetts are far more likely than the overall population to lack 
health insurance coverage. 
 
Notes: CPS data. The pre-period is 2000-2006 and the post-period is 2008-2011. The sample is 
restricted to workers age 18 to 64 who are between 133 and 300 percent FPL working in the private 
sector and not receiving any SSI or SSDI benefits. Small firms are defined as 1-24 employees and large 
firms as 25 or more employees. 
 
Figure 1.7: ESI: Massachusetts vs. North East 
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Notes: CPS data. The pre-period is 2000-2006 and the post-period is 2008-2011. The sample is 
restricted to workers age 18 to 64 who are between 133 and 300 percent FPL working in the private 
sector and not receiving any SSI or SSDI benefits. Small firms are defined as 1-24 employees and large 
firms as 25 or more employees. 
 
Figure 1.8: Subsidized Coverage: Massachusetts vs. North East 
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Notes: CPS data. The pre-period is 2000-2006 and the post-period is 2008-2011. The sample is 
restricted to workers age 18 to 64 who are between 133 and 300 percent FPL working in the private 
sector and not receiving any SSI or SSDI benefits. Small firms are defined as 1-24 employees and large 
firms as 25 or more employees. 
 
Figure 1.9: Uninsured: Massachusetts vs. North East 
 
Table 1.3 displays the summary statistics for insurance outcomes and the predictors of 
insurance outcomes (FPL, firm size, educational attainment, race, age, sex, and family 
characteristics) by firm size in Massachusetts and in the Northeast control states for the pre-
period (2000-2006) compared to the post-period (2008-2011) calculated from the CPS sample 
of income-eligible workers (the during period of 2007 has been omitted). Neither 
Massachusetts nor the control states show any dramatic changes in these predictor variables. 
The regression unadjusted triple-difference estimates for insurance outcomes can be used to 
construct an estimate of small-firm ESI to subsidized insurance coverage shifts. I use the 
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following definition (equation 1.2) for small-firm coverage shifts: Let 𝛽𝐸𝑆𝐼 and 𝛽𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦 be the 
triple-difference estimates for ESI and subsidized coverage, respectively. 
𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑆ℎ𝑖𝑓𝑡 =  −
𝛽𝐸𝑆𝐼
𝛽𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦
 
This definition can be interpreted to mean that for all individuals in small firms who are newly 
covered by subsidized coverage, the fraction Coverage Shift would have chosen ESI had they 
been subject to the more stringent large-firm employer mandate. Using equation 1.2 and the 
estimates provided in Table 1.3, the estimated coverage shift is 40 percent and the different 
impact on overall insurance rates for workers in small firms is 7 percent. This can be 
interpreted to mean that 40 percent of small-firm workers newly covered by subsidized 
insurance would have taken up ESI had they been subject to the more stringent large-firm 
employer mandate. And the trade-off of applying the more stringent large-firm mandate to all 
firms would be an observed decrease of 7 percent in overall insurance rates for small-firm 
workers.
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Table 1.3: Summary Statistics by Firm Size 
                    
  Control States Massachusetts Triple 
Difference   Pre-LF Pre-SF Post-LF Post-SF Pre-LF Pre-SF Post-LF Post-SF 
N 15,157 6,770 8,410 4,674 1,022 502 488 252  
Weighted Count 17,626,284 8,087,999 9,541,953 5,704,196 1,915,560 913,446 1,029,789 537,835  
Insurance Outcomes                   
ESI 0.72 0.48 0.68 0.42 0.67 0.50 0.76 0.52 -0.05 
Subsidized Coverage 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.28 0.12 
Uninsured 0.24 0.46 0.24 0.47 0.25 0.39 0.12 0.20 -0.07 
Insurance Predictors                   
Age 37.27 37.09 38.16 37.98 36.83 37.82 37.36 36.60 -1.75 
Male 0.49 0.56 0.49 0.57 0.46 0.51 0.43 0.44 -0.06 
Family Size 2.81 2.80 2.72 2.69 2.79 2.79 2.73 2.84 0.14 
Married 0.43 0.45 0.39 0.44 0.38 0.44 0.35 0.44 0.01 
Dependents (indicator) 0.72 0.71 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.67 0.72 0.04 
Children (indicator) 0.50 0.44 0.46 0.41 0.45 0.48 0.43 0.49 0.02 
Median FPL 2.26 2.18 2.27 2.22 2.29 2.16 2.26 2.31 0.14 
Full Time 0.90 0.86 0.87 0.86 0.86 0.81 0.84 0.83 0.02 
Firm Size < 10 0.00 0.57 0.00 0.49 0.00 0.59 0.00 0.53 0.01 
Firm Size 10-24 0.00 0.43 0.00 0.51 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.47 -0.01 
Firm Size 25-99 0.25 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.01 
Firm Size 100-499 0.23 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.01 
Firm Size 500-999 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.11 0.00 -0.03 
Firm Size 1,000+ 0.43 0.00 0.49 0.00 0.46 0.00 0.51 0.00 0.01 
White 0.73 0.79 0.72 0.76 0.78 0.86 0.79 0.82 -0.03 
Black 0.22 0.13 0.22 0.14 0.15 0.08 0.15 0.10 0.02 
Native American 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 
 36 
Table 1.3 (Continued) 
Asian 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.01 
Hispanic 0.16 0.23 0.18 0.30 0.18 0.19 0.15 0.16 -0.06 
Less than High School 0.15 0.23 0.11 0.19 0.18 0.21 0.11 0.08 -0.07 
High School Diploma 0.44 0.43 0.41 0.42 0.37 0.45 0.35 0.47 0.02 
Some College 0.27 0.23 0.29 0.24 0.27 0.22 0.29 0.29 0.07 
College Graduate 0.11 0.09 0.14 0.11 0.14 0.10 0.20 0.13 -0.02 
Graduate School 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.03 -0.01 
At least High School 0.85 0.77 0.89 0.81 0.82 0.79 0.89 0.92 0.07 
At least College 0.14 0.12 0.18 0.15 0.19 0.12 0.25 0.15 -0.02 
Notes: CPS data. The pre-period is 2000-2006 and the post-period is 2008-2011. The sample is restricted to workers age 18 to 64 who are between 133 and 
300 percent FPL working in the private sector and not receiving any SSI or SSDI benefits. Small firms (SF) are defined as 1-24 employees and large firms 
(LF) as 25 or more employees. All data has been weighted by the March CPS Supplement weight. 
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To formalize the intuition from Figures 1.7, 1.8, and 1.9 and Table 1.3, I estimate the 
following equation (equation 1.3) for all three coverage outcomes (ESI, subsidized coverage, 
uninsurance) jointly using a seemingly unrelated regression estimation: 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽(𝑀𝐴 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚)𝑖 + 𝛾1(𝑀𝐴 ∗ 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗ 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚)𝑖
+ 𝛾2(𝑀𝐴 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡)𝑖 +  𝛾3(𝑀𝐴 ∗ 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔)𝑖
+ ∑ 𝜙𝑠(𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚)𝑖
𝑠
+ ∑ 𝜏𝑡(𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚)𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖
′𝛿 +  ∑ 𝜙𝑠 + ∑ 𝜏𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖
𝑡𝑠𝑡
 
Each observation corresponds to a person i in state s at time t. 𝛽 is the triple-difference 
coefficient of interest. The matrix 𝑋𝑖 includes individual and family characteristics
14, and 𝜙𝑠 
and 𝜏𝑡 are state- and year-fixed effects, respectively. Thus, the parameter of interest (𝛽) is 
identified from the variation between small firms and large firms in Massachusetts from the 
pre-period to the post-period. The standard errors from this regression are clustered at the state 
level. 
The identifying assumption for this triple-difference estimation strategy is that outside of the 
Massachusetts reform and the different application of the employer mandate by firm size, no 
other factors differentially impacted the coverage outcome variables between Massachusetts 
and the control states and small firms and large firms. Additionally, to explicitly state the 
trade-offs of applying a firm-size-dependent employer mandate in Massachusetts I must 
assume that the treatment effect of the MHCI would have been identical for both small and 
large firms had both firm sizes been subject to the same employer mandate. Specifically, 
                                                 
14 The characteristics used are the same as the difference-in-difference estimation (excluding firm size 
less than 25). 
 38 
outside of the different application of the employer mandate, no other factors differentially 
impacted the coverage outcome variables between small and large firms in Massachusetts. 
1.6 Robustness Checks 
1.6.1 Overview 
The first threat to my identification strategy is that the employer fine for non-compliance is 
relatively low: it is set at $295 per FTE per year. Thus, it may be reasonable to assume that 
both large and small firms would restructure their employment contracts to allow their 
income-eligible employees to choose between accessing subsidies and the firm’s ESI plan 
while paying a seemingly trivial fine. If this were true then the assumption that small-firm 
employees can overcome the categorical firewall to access subsidies more easily than large-
firm employees does not hold, and the differences in coverage distributions would be 
generated by some other factor outside of the different application of the employer mandate. 
Another issue that to address is whether or not small-firms have increased the ESI premium 
share that their employees must pay. If small firms have not allowed their income eligible 
employees to be categorically eligible for subsidies by increasing their premium contribution 
share then the mechanism through which differences in coverage distributions exist due to 
special treatment of small-firms under the employer mandate does not hold. 
Absent any spillover effects across state lines, the assumption that no other factors outside of 
the MHCI affected coverage distributions between Massachusetts and the control states should 
hold in general. The MHCI only affected the residents of Massachusetts and no other states. A 
spillover effect that would pose a threat to my identification is migration of lower-income 
small-firm workers from neighboring states into Massachusetts. I argue in more detail below 
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that lower-income small-firm worker migration would produce an overestimate of small-firm 
ESI to subsidized insurance coverage shifts. 
Another threat to my identification strategy would be the existence of an adjustment period in 
Massachusetts over which firms and employees had a slow reaction to the incentives 
embedded in the MHCI. This phenomena could dampen all estimated effects toward zero, but 
also might initially bias ESI estimates upwards. Suppose firms and workers responded to the 
MHCI by initially offering and taking up ESI respectively, then small firms learned that they 
could reduce labor costs by changing their ESI contracts to allow their income-eligible 
workers access to subsidies. This behavior would result in large initial increases in ESI rates 
for small firms that eventually decrease over the small-firm learning process. Additionally, 
there would be relatively low take-up of subsidized coverage throughout the learning process. 
This would initially result in increased ESI and overall insurance rates followed by decreased 
in ESI and increases in subsidized coverage rates. The learning process would result in 
different post-period trends that ultimately serve to bias estimates of small-firm ESI to 
subsidized insurance coverage shifts downward. 
The MHCI generates a larger incentive for lower-income workers to take up subsidized 
coverage due to the higher subsidies awarded to lower-income workers. This is not necessarily 
a threat to identification, but it is an issue worth investigating to verify that heterogeneity 
exists in the treatment effect by FPL. Additionally, the assumption that small and large firms 
in the control states can serve as counterfactuals for Massachusetts small and large firms 
requires small and large firms in Massachusetts to react to economic conditions with respect to 
ESI offerings similarly. States have different regulations with regard to insurance markets, 
thus ESI offerings may be differentially affected by the same economic conditions across 
states. For example, community rating and guaranteed issue in health insurance markets raises 
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the cost of insurance relative to states that have not imposed guaranteed issue and community 
rating. Massachusetts implemented community rating and guaranteed issue in 1996, therefore 
Massachusetts firms may respond differently to economic conditions when choosing ESI 
plans to offer their employees. 
Below in sections 1.6.2-1.6.10, I address each of the potential threats to my primary 
estimations. I then provide robustness checks in the results section that follows. 
1.6.2 Small Employer Fines 
The relative ease with which small-firm employees can overcome the categorical firewall to 
access subsidized coverage hinges upon the employer fine ($295 per FTE per year) being 
large enough to cause a differential response between small and large firms. The decision of a 
firm sized 11 to 50 FTE employees to allow their income eligible employees to have the 
option of choosing either subsidized coverage or the firm’s ESI plan imposes no additional 
fines on the employer since they are in compliance with the “fair and reasonable” contribution 
requirement. While a large firm must weigh the costs of a $295 per FTE per year fine against 
the potential savings from allowing their income eligible workers access to subsidized 
coverage. Therefore, the ultimate decision of a large firm to not be in compliance with the 
“fair and reasonable” contribution requirement to allow their income eligible employees 
access to subsidies depends entirely upon the distribution of incomes within the firm. 
Suppose a that a small firm with 40 FTEs and 30 full-time employees is deciding whether to 
allow their income-eligible employees the option to choose either subsidized coverage or the 
firm’s ESI plan. If 8 full-time employees are above 300 percent of the FPL and enrolled in ESI 
then the firm meets the “fair and reasonable contribution” requirement and can allow the other 
22 employees below 300 percent of the FPL to access subsidies without facing any employer 
 41 
fines if the employer pays less than 33 percent of the single premium. If the employer was 
contributing more than 33 percent of the annual premium prior to this decision, the employer 
would simply pass back the increased employee contribution in wages to make the employee 
no worse off economically, independent of the employee’s ultimate coverage choice. 
Now suppose that a large firm with 300 FTEs and 150 full-time employees is considering the 
same problem. If 125 full-time employees are above 300 percent of the FPL and the employer 
pays less than 33 percent of the single premium, then the 25 income-eligible full-time 
employees can access subsidies, but the firm is fined $88,500 (300295). This amounts to an 
average fine of $3, 540 per subsidized coverage enrollee. If the firm does not save at least 
$3,540 per subsidized coverage enrollee then it will not violate the “fair and reasonable 
contribution” requirement. This stylized calculation also assumes that all income-eligible 
employees would choose to enroll in subsidized coverage. If this is not the case then the per-
subsidized-coverage enrollee fine increases. 
Therefore there may be instances in which large firms find it beneficial to pay the $295 per 
FTE per year fine to allow their income-eligible employees to access subsidized coverage, but 
there are also instances in which it is not in the firm’s interest to engage in such behavior. My 
assumption that the employer fine generates asymmetric behavioral responses across small 
and large firms is appropriate if the fine is large enough such that some large firms choose not 
to allow their income-eligible employees to access subsidized coverage. I do not need to 
assume anything about the distribution of employees within a firm, only that there are 
instances in which large firms do not allow their income-eligible employees to access 
subsidized coverage in order to avoid the fine and be in compliance with the mandate. 
1.6.3 Premium Share 
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The mechanism through which small-firms can allow their income eligible employees to 
access subsidized coverage without creating any economic harm to all of their employees 
while avoiding the $295 per FTE fine relies on the assumption that employers have increased 
the share of the ESI premium that their employees must pay. I do not have micro-data that 
allows me to fully address whether or not employers have increased ESI employee 
contribution shares, but there is indirect evidence that this behavior is in fact occurring. 
The MEPS-IC summary tables and the Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts (2012) report 
present evidence that small firms are in fact requiring their employees to pay a higher fraction 
of their health insurance premiums post-MHCI reform. The Blue Cross Blue Shield of 
Massachusetts (2012) report claims that all employers have decreased their contributions 
toward ESI subsequent to the implementation of the MHCI. In addition, the MEPS-IC 
summary tables reveal that small firms (firms of fewer than 50 employees) have, on average, 
increased the premium share that employees must contribute to their single-coverage health 
plans by almost 6 percentage points more than large firms in Massachusetts subsequent to 
MHCI implementation (2000-2006 vs. 2008-2011).15  This 6 percent premium share increase 
in Massachusetts small firms corresponds to more than an 8000 percent increase in premium 
shares compared to national averages. Additionally, the Massachusetts Division of Health 
Care, Finance, and Policy (2013) report notes that in 2011 93.9 percent of all firms with more 
than 11 FTEs offered a section 125 plan while 93 percent of firms sized 11 to 25 FTEs and 96 
percent of firms sized 26 or more FTEs were in compliance with the “fair and reasonable” 
contribution requirement. Therefore, almost all non-exempt firms offered health insurance 
(93.9 percent) and almost 100 percent of offering firms were in compliance with the “fair and 
reasonable” contribution. Therefore any large differences in subsidized coverage take-up 
                                                 
15 This is a regression unadjusted triple-difference estimate comparing Massachusetts small- and large-
firms before and after the MHCI reform to the national average for small- and large-firms. 
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between small and large firms should be driven by mandate-compliant small-firms allowing 
their income-eligible employees to access subsidies by increasing the employee ESI premium 
share. 
1.6.4 Firm Size Definition 
I cannot capture firms sized 1 to 50; hence I used firms sized 1 to 24 compared to firms over 
25 for my main estimation. I check the robustness of my results by estimating equation 1.3 for 
varying definitions of small firms and large firms. Table 1.4 displays the alternative 
definitions of small and large firms. 
1.6.5 Implementation of Less Substantial Health Reforms 
Over the analysis period California, Maine, Vermont, and Oregon implemented less 
substantial health reforms, which may serve to bias all of my estimates toward zero. To 
address this issue I re-estimate equation 1.3 using my original Northeast control states, with 
Maine and Vermont excluded. Additionally, I estimate equation 1.3 for the contiguous 48 
states and the contiguous 48 states with California, Maine, Vermont, and Oregon removed as 
well. The additional control group of the 48 contiguous states serves as a robustness check to 
my Northeast control group specification. ESI has been the traditional source of health 
insurance for workers since World War II, thus firms in all states have adapted to this market 
feature over the past 70 years. Across-state trends in ESI for the 48 contiguous states should 
be relatively similar due to the tenure of ESI as a market institution. Estimates from the 
Northeast and the contiguous 48 states should be nearly identical. 
Additionally, the inclusion of the 48 contiguous states as a control group allows me to 
effectively use a non-parametric block bootstrap t technique to assess the significance of my 
estimates. Block bootstrapping a distribution of t-statistics that include the cluster robust 
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variance estimator as an asymptotic refinement has been shown to be successful in correcting 
for the underestimation of the standard deviation of the estimates in difference-in-difference 
estimation (Bertrand et al., 2004; Cameron et al., 2008). I include significance estimates from 
a block bootstrap t-statistic procedure for the baseline firm-size definition with a 48 
contiguous states control group using 10,000 sample draws. I use the block bootstrap 
procedure over other methods (e.g., wild bootstrap methods) due to a significant reduction in 
power of the bootstrap test when using alternative methods (Cameron et al., 2008). 
1.6.6 Heterogeneous Insurance Market Regulations 
To test whether heterogeneous insurance market regulations across Massachusetts and the 
control states bias my estimates, I re-estimate equation 1.3 including only New Jersey, New 
York, and Washington as control states. These three states and Massachusetts all implemented 
guaranteed issue and community rating prior to 1997 and still have these policies in place as 
of 2013.16 
1.6.7 Migration Spillovers  
Migration of the uninsured small-firm population from other New England states into 
Massachusetts would increase the percentage of small-firm workers in Massachusetts on the 
subsidized health coverage rolls, have no effect on neighboring states small-firm employee 
subsidized coverage take-up (subsidized coverage is not an option for workers living outside 
Massachusetts), decrease the percent of small-firm workers with ESI in Massachusetts (adding 
more subsidized coverage enrollees to Massachusetts decreases the percent with ESI), increase 
the percentage of ESI coverage in neighboring states (removal of uninsured persons from the 
                                                 
16 Massachusetts implemented these policies in 1996, New Jersey in 1992, New York in 1993, and 
Washington in 1993. 
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population increases the percent already in the state with ESI), and decrease the overall 
percentage of uninsured workers in both Massachusetts and its neighboring states. The 
combined effect of small-firm worker migration would bias the ESI triple-difference estimate 
downward due to biasing the treatment effect of the MHCI on small firms toward zero, bias 
the subsidized coverage triple-difference estimate upward, and have an ambiguous effect on 
the uninsurance triple-difference estimate. It is more likely that the negative bias on the ESI 
triple-difference estimate will outweigh the positive bias on the subsidized coverage estimate 
due to the bias on the MHCI small-firm treatment effect toward zero while maintaining a large 
and positive treatment effect for ESI coverage rates in large firms. Therefore, these biases 
would combine to produce an overestimate of small-firm ESI to subsidized insurance 
coverage shifts. 
To address the potential occurrence of migration spillovers, I re-estimate equation 1.3 using 
the surrounding New England states of Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, Connecticut, and 
Rhode Island, as well as the surrounding New England states with Maine and Vermont 
removed due to their implementation of less substantial health reforms during the analysis 
period. If spillovers exist, I would expect a negative bias on the triple-difference estimate for 
ESI and a positive bias on the triple-difference estimate for subsidized coverage. These biases, 
arguably, would result in an overestimate of small-firm ESI to subsidized insurance coverage 
shifts. Subsequent to this test, I also re-estimate equation 1.3 using my original Northeast 
control group with the above listed New England states removed. I additionally estimate 
equation 1.3 for the contiguous 48 states with the New England states removed, and again 
with the New England states along with California and Oregon removed. 
1.6.8 Heterogeneity in the Treatment Effect by FPL 
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I check for heterogeneity in the treatment effect by FPL by estimating equation 1.3 for FPL 
brackets 133 to 200 percent and 200 to 300 percent of the FPL. Due to the availability of 
higher subsidies for lower-income workers, I expect the treatment effect to be greater for 
workers in the 133 to 200 percent of the FPL bracket compared to workers in the 200 to 300 
percent of the FPL bracket. Additionally I conduct a falsification test by estimating equation 
1.3 for workers above 300 percent of the FPL. Employees who are not income eligible for 
subsidies (FPL greater than 300 percent) should not demonstrate any substantial increase in 
subsidized coverage. Almost all large forms offer ESI (99 percent), and just over half of small 
firms offer ESI (54 percent). Thus, uninsured large-firm workers have chosen to remain 
without coverage due to some other factor than access to ESI, while small-firm workers may 
be uninsured because they do not have access to insurance through their employer. The 
distribution of firms offering coverage by firm size indicates that increases in ESI rates due to 
the MHCI for large-firm workers will mostly come from uninsured employees taking up ESI 
that had already been offered as a result of the individual mandate, while increases in ESI rates 
for small-firm workers will come from increased offer rates due to the employer mandate and 
the individual mandate incentive to obtain health insurance as well. Therefore, small-firm 
workers above 300 percent of the FPL should exhibit a much larger positive increase in ESI 
rates due to the MHCI relative to large-firm employees. 
1.6.9 Adjustment Period 
To test for an adjustment period, I examine differences in pre-treatment trends and post-
treatment effects by further refining my definition of pre-periods and post-periods into “early 
pre-period” (2000-2003), “late pre-period” (2004-2006), “during” (2007), “early post-period” 
(2008- 2009), and “late post-period” (2010-2011) and estimating the following equation 
(equation 1.4): 
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𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼 +  𝛽1(𝑀𝐴 ∗ 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝑃𝑟𝑒 ∗ 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚)𝑖 +  𝛽2(𝑀𝐴 ∗ 𝐷𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗ 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚)𝑖
+  𝛽3(𝑀𝐴 ∗ 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚)𝑖
+  𝛽4(𝑀𝐴 ∗ 𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚)𝑖 +  𝛾1(𝑀𝐴 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡)𝑖
+ 𝛾2(𝑀𝐴 ∗ 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔)𝑖
+  ∑ 𝜙𝑠(𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚)𝑖
𝑠
+  ∑ 𝜏𝑡(𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚)𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖
′𝛿 + ∑ 𝜙𝑠 +  ∑ 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖
𝑡𝑠
 
𝑡
 
Larger (in absolute value) significant subsidized insurance and ESI estimates of the triple-
difference parameter for the “late post-period” relative to the “early post-period” would be 
indicative of an adjustment period immediately following MHCI implementation. 
1.6.10 Synthetic Control Group 
I constructed a synthetic control group for Massachusetts small firms and large firms from 
aggregate data using the method outlined in Abadie et al. (2010). This method provides a 
robustness check to my triple-difference specification by using aggregate data and a data-
driven method to develop estimates of the MHCI’s dissimilar impact on coverage distributions 
by firm size. 
To estimate the impact on coverage distributions from the MHCI’s firm-size-dependent 
employer mandate using the synthetic control approach, I allow for 48 donor states: all states 
in the contiguous Unites States, including Washington, DC. The CPS data is aggregated up to 
the state-year level, and statistics from the MEPS-IC are reported in this format as well. The 
goal of this exercise is to generate a linear combination of donor-state insurance outcomes and 
insurance predictors that best match Massachusetts. To do this I solve for both W and V in the 
following equation (equation 1.5) for each insurance outcome by firm size: 
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min
𝑊
(𝑌𝑀𝐴 − 𝒀𝑊)𝑽(𝑌𝑀𝐴 − 𝒀𝑊) 𝑠. 𝑡. 𝑊 = [𝑤1 𝑤2 … 𝑤48]
′, ∑𝑤𝑖 = 1 , 𝑤𝑖 ≥ 0 ∀ 𝑖 = 1, … ,48 
𝑌𝑀𝐴 is a column vector containing the relevant outcome variable for 2003 to 2006 (ESI, 
subsidized coverage, and uninsurance) and the following predictors of aggregate insurance 
status: average of the median FPL for workers in the 133-300 percent of the FPL range by 
firm size over 2003-2006, average of the fraction of college-educated workers in the 133-300 
percent of the FPL range by firm size from 2003-2006, average of the fraction of firms that 
offered health insurance by firm size from 2003-2006, average of the fraction of employees in 
firms that offered health insurance by firm size from 2003-2006, and average of the fraction of 
employees eligible for employer-sponsored health insurance in firms that offer health 
insurance by firm size from 2003-2006. The aggregate coverage outcomes, median FPL, and 
fraction of workers who were college educated were calculated using the CPS sample 
previously described. The MEPS-IC tables by state and firm size were used to obtain the 
fraction of employers offering coverage, fraction of employees in firms that offer coverage, 
and fraction of employees in firms that offer coverage who are eligible to enroll in coverage.17 
𝒀 is a matrix that has columns for each donor state corresponding to the row entries in 𝑌𝑀𝐴. 𝑊 
is a set of weights to be estimated that minimizes the distance defined in equation 1.5. 𝑽 is a 
weighting matrix that is calculated to minimize the difference between the trajectories of the 
outcome variable over the 2003 to 2006 period.18 
After estimating 𝑊 I construct the synthetic control groups for Massachusetts by firm size and 
calculate the triple-difference average treatment effect from 2008-2011. I then estimate 
placebo treatment effects for each of the 48 states in the donor pool and estimate an empirical 
                                                 
17 The MEPS-IC tables divided firm size by 1-50 employees and 51 or more employees. 
18 The results presented from this method are robust to using a weighting matrix that minimizes the 
mean squared error. 
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and kernel-smoothed distribution of outcomes, both which can be used to generate a measure 
of significance by comparing the treatment effect in MA to the placebo donor states. I then 
estimate the small-firm ESI to subsidized insurance coverage shifts using the calculated 
average treatment effects and equation 1.2. 
One of the main concerns regarding the synthetic control group approach is that the researcher 
has a large degree of latitude in choosing the predictor variables that enter into the objective 
function in equation 1.5. I address this issue by re-estimating the weights from equation 1.5, 
including a variable containing the number of letters in the state’s name (e.g., Massachusetts 
has 13 letters). The inclusion of this variable should not be related to coverage outcomes, thus 
its presence should not significantly alter the original estimation results. 
1.7 Results 
I summarize alternative firm-size definitions and control groups in Tables 1.4 and 1.5, 
respectively. Table 1.6 displays regression coefficients for the parameter of interest 𝛽 on 
(𝑀𝐴 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚)𝑖 derived from the estimation of equation 1.3 for the baseline 
control group (the Northeast states) and for the baseline definition of firm size, as well as for 
the six other firm-size definitions listed in Table 1.4. 
Table 1.4: Alternative Firm Size Definitions 
        
Label 
Firm 
Size Label Firm Size 
SF Baseline 1-24 LF Baseline 25+ 
SF-1 1-24 LF-1 100+ 
SF-2 11-24 LF-2 100+ 
SF-3 11-24 LF31 25+ 
SF-4 1-10 LF-4 11-24 
SF-5 1-10 LF-5 25+ 
SF-6 1-10 LF-6 100+ 
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Table 1.5: Alternative Control Groups 
   
Label States 
North East and Contiguous 48  
North East (Baseline) CT, DC, DE, MD, ME, NH, NJ, NY, PA, 
RI, VT 
Contiguous 48 The contiguous 48 state of the U.S. 
Less Substantial Health Reforms  
North East Limited CT, DC, DE, MD, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI 
Contiguous 48 Limited The contiguous 48 state of the U.S. with 
CA, ME, VT, and OR removed 
Community Rating and Guaranteed Issue  
Community Rating/Guaranteed Issue NY, NJ and WA 
Migration Spillovers  
New England CT, ME, NH, RI, VT 
New England Limited CT, NH, RI 
North East with New England Removed DC, DE, MD, NJ, NY, PA 
Contiguous 48 with New England 
Removed 
The contiguous 48 state of the U.S. with 
CT, ME, NH, RI, and VT removed 
Contiguous 48 with New England 
Removed Limited 
The contiguous 48 state of the U.S. with 
CT, ME, NH, RI, VT, CA and OR 
removed 
The first three alternative firm-size definitions (SF-1, SF-2, and SF-3) check the robustness of 
my baseline result to varying definitions of firm size. The small firm ESI to subsidized 
insurance coverage shift estimates remain highly significant and large for the baseline firm-
size definition as well as for the first three alternative definitions. The last three alternative 
definitions test the existence of coverage shifts between mandate exempt firms (size 1-10) and 
other sized firms. SF-4 tests whether there are significant small-firm ESI to subsidized 
insurance coverage shifts between exempt firms and small firms subject to the mandate (size 
11-24). This test results in a positive but not significant coverage shift estimate, indicating that 
there is no significant difference in the treatment effect between these two firm sizes. This 
result is due to an imprecise measure of the ESI triple-difference parameter. The sign of the 
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estimate is in line with the intuition that exempt firms would rely more heavily on the 
Connector to provide insurance to their employees than non- exempt firms would, but the 
small sample sizes of these two firm-size groups and the relatively small coefficient estimate 
of the triple-difference parameter resulted in an imprecise estimate. A comparison of the 
estimates from the SF-3 and SF-5 rows provides additional evidence that exempt firms display 
more ESI to subsidized coverage shift than small non-exempt firms. SF-5 and SF-6 tested 
exempt firms against firms sized 25 and over and firms sized 100 and over respectively. Both 
tests resulted in positive and significant small firm ESI to subsidized insurance coverage shift 
estimates. 
Table 1.6: Triple-Difference Estimation – Firm Size Robust 
            
Firm Size N ESI 
Subsidized 
Coverage Uninsured 
Coverage 
Shift 
Baseline 40,696 -0.059 0.116 -0.057 0.507 
(1-24 vs. 25+)  (0.021)** (0.010)*** (0.016)*** (0.154)*** 
SF-1 34,271 -0.051 0.110 -0.059 0.465 
(1-24 vs. 
100+)  (0.021)* (0.012)*** (0.015)*** (0.157)*** 
SF-2 27,048 -0.040 0.072 -0.032 0.554 
(11-24 vs. 
100+)  (0.020) (0.012)*** (0.013)* (0.219)** 
SF-3 33,473 -0.049 0.078 -0.029 0.625 
(11-24 vs. 
25+)  (0.021)* (0.010)*** (0.015)* (0.212)*** 
SF-4 13,266 -0.025 0.079 -0.055 0.314 
(1-10 vs. 11-
24)  (0.018) (0.007)*** (0.013)*** (0.209) 
SF-5 34,653 -0.067 0.154 -0.088 0.432 
(1-10 vs. 25+)  (0.022)** (0.012)*** (0.018)*** (0.128)*** 
SF-6 28,228 -0.059 0.148 -0.089 0.398 
(1-10 vs. 
100+)   (0.023)** (0.014)*** (0.017)*** (0.132)*** 
Notes: The pre-period is 2000-2006 and the post-period is 2008-2011. The sample is restricted to 
workers age 18 to 64 who are between 133 and 300 percent FPL working in the private sector and not 
receiving any SSI or SSDI benefits. The control group used here is the North East. Standard errors for 
coefficients are clustered at the state level. Standard errors for the coverage shift estimates were 
calculated using the delta method. *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level, ** indicates 
significance at the 5 percent level, and * indicates significance at the 10 percent level. 
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The first three estimates (baseline, SF-1, and SF-2) demonstrate very similar effects of the 
MHCI on ESI, subsidized coverage and overall insurance rates. In all instances small firms 
responded with a lower increase in ESI rates, and with higher increases in both subsidized 
coverage and overall insurance rates. These responses resulted in coverage shift estimates 
between 46 and 55 percent. The estimates indicate that about half of newly covered small firm 
employees with subsidies would have chosen ESI had they been subject to the more stringent 
large firm employer mandate. The coverage shift estimate for SF-3 is noticeably higher, but is 
also less precise than the first three, resulting in a one standard deviation range of 42 to 82 
percent. The first three estimates fall within this range, and are far more precise. The last three 
estimates in Table 1.4 (SF-4, SF-5, and SF-6) indicate smaller estimates of small firm ESI to 
subsidized insurance coverage shifts. The treatment effect on ESI was relatively similar to the 
baseline and to the first three alternative firm sizes, but the take up of subsidized coverage was 
much higher, resulting in a lower coverage shift estimate. This result is congruent with a larger 
pool of uninsured workers in small firms relative to large firms and with the incentive for 
exempt firms to rely more heavily on the Connector to subsidize their employees’ health 
insurance. 
Table 1.7 displays regression coefficients for the parameter of interest 𝛽 on (𝑀𝐴 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗
𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚) derived from the estimation of equation 1.3 for the baseline definition of firm 
size and baseline Northeast control group as well as for the nine other control groups listed in 
Table 1.5. The estimates from the baseline specification, and the alternative control group of 
the 48 contiguous states are very similar for all coverage outcomes, indicating that small-firm 
employees had a smaller ESI treatment effect as well as larger subsidized coverage and overall 
insurance rate effects. Both estimations yielded coverage shift estimates of approximately 50 
percent. Additionally, the block bootstrap-t procedure produced results indicating significance 
of all estimates at the 5-percent level for the 48 contiguous states control group. Removing 
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from the control group states that implemented less substantial health reforms over the 
analysis period did not substantially change the 50-percent coverage shift estimate either, 
indicating that these health reforms did not have a substantial impact on coverage distributions 
for lower-income workers. Testing for heterogeneity in firm response to different insurance 
market regulations by only analyzing states with both guaranteed issue and community rating 
resulted in similar results to the baseline model and a coverage shift estimate of 42 percent. 
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Table 1.7: Triple-Difference Estimation – Control Group Robust 
            
  N ESI Subsidized Coverage Uninsured Coverage Shift 
North East and Contiguous 48      
North East (Baseline) 40,696 -0.059 0.116 -0.057 0.507 
  (0.021)** (0.010)*** (0.016)*** (0.154)*** 
Contiguous 48 185,112 -0.065 0.126 -0.061 0.515 
    (0.006)++
∗∗∗ (0.004)+++
∗∗∗  (0.005)++
∗∗∗ (0.041)++
∗∗∗ 
Less Substantial Health Reforms      
North East Limited 35,393 -0.056 0.117 -0.061 0.479 
  (0.021)** (0.011)*** (0.016)*** (0.157)*** 
Contiguous 48 Limited 159,401 -0.064 0.126 -0.062 0.509 
    (0.007)*** (0.005)*** (0.006)*** (0.048)*** 
Community Rating and Guaranteed Issue      
Community Rating/Guaranteed Issue 17,036 -0.049 0.116 -0.068 0.419 
    (0.025)* (0.015)*** (0.021)** (0.190)** 
Migration Spillovers      
New England 15,987 -0.124 0.136 -0.011 0.916 
  (0.018)*** (0.011)*** (0.018) (0.129)*** 
New England Limited 10,684 -0.119 0.149 -0.030 0.797 
  (0.029)*** (0.007)*** (0.026) (0.177)*** 
North East with New England Removed 27,134 -0.051 0.115 -0.064 0.44 
  (0.022)* (0.011)*** (0.018)*** (0.170)*** 
Contiguous 48 with New England Removed 171,550 -0.063 0.126 -0.062 0.505 
  (0.006)*** (0.004)*** (0.005)*** (0.042)*** 
Contiguous 48 with New England Removed Limited 151,142 -0.063 0.126 -0.063 0.503 
    (0.007)*** (0.005)*** (0.006)*** (0.048)*** 
Notes: The pre-period is 2000-2006 and the post-period is 2008-2011. The sample is restricted to workers age 18 to 64 who are between 133 and 300 percent 
FPL working in the private sector and not receiving any SSI or SSDI benefits. Standard errors for coefficients are clustered at the state level. Standard errors 
for the coverage shift estimates were calculated using the delta method. Significance based on asymptotic standard error estimation is indicated by *’s, *** 
indicates significance at the 1 percent level, ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level, and * indicates significance at the 10 percent level. Significance 
based on 10,000 sample draws for a block bootstrap-t with asymptotic cluster robust variance estimator refinement indicated by +’s, +++ indicates 
significance at the 1 percent level, ++ indicates significance at the 5 percent level, and + indicates significance at the 10 percent level. 
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The robustness test for the occurrence of migration spillovers generated estimates in line with 
the migration theory. The estimated ESI treatment effect is much more negative compared to 
the baseline, potentially due to small-firm workers migrating into Massachusetts to access 
subsidies, which closes the post-period treatment effect gap between small firms in 
Massachusetts and in the neighboring control states, while leaving the difference between 
large firms in Massachusetts and the control states unaffected. The estimated subsidized 
coverage treatment effect is slightly more positive than the baseline, potentially due to an 
increase in the take up of subsidized coverage among migrating small-firm workers and a 
decrease in lower-income workers who may have been on the Medicaid rolls in neighboring 
states. The overall insurance rate estimate is more positive and closer to zero than the baseline 
estimate, possibly due to the reduction of uninsurance rates in neighboring states due to 
migration. All of these estimates are congruent with a theory of migration, yielding an 
overestimate of coverage shifts. Removing New England from the Northeast and contiguous 
48 states control groups yielded treatment effect estimates similar to the baseline model, 
resulting in a significant coverage shift estimate of 50 percent. 
Table 1.8 displays regression coefficients for the parameter of interest 𝛽 on (𝑀𝐴 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗
𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚)𝑖 derived from the estimation of equation 1.3 for the baseline definition of firm 
size (1-24 vs. 25+) and the baseline Northeast control group by FPL. The estimated small firm 
ESI to subsidized insurance coverage shift is much higher and more significant for lower-
income workers. Lower-income workers have access to higher subsidies, so they have a 
greater incentive to switch from ESI to subsidized health insurance. The results for individuals 
above 300 percent FPL, and thus not eligible for subsidies, reveal that higher-income small-
firm workers are more likely than large-firm workers to newly take up ESI coverage after the 
MHCI reform. These results are congruent with the heterogeneous distribution of ESI offer 
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rates between small and large firms (99 percent of large firms and 54 percent of small firms 
offer ESI), as discussed in Section 1.6. 
Table 1.8: Triple-Difference Estimation – FPL Heterogeneity 
            
  N ESI 
Subsidized 
Coverage Uninsured 
Coverage 
Shift 
Baseline 40,696 -0.059 0.116 -0.057 0.507 
    (0.021)** (0.010)*** (0.016)*** (0.154)*** 
FPL Heterogeneity      
133 ≤ 𝐹𝑃𝐿 ≤ 200 14,220 -0.134 0.195 -0.061 0.688 
  (0.023)*** (0.022)*** (0.028)* (0.125)*** 
200 < 𝐹𝑃𝐿 ≤ 300 26,476 -0.023 0.072 -0.050 0.312 
  (0.019) (0.007)*** (0.013)*** (0.234) 
𝐹𝑃𝐿 > 300 125,267 0.045 0.013 -0.058 N/A 
    (0.006)*** (0.003)*** (0.009)***   
Notes: The pre-period is 2000-2006 and the post-period is 2008-2011. The sample is restricted to 
workers age 18 to 64 working in the private sector and not receiving any SSI or SSDI benefits. The 
control group used here is the North East. Standard errors for coefficients are clustered at the state level. 
Standard errors for the coverage shift estimates were calculated using the delta method. *** indicates 
significance at the 1 percent level, ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level, and * indicates 
significance at the 10 percent level. 
Table 1.9 displays regression coefficients for the parameters of interest derived from the 
estimation of equation 1.4 for the baseline definition of firm size (1-24 vs. 25+) and the 
baseline Northeast control group separated into finer pre- and post-periods. The “early pre-
period” is 2000-2003, the “late pre-period” is 2004-2006, the “during period” is 2007, the 
“early post-period” is 2008-2009, and the “late post-period” is 2010-2011. The omitted period 
is the “late pre-period”; thus all estimates are relative to this pre-period. There is no 
statistically significant difference between the “early pre-period” and the “late pre-period.” 
There were positive and significant increases in both ESI for small firms in the “during 
period” relative to large firms, followed by no difference in the treatment effect between small 
and large firms in the “early post-period”; after this period there were large and significant 
reductions in ESI for small-firm workers in the “late post-period” relative to large firms. Take 
up of subsidized coverage throughout the during and post-periods was differentially higher for 
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small-firm workers, and overall insurance rates increased for small-firm workers relative to 
large firm workers in all post-periods. These results are congruent with an adjustment period 
in which small-firm employers and employees adjust to the incentives to reduce labor costs 
and increase earnings, respectively. 
Table 1.9: Triple-Difference Estimation - Heterogeneity in pre-period and post-period Trends 
          
  ESI 
Subsidized 
Coverage Uninsured 
Coverage 
Shift 
MA*Early Pre*Small 
Firm 0.019 -0.011 -0.008  
 (0.033) (0.009) (0.033)  
MA*During*Small Firm 0.048 0.07 -0.118  
 (0.021)* (0.010)*** (0.024)***  
MA*Early Post*Small 
Firm -0.000 0.064 -0.064 0.006 
 (0.024) (0.006)*** (0.022)** (0.378) 
MA*Late Post*Small Firm -0.092 0.154 -0.062 0.595 
  (0.016)*** (0.007)*** (0.013)*** (0.091)*** 
Notes: The early pre-period is 2000-2003, the late pre-period is 2004-2006, the during period is 2007, 
the early post-period is 2008-2009, and the late post-period is 2010-2011. The sample is restricted to 
workers age 18 to 64 working in the private sector and not receiving any SSI or SSDI benefits. The 
control group used here is the North East. Standard errors for coefficients are clustered at the state level. 
Standard errors for the coverage shift estimates were calculated using the delta method. *** indicates 
significance at the 1 percent level, ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level, and * indicates 
significance at the 10 percent level. 
To further check the robustness of these results, I used a synthetic control group approach. I 
solved equation 1.5 and assigned weights to each state. I assigned most states a weight of zero; 
I report the weights for each synthetic control group in Table 1.10. It is important to note here 
that of the 11 control states used in the triple-difference analysis, 10 show up with positive 
weights for at least one synthetic control group (New Jersey was not assigned a positive 
weight for any control group). These weights were applied to each state to construct synthetic 
control groups for each outcome in Massachusetts by firm size. Figures 1.10, 1.11, and 1.12 
display the resulting synthetic control groups compared to Massachusetts. For each of the 
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outcomes, the pre-trends for the synthetic control group match well to the pre-trends for 
Massachusetts. 
Table 1.10: State Weights for Synthetic Control Groups 
              
State ESI-SF ESI-LF Subsidy-SF Subsidy-LF Uninsured-SF Uninsured-LF 
AZ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.177 0.000 0.000 
CA 0.000 0.261 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CT 0.407 0.000 0.508 0.000 0.000 0.000 
DC 0.193 0.138 0.000 0.347 0.300 0.000 
DE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.206 0.000 
IA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.050 0.000 
MD 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.502 
ME 0.000 0.000 0.058 0.137 0.000 0.000 
MI 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.052 0.000 
MT 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.137 
NH 0.074 0.000 0.000 0.178 0.000 0.000 
NY 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.029 0.000 0.000 
OH 0.259 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.231 0.000 
OR 0.067 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PA 0.000 0.000 0.169 0.000 0.000 0.000 
RI 0.000 0.334 0.132 0.131 0.160 0.000 
TN 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 
VA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.295 
VT 0.000 0.267 0.133 0.000 0.001 0.064 
Notes: States which contributed zero weight for all synthetic control groups have been omitted from this 
table. 
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Figure 1.10: ESI: Massachusetts vs. Synthetic Massachusetts 
 
Figure 1.11: Subsidized Coverage: Massachusetts vs. Synthetic Massachusetts 
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Figure 1.12: Uninsured: Massachusetts vs. Synthetic Massachusetts 
To assess the significance of the treatment effect in Massachusetts for each of the insurance 
coverage outcomes (ESI, subsidized coverage, and uninsurance), I used the placebo method 
outlined in Abadie et al. (2010). Subsequently, I calculated the average treatment effect using 
years 2008-2011 for Massachusetts and all 48 placebo states and constructed an empirical and 
smoothed cumulative density function to see where Massachusetts’ treatment effects fell 
relative to the placebo study. These results are presented in Figures 1.13, 1.14, and 1.15. The 
estimated average treatment effects in Massachusetts were all significant; the ESI treatment 
effect is significant at 10-percent level, the subsidized coverage treatment effect is significant 
at the 1-percent level, and the overall insurance rate treatment effect is significant at the 10-
percent level. The treatment effects taken jointly are significant at the 1-percent level. The 
estimated average treatment effects on ESI, subsidized coverage, and uninsurance, 
respectively, are -9.42 percent, 15.11 percent, and -7.19 percent. Next, using equation 1.2 and 
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the synthetic control group approach, I estimated small firm ESI to subsidized insurance 
coverage shifts to be 62.33. This estimate of the coverage shift parameter is higher than the 
estimate stemming from the triple-difference identification strategy. This is most likely due 
New England comprising most of the donor states. These states display evidence in line with a 
theory of migration spillovers which biases the coverage shift estimate upwards. 
 
Figure 1.13: Significance of the Average Treatment Effect for ESI in Massachusetts 
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Figure 1.14: Significance of the Average Treatment Effect for Subsidized Coverage in 
Massachusetts 
 
Figure 1.15: Significance of the Average Treatment Effect on the Uninsured in Massachusetts 
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Including the number of letters in a state’s name as a variable in the estimation of equation 1.5 
resulted in similar estimates of average treatment effects on ESI, subsidized coverage, and 
uninsurance. The specific estimates respectively are -10.46 percent, 15.13 percent, and -8.12 
percent (Coverage Shift = 69.11 percent). It is important to note here that the inclusion of this 
variable did change the estimated weights for each insurance outcome and leaned heavily 
toward states with longer names. This occurred because Massachusetts has a relatively long 
name compared to other states. In fact, Washington DC and New Hampshire (which both have 
as many letters in their state names as Massachusetts) had positive estimated weights in more 
outcomes than in the original estimation. Table 1.11 displays the weights from this exercise. 
Despite obtaining similar results when including this variable, the dramatic change in the 
estimated weights should not be ignored, and it is noted that results from this method should 
be scrutinized heavily with respect to the variables chosen to be included in the estimation. 
This method still retains some merit as a data-driven robustness check that is congruent with 
my triple-difference estimates. 
Table 1.11: State Weights for Synthetic Control Groups (Adding Number of Letters in State’s 
Name) 
              
State ESI-SF ESI-LF Subsidy-SF Subsidy-LF Uninsured-SF Uninsured-LF 
AZ 0.000 0.070 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CA 0.000 0.141 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CT 0.505 0.000 0.277 0.000 0.020 0.000 
DC 0.000 0.000 0.033 0.390 0.131 0.150 
MI 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.597 0.000 
NC 0.000 0.587 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.337 
NH 0.422 0.185 0.000 0.083 0.253 0.512 
NM 0.073 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
RI 0.000 0.000 0.629 0.322 0.000 0.000 
VT 0.000 0.000 0.060 0.000 0.000 0.000 
WV 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.206 0.000 0.000 
WY 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: States which contributed zero weight for all synthetic control groups have been omitted from this 
table. 
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 1.8 Conclusion 
In this paper I investigate the extent to which more lenient mandates on small firms have 
differently impacted the movement of their workers onto government subsidized insurance 
rolls. I find that the relatively lenient treatment of small firms has generated enough incentives 
to noticeably change the pathways to health insurance coverage for small-firm workers. 
Evidence presented in this paper demonstrates a substantial and significant response on the 
part of small firms to the incentive to shift the burden of health insurance costs from the firm 
and the worker to taxpayers by sending their income-eligible employees to the Connector for 
subsidized coverage. Specifically, I find that almost all of newly subsidized coverage take-up 
is generated by small-firm employees and that one out of every two newly covered small-firm 
employees receiving subsidies would have obtained or maintained ESI had they been subject 
to the more stringent large-firm employer mandate. Additionally, the trade-off of not allowing 
these coverage shifts to occur by applying the large-firm mandate to all firms is estimated to 
be a 6 percent reduction in overall insurance rates for small-firm employees. 
The results presented in this paper are robust to firm size definition, the elimination of states 
that implemented less substantial health reforms over the analysis period, limiting the control 
group to only states with guaranteed issue and community rating, migration spillover effects, 
and the creation of a synthetic Massachusetts. Additionally, when bootstrapping methods were 
appropriate, significance of the results was maintained. Testing for heterogeneity in the 
treatment effect of the MHCI by FPL, I find that lower-income working individuals are more 
likely to enroll in subsidized coverage. I also find no evidence of dissimilar impacts on 
coverage distributions between small- and large-firm employees immediately following MHCI 
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implementation (2008-2009); I do find substantial differences since 2010, however, which 
indicate an adjustment period immediately following implementation. 
These findings are congruent with an interpretation that small firms respond to the incentives 
embedded in the MHCI by sending relatively more of their income-eligible employees to the 
Connector for subsidized health insurance coverage compared to large firms. This effect is 
strongest among lower-income groups who have access to higher subsidies, and it is non-
existent for workers not eligible for subsidized coverage (workers above 300 percent of the 
FPL). There appears to be an adjustment period immediately following MHCI implementation 
in which there is no evidence that small firms were responding to a relatively more lenient 
application of the employer mandate, but since 2010 small-firm employees have been taking 
up subsidized coverage at much higher rates than demographically similar large-firm workers. 
In fact, current ESI levels for income-eligible small-firm workers has fallen to pre-MHCI 
levels after an initial increase in the take-up of ESI. 
The question of whether firms and employees respond differently to the MHCI employer 
mandate has both economic and policy relevant implications. Economically, one would expect 
small firms to respond to their more lenient employer mandate by sending more income-
eligible employees to the Connector for subsidized coverage, resulting in fewer small-firm 
employees taking up ESI as compared to large-firm employees. This behavioral response on 
the part of small firms is due to the ease with which small firms can reduce the costs of hiring 
income-eligible workers by transferring health insurance costs to taxpayers. This paper 
provides evidence that small firms have in fact responded to the differential incentives 
embedded in the MHCI. The main policy conclusion that can be drawn from this paper is that 
in applying more lenient employer mandates to small firms, the MHCI increased overall 
health insurance coverage rates for small-firm employees by six percent. However, this 
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increase in coverage rates comes at a cost. Specifically, the cost of increased health insurance 
coverage rates for small-firm employees is that half of the subsidized coverage pool would 
have otherwise obtained or maintained employer plans had small firms been subject to the 
more stringent large-firm employer mandate. More broadly, these results provide evidence 
that not only are employer mandates effective at maintaining ESI distributions, but also that 
the stringency of employer mandates has an impact on pathways to coverage for lower-income 
workers as well. 
The ACA has a much more lenient definition of exempt small-firms19, a much more stringent 
employer mandate on large firms20, and much more generous income eligibility guidelines 
than the Massachusetts reform.21 Thus, there exists a larger exempt population of small-firms 
and employees under the ACA due to both more generous income eligibility guidelines and a 
more lenient definition of exempt small-firms. Therefore, to the extent that firms and 
employees respond to the ACA’s employer mandate similarly to firms and employees under 
the MHCI employer mandate, I would expect the more stringent requirements on large firms 
under the ACA to increase ESI offer and take up rates relative to the increases observed in 
Massachusetts. I would also expect a much larger share of the overall population in small 
firms to rely on subsidized exchange coverage due to the more lenient exemption criteria for 
small firms and more generous subsidy eligibility criteria under the ACA. Additionally, the 
federal government has postponed the employer mandate until 2015 which may have an 
impact on whether large firms decide to offer acceptable ESI or postpone offering until 2015. 
                                                 
19 A small exempt firm under the ACA is one with less than 50 FTEs, while in Massachusetts and 
exempt small firm is one with less than 11 FTEs. 
20 Under the ACA a $2,000 per FTE fine is imposed if the employer does not offer acceptable coverage, 
while a $3,000 fine per employee is imposed if the employer offers coverage but employees are still 
able to access subsidies in the exchange. Massachusetts fines employers $295 per FTE for failing to 
comply with the “fair and reasonable” contribution mandate. 
21 Under the ACA individuals below 400 percent of the FPL are eligible for subsidies, while 
Massachusetts limits eligibility to those below 300 percent of the FPL. 
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As the ACA continues to roll-out and complete the implementation process in 2015, it will be 
crucial to track how employers and employees are responding to the incentives to offer and 
take up ESI relative to accessing subsidized coverage through the state run health insurance 
exchanges.  
 68 
REFERENCES 
Abadie, A., A. Diamond, and J. Hainmueller (2010). Synthetic Control Methods for 
Comparative Case Studies: Estimating the Effect of California’s Tobacco Control 
Program. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 105(490):493-505. 
Bertrand, M., E. Duflo, and S. Mullainathan (2004). How Much Should We Trust 
Differences-In-Differences Estimates? The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
119(1):249-275. 
Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts, (2012). Health Reform in Massachusetts: 
Expanding Access to Health Insurance Coverage. Accessed at: 
https://www.mahealthconnector.org/portal/binary/com.epicentric.contentmanagement.
servlet.ContentDeliveryServlet/Health%2520Care%2520Reform/Overview/HealthRef
ormAssessingtheResults.pdf 
Brown, C. (1980). Equalizing Differences in the Labor Market. The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 94(1):113-134. 
Cameron, A., J. Gelbach, and D. Miller (2008). Bootstrap-Based Improvements for 
Inference with Clustered Errors. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 90(3):414-
427. 
Commonwealth Health Insurance Connector Authority, (2012). Health Reform Facts 
and Figures. Accessed at: 
https://www.mahealthconnector.org/portal/binary/com.epicentric.contentmanagement.
servlet.ContentDeliveryServlet/Health%2520Care%2520Reform/Facts%2520and%25
20Figures/Facts%2520and%2520Figures.pdf 
Courtemanche, C. J. and D. Zapata (2014). Does Universal Coverage Improve Health? 
The Massachusetts Experience. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 
33(1):36-69. 
Gruber, J. (2008). Incremental Universalism for the United States: The States First 
Move? Journal of Economic Perspectives, 22(4):51-68. 
Gruber, J. (2010). Health Care Reform is a “Three-Legged Stool”: The Costs of 
Partially Repealing the Affordable Care Act. Center for American Progress. Accessed 
at: http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-
content/uploads/issues/2010/08/pdf/repealing_reform.pdf 
Kolstad, J. T. and A. E. Kowalski (2012a). The Impact of an Individual Health 
Insurance Mandate on Hospital and Preventive Care: Evidence from Massachusetts. 
Journal of Public Economics, 96(11-12):909-929. 
 69 
Kolstad, J. T. and A. E. Kowalski (2012b). Mandate-Based Health Reform and the 
Labor Market: Evidence from the Massachusetts Reform. NBER Working Paper 
17933. 
Long, S. (2010). A Comment On “The Massachusetts Health Plan: Much Pain Little 
Gain.” Urban Institute Health Policy Center Brief. 
Long, S. and K. Stockley (2011). The Impacts of State Health Reform Initiatives on 
Adults in New York and Massachusetts. Health Services Research, 46(1-2):365-428. 
Long, S., K. Stockley, and H. Dahlen (2012). Health Reform in Massachusetts as of 
Fall 2010: Getting Ready for the Affordable Care Act and Addressing Affordability. 
Urban Institute Research Report. 
Long, S., K. Stockley, and A. Yemane (2009). Another Look at the Impacts of Health 
Reform in Massachusetts: Evidence Using New Data and a Stronger Model. American 
Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 99(2):508-511. 
Massachusetts Division of Health Care, Finance, and Policy, (2011). Health Care in 
Massachusetts: Key Indicators. Accessed at: 
http://www.mass.gov/chia/docs/r/pubs/11/2011-key-indicators-february.pdf 
Massachusetts Division of Health Care, Finance, and Policy, (2013). Fair Share 
Contribution and Employer Health Insurance Responsibility Disclosure: Filing Year 
2011 Results and Analyses. Accessed at: 
http://www.mass.gov/chia/docs/r/pubs/13/fsc-and-ehird-report-2011.pdf 
Raymond, A. (2009). Massachusetts Health Reform: The Myth of Uncontrolled Costs. 
Massachusetts Taxpayer Foundation. Accessed at: 
http://www.masstaxpayers.org/sites/masstaxpayers.org/files/Health%20care-NT.pdf 
Summers, L. (1989). Some Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits. American 
Economic Review, 79(2):177-183. 
 
 70 
CHAPTER 2                                                                                                                   
AN OPTION DEMAND MODEL OF COMPETITION AND MARKET POWER IN 
PHYSICIAN PRACTICE GROUPS 
2.1 Introduction 
The assessment of market power for health care services is of considerable interest for 
antitrust purposes. Health care has been the most active area for antitrust enforcement over the 
past two decades, with over 1400 mergers and acquisitions successfully consummated 
between 1994 and 2009 (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2005; Irving Levin Associates, 2007, 
2008, 2009, 2010). During much of this period, the antitrust agencies were largely 
unsuccessful in their attempted challenges to a number of these mergers, due largely to the 
acceptance by the courts of ad hoc market definition techniques that defined overly expansive 
markets and consequently a particularly permissive merger environment for hospitals (Gaynor 
et al., 2012). As a result a number of new approaches to inferring market power in health care 
markets have emerged in recent years. 
A key insight of these models is the recognition of the unique role of intermediation by payers 
on behalf of patients. In health care markets, price negotiation between managed care 
organizations and providers in exchange for the inclusion of providers in a network is 
especially common. This process, termed selective contracting by Dranove et al. (1993) has 
become the basis for empirical economic models introduced by Town and Vistnes (2001) and 
Capps et al. (2003) that capture the bargaining leverage possessed by providers when 
negotiating with insurers. Recent application of these models have shown that hospital 
markets are largely local, and courts have been receptive to the conceptual framework inherent 
in these models, as applied to the bargaining context specific to the health care industry. In 
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addition, the most recent revision of the authoritative Federal Trade Commission and 
Department of Justice merger guidelines (Federal Trade Commission and Department of 
Justice, 2010) has explicitly acknowledged the validity of alternative approaches to market 
analysis, including concepts that are closely related to the bargaining framework embodied in 
these models (Capps, 2012). 
However, despite a considerable literature that has emerged analyzing market power in the 
hospital industry, little is known about the extent of market power for physician services. 
Physician services currently account for nearly one-fifth of health care expenditures in the 
United States (Martin et al., 2012) and recent evidence in a limited number of markets is 
suggestive of the ability of physician practices to bargain effectively with insurers (Ginsburg, 
2010). Consequently, there exists a substantial need to develop reliable and economically 
sound methods for analyzing the effects of physician practice mergers. Anecdotal observation 
suggests that patients prefer to obtain physician services relatively close to where they work or 
live, suggesting the potential for relatively few physician groups within a small geographic 
area to exert market power in the event of a merger (American Bar Association, 2003). This 
may particularly be the case for primary care physicians, who are generally consulted more 
frequently than specialists, and typically generate referral patterns in a more localized area 
than do specialists. However, obtaining actual evidence on the extent of market power for 
physicians is particularly difficult, since in contrast to hospitals, data on patient origin, 
treatment location, and pricing of services that can be used to empirically examine market 
power is unavailable. 
Evidence on the existence (or absence) of physician market power is especially important 
given provisions in the 2010 Affordable Care Act (ACA) that encourage the formation of 
Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs). While it is hoped that these ACOs will coordinate 
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care across networks of providers and realize cost-reducing efficiencies, the coordination of 
providers through these organizations may potentially contribute to an increase in bargaining 
power among ACO participants, thereby resulting in higher health care prices in the private 
market. While the antitrust agencies have instituted “safe-harbor” guidelines for ACO 
formation that are intended to guard against anti-competitive practice arrangements, these 
guidelines are voluntary, and make use of patient-flow methods which have been shown to 
understate the degree of market power for health care providers (Elzinga and Swisher, 
Forthcoming; Gaynor et al., 2012). 
This study makes use of Medicare Part B claims data for a 20% sample of Medicare 
beneficiaries enrolled in traditional Medicare (Fee-for-Service) for 2009 and physician pricing 
data from a database of private insurers to assess market power for physician practices. Using 
insights from Fournier and Gai (2007) and Farrell et al. (2011), the option demand model of 
Capps et al. (2003) is further developed and applied to three specialty physician markets 
(cardiology, oncology, and orthopedics) in a major metropolitan area. Results indicate the 
existence of market power for all specialty physician practices, and further the degree of 
market power varies across specialties within the market. The methods used here can be 
applied more generally to infer the degree of market power in physician and other health care 
provider markets. 
The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2.2 reviews the literature on market power for health 
care providers. Section 2.3 describes the adapted option demand model. Section 2.4 describes 
the data sets used. Section 2.5 presents the results. Section 2.6 concludes. 
2.2 Market Power for Health Care Providers 
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A sizable literature exists on inferring market power for hospitals. Approaches to identifying 
market power in the academic literature have varied considerably (Gaynor and Vogt, 2000). 
The most common methods analyze firm concentration in specific geographic areas using 
either relatively large geopolitical units defined for other purposes such as counties or census 
divisions such as Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) or Health Services Areas (HSA) 
(Romeo et al., 1984; Lynk, 1995a; Dranove et al., 1992) or by constructing an area around a 
particular provider and encompassing all providers located in that area (Robinson and Luft, 
1985; Gruber, 1994). Using the set of providers located in the geographic areas, concentration 
indices are typically constructed using providers in the market. The underlying assumption of 
this method is that within these defined boundaries, each provider could constrain the pricing 
decision of other providers in that market such that a price increase would not be profitable. 
Recent literature has focused on identifying provider market power in health care markets 
using structural approaches. In these studies, patient choice and firm behavior are explicitly 
modeled and estimated using econometric techniques. Two of the most prominent of these 
models, developed by Gaynor and Vogt (2003) and Capps et al. (2003) estimate the extent of 
market power in the hospital industry using micro-data collected from hospital discharge 
records that enable direct estimation of patient preferences for hospital care. The model 
developed by Gaynor and Vogt (2003) is an adaptation of the methods set forth in Berry et al. 
(2004) which constructed a model of differentiated product oligopoly with Bertrand conduct. 
This model explicitly treats price as a component of consumer preferences under the implicit 
assumption hospital price in a consumer’s utility function accurately captures a reduced form 
choice function incorporating the objectives of consumers and insurers. Capps et al. (2003) 
make the alternative assumption that prices do not enter directly into a consumer’s choice 
framework. In this model, the decision of a consumer to join an insurance plan is determined 
 74 
by both the price of an insurance plan, as well as the network of providers included in each 
plan. 
This framework allows providers that are more desirable to consumers to bargain more 
effectively with insurance companies, and thus command a higher price. Grennan 
(forthcoming), has derived the conditions under which these models coincide, however, they 
are similar in their empirical conclusions regarding the extent of market power for hospitals in 
that they both predict that the consolidation of a very small set of providers would 
significantly increase the price of health care services (Gaynor and Town, 2011). 
The option demand model has been applied empirically and tested against actual merger 
outcomes.  For example, Dranove and Sfekas (2009) applied the model to proposed 
consolidations in New York State and found that merging the only two hospitals in Elmira, 
NY could result in a price increase of 8%. Two related papers also show that these methods 
can provide reliable predictions of actual mergers (Fournier and Gai, 2007; Akosa et al., 
2009). Fournier and Gai (2007) empirically tested the Capps et al. (2003) model against data 
from actual hospital mergers in both Florida and New York, and found that the Capps et al. 
(2003) model estimates price increases reliably, and conservatively. Akosa et al. (2009) tested 
a version of the structural Bertrand Pricing model and found that it produced accurate 
estimates of merger induced price increases. Gaynor et al. (2012) then compared the Capps et 
al. (2003) and the Bertrand Pricing models to each other and found that merger simulations 
from both models produced similar results. 
However, despite the central role of physicians in providing medical services and coordinating 
care, the question of the extent of market power in physician markets is largely an unexplored 
topic. With the exception of a relatively recent study by Schneider et al. (2008) that provides 
evidence on the relationship between physician group practice concentration and price in 
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California counties, there is no good systematic information on the extent of market power in 
local physician markets (Gaynor and Town, 2011). The difficulty in analyzing physician 
markets is mainly due to the limited availability of data containing patient location, provider 
location and pricing information for physician services. Anecdotal observation suggests the 
potential for physicians to leverage market power in geographically small markets because 
patients typically prefer to obtain physician services close to where they work or live 
(American Bar Association, 2003). This is particularly true for primary care physicians, who 
are generally consulted more frequently than specialists and typically generate referral patterns 
in a more localized area than do specialists. However, obtaining actual evidence of market 
power for physician practices is notoriously difficult. This is because, in contrast to hospital 
mergers, data on patient origin, treatment location, and pricing of services that can be used to 
examine market power is generally unavailable for physician services. Consequently, very 
little empirical evidence exists pertaining to market power in physician markets. 
Within the market for physician services, antitrust enforcement has addressed anticompetitive 
conduct along multiple dimensions, much of which requires (either implicitly or explicitly) the 
delineation of geographic markets. For example, Independent Practice Associations (IPOs) 
and Physician Hospital Organizations (PHOs) have represented attempts by physicians to 
increase their bargaining leverage with insurers, while attempts by physicians to gain 
exemption from antitrust laws and allow for collective bargaining have resulted in statements 
by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) alleging that 
such exemptions would harm consumers by increasing costs without producing improvements 
in the quality of care (Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice, 2004). Implicit 
in such policies is the assumption of the presence of market power in physician markets; that 
is physicians have the ability to extract excess profits by engaging in collusive conduct 
intended to limit competition. Furthermore, in response to the provisions encouraging the 
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formation of Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) in the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act of 2010 (PPACA) the FTC and the DOJ have issued voluntary guidelines outlining 
criteria for evaluating whether an ACO may raise significant competitive concerns and thus 
warrant antitrust scrutiny. 
In addition, the assessment of market power has become increasingly salient in recent antitrust 
cases involving physician services. For example, in Little Rock Cardiology Clinic v. Baptist 
Health, 591 F.3d 591 (8th Cir. 2009), the court rejected claims by the plaintiffs (Little Rock 
Cardiology Clinic) that the defendants (Baptist Health) were engaged in an attempt to restrain 
trade and monopolize a market on the grounds that practices outside of Little Rock were 
sufficiently close substitutes for practices in Little Rock such that the defendant could not 
profitably increase the price of services. Market power for physician practices has also been a 
fundamental issue of contention in physician cases such as Morgenstern v. Wilson, 29 F.3d 
1291 (8th Cir. 1994), where an appeals court reversed the ruling of a lower court’s decision 
that a group of cardiac surgeons in Lincoln, Nebraska had monopolized the market for cardiac 
surgery. A key factor in the court’s decision to reverse the lower court’s ruling was that the 
“plaintiff’s geographic market was, as a matter of law, too narrow”, thereby implying the 
existence of a limited scope of market power for these surgeons within the local market. 
Ginsburg (2010) notes that providers in California have implemented strategies that have 
strengthened their market power, thus increasing their bargaining power with private health 
plans. This study further stresses that proposals to promote the formation of ACOs could lead 
to harmful increases in rates for physician services in the private market. The wide variation in 
private insurer physician reimbursement across and within local markets is indicative that 
some physician group practices have significant market power, thereby enabling them to 
extract prices above the competitive level (Berenson et al., 2010). Both Ginsburg (2010) and 
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Berenson et al. (2010) underscore the need to develop reliable and implementable methods to 
assess physician market power. 
2.3 Model Adaptation and Methods 
A key determinant of provider pricing in the health care industry is the bargaining process 
between providers and insurers over provider network composition (Capps, 2012). The 
insurers negotiate with providers over fee schedules, where insurers possesses bargaining 
power over providers through the threat of excluding them from their network (thus limiting 
the set of consumers that could potentially use the provider’s services), and a provider’s 
bargaining power stems from the threat of not allowing the insurance company to include 
them in their network (thus making the network less desirable to consumers). Once the 
bargaining process has concluded, the insurers have built a network which they can then offer 
to consumers. Consumers then choose an insurer based on the price (premiums, deductibles, 
co-payment, etc.) and access to providers that the network grants. More specifically, a 
provider weighs the negotiated price against the cost of serving an insurers patient population, 
and an insurer weighs the willingness to pay of their consumers to have access to a particular 
provider against the costs of including the provider in their network (Capps, 2012). And 
consumers’ willingness to pay for access to a provider is directly tied to the number of 
substitute hospitals in a geographic location. 
The Capps et al. (2003) option demand model is particularly well suited for an application to 
physician group practice market power as it incorporates these institutional features into its 
modeling framework. The two step process in which insurers bargain with physicians and then 
insurers market their network to consumers is a reasonable representation of the process by 
which physician practices bargain with insurers (Berenson et al., 2010). First, insurance 
companies bargain with physician group practices, where the insurer weighs the willingness to 
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pay of their consumers for access to the physician group practice against to costs of including 
the practice in their network. The difference between the willingness to pay of an insurer’s 
consumers and the cost of inclusion is the surplus from bargaining. Upon successful 
negotiations (the insurer contracts with the physician practice) the surplus from bargaining is 
shared between the practice and the insurer, depending on their relative bargaining power. The 
share that the physician practice group receives is translated into the price they are paid for 
their services to members of an insurer’s network. This price, in theory, is directly tied to the 
consumers’ willingness to pay (the mechanism through which a physician practice derives its 
bargaining power). Thus, one could think of a physician practice group having a reservation 
price for their services (the minimum they are willing to accept to provide a service), and the 
more desirable they are, the higher the price they can extract from the insurer. The model 
described below accounts for this bargaining process as well as the ability of physician 
practices to translate their desirability (consumers’ willingness to pay) into higher 
reimbursements for services rendered. 
2.3.1 Option Demand Model and Relevant Assumptions 
In the Capps et al. (2003) Option Demand Model the ex-post decisions (the decision to seek 
medical services subsequent to the realization of illness) of consumers to select specific 
physicians is independent of price, while the ex-ante decision of a consumer to select a 
specific insurer is jointly determined by the network of providers offered by the insurer and 
the price charged by the insurer. This framework allows more desirable physician practice 
groups to have increased bargaining power with insurers due to the higher willingness to pay 
(WTP) of consumers to include these preferred physicians in their network. 
The goal of this model is to calculate each consumer’s ex-ante willingness to pay (WTP) to 
include a particular physician in an insurance company’s network. The ex-ante WTP is a 
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consumer’s WTP to have access to a particular physician practice prior to any realization of 
illness resulting in a physician visit. The sum of the individual ex-ante WTP over all 
consumers is the ex-ante value that a physician group practice brings to the network. The 
interim WTP, which is the consumers WTP conditional on the realization of illness, is first 
estimated as an intermediate step in the calculation of ex-ante WTP. The first step in 
implementing this model is to estimate the parameters of consumers’ ex-post expected utility 
function. The ex-post expected utility that patient i receives from selecting physician practice j 
is (equation 2.1): 
𝑈𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼𝑅𝑗 + 𝐻𝑗
′Γ𝑋𝑖 + 𝜏1𝑇𝑖𝑗 + 𝜏2𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑋𝑖 + 𝜏3𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑅𝑗 − 𝛾(𝑋𝑖)𝑃𝑗(𝑍𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖𝑗
= 𝑈(𝐻𝑗, 𝑋𝑖 , 𝜆𝑖) − 𝛾(𝑋𝑖)𝑃𝑗(𝑍𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 
Where 𝐻𝑗 = [𝑅𝑗; 𝑆𝑗] is a column vector of location specific physician practice j’s 
characteristics. 𝑅𝑗 includes number of practitioners, share of practitioners that are primary care 
physicians, number of services performed, and an indicator for the presence of physician 
assistants (PAs) or nurse practitioners (NPs). 𝑆𝑗 includes condition and procedure specific 
offerings such as whether physician j performs vaccinations or serves patients diagnosed with 
congestive heart failure. The vector 𝑋𝑖 = [𝑌𝑖; 𝑍𝑖] is patient i’s type and includes demographic 
characteristics (𝑌𝑖  = age, sex and race) and clinical attributes (𝑍𝑖 = diagnosis history, past 
diagnosis history as well as current procedure and diagnosis). 𝑃𝑗(𝑍𝑖) is physician j’s out of 
pocket payment from patient i with clinical attributes 𝑍𝑖. 𝜆𝑖 is the zip code of patient i’s home, 
and 𝑇𝑖𝑗 = 𝑇𝑗(𝜆𝑖) is the distance (in miles) from patient i’s home to practice j’s location. 
Distance is one of the most important predictors of a patient’s choice of physician (Cohen and 
Lee, 1985; Burns and Wholey, 1992; Capps et al., 2001; Varkevisser and van der Geest, 2006; 
Mayer, 1983). The function 𝛾(⋅) coverts money into utility terms. And 𝜀𝑖𝑗 is the idiosyncratic 
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shock to patient i’s utility evaluation of practice j, and is assumed to be distributed i.i.d 
extreme value.22 
It is important to note that claims data does not allow me to observe consumers choosing not 
to engage in the physician services market. This makes the specification of an outside option 
(insured individuals choosing not to use physician services) impossible. Thus, following the 
methods of Capps et al. (2003), I assume there is a captive market of patients who must 
choose to see a physician. 
The utility parameters in equation 2.1 (𝛼, Γ, 𝜏) = [𝜏1 𝜏2 𝜏3] represent the unconditional 
marginal values of physician practice attributes, patient specific values of practice location 
characteristics and travel costs respectively. 
Patient i will select physician practice j if, for all physician practices 𝑘 ≠ 𝑗 (equation 2.2), 
𝛼(𝑅𝑗 − 𝑅𝑘) + (𝐻𝑗 − 𝐻𝑘)
′
Γ𝑋𝑖 + 𝜏1(𝑇𝑖𝑗 − 𝑇𝑖𝑘) + 𝜏2(𝑇𝑖𝑗 − 𝑇𝑖𝑘)𝑋𝑖 + 𝜏3(𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑅𝑗 − 𝑇𝑖𝑘𝑅𝑘)
+ 𝛾(𝑌𝑖 , 𝑍𝑖)(𝑃𝑗 − 𝑃𝑘) = 𝑈(𝐻𝑗, 𝑋𝑖 , 𝜆𝑖) − 𝑈(𝐻𝑘 , 𝑋𝑖, 𝜆𝑖) >  𝜀𝑖𝑘 − 𝜀𝑖𝑗 
Patients in the estimation sample will be selected to have health insurance for which there is 
no meaningful difference in the out-of-pocket price charged by different providers. Thus, the 
price difference between physician j performing procedure x and physician k performing 
procedure x for a patient in the sample is zero. Therefore, the term 𝛾(𝑌𝑖, 𝑍𝑖)(𝑃𝑗 − 𝑃𝑘) 
vanishes. And, under the assumption that 𝜀𝑖𝑗 is distributed i.i.d. extreme value, the probability 
                                                 
22 As Capps et al. (2003) note, the utility specification in equation 2.1 allows for flexible substitution 
patterns across physician group practices due to the interaction of patient and provider characteristics. 
Therefore, this facilitates plausible own and cross price elasticities of demand and mitigates the 
problems associated with the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption in simple logit 
demand models. 
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that patient i chooses practice j takes on the following closed form of the logit demand 
formula (equation 2.3): 
𝑆𝑗(𝐺, 𝑋𝑖, 𝜆𝑖) =
exp[𝑈(𝐻𝑗, 𝑋𝑖 , 𝜆𝑖)]
∑ exp [𝑈(𝐻𝑔, 𝑋𝑖 , 𝜆𝑖)]𝑔∈𝐺
 
Where 𝐺 is the set of all physician practice locations within a geographic area. In line with 
Capps et al. (2003), I assume that each insurer’s network includes all physician practices. This 
assumption is necessary because I cannot observe the set of physician practices that consumers 
can access through their network. The utility parameters in equation 2.1 are estimated using 
maximum likelihood from the implied likelihood function of equation 2.3. The parameter 𝛾(⋅) 
is left unidentified, this is resolved by Capps et al. (2003) by assuming 𝛾(⋅) = 𝛾, a constant, 
implying that all WTP estimates will be identified up to an unknown scalar 𝛾. 
Subsequent to estimating the underlying parameters of the ex-post utility function, I can now 
calculate the interim expected utility for access to physician network 𝐺 of patient i using the 
following equation (equation 2.4): 
𝑉𝐼𝑈(𝐺, 𝑌𝑖, 𝑍𝑖 , 𝜆𝑖) = 𝐸 max
g∈G
[𝑈(𝐻𝑔, 𝑌𝑖 , 𝑍𝑖 , 𝜆𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖𝑔] = ln ∑ exp [𝑈(𝐻𝑔, 𝑌𝑖 , 𝑍𝑖 , 𝜆𝑖)]
𝑔∈𝐺
 
Thus, physician practice j’s contribution to interim utility is simply the difference between 
interim utility with network 𝐺 and interim utility with network 𝐺\𝑗.23 
                                                 
23 𝐺\𝑗 is the entire network 𝐺 with physician practice j excluded. 
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ΔVj
IU(𝐺, 𝑌𝑖, 𝑍𝑖 , 𝜆𝑖) = 𝑉𝑗
𝐼𝑈(𝐺, 𝑌𝑖, 𝑍𝑖 , 𝜆𝑖) − VJ
IU(𝐺\𝑗, 𝑌𝑖, 𝑍𝑖 , 𝜆𝑖)
= ln ∑ exp[𝑈(𝐻𝑔, 𝑌𝑖, 𝑍𝑖 , 𝜆𝑖)]
𝑔∈𝐺
− ln ∑ exp[𝑈(𝐻𝑘, 𝑌𝑖 , 𝑍𝑖 , 𝜆𝑖)]
𝑘∈𝐺\𝑗
= ln
∑ exp[𝑈(𝐻𝑔, 𝑌𝑖 , 𝑍𝑖 , 𝜆𝑖)] 𝑔∈𝐺
∑ exp[𝑈(𝐻𝑘, 𝑌𝑖 , 𝑍𝑖 , 𝜆𝑖)]𝑘∈𝐺\𝑗
= ln (
∑ exp[𝑈(𝐻𝑘 , 𝑌𝑖 , 𝑍𝑖 , 𝜆𝑖)]𝑘∈𝐺\𝑗
∑ exp[𝑈(𝐻𝑔, 𝑌𝑖, 𝑍𝑖 , 𝜆𝑖)] 𝑔∈𝐺
)
−1
= ln {[ ∑
exp[𝑈(𝐻𝑘 , 𝑌𝑖 , 𝑍𝑖 , 𝜆𝑖)]
∑ exp[𝑈(𝐻𝑔, 𝑌𝑖 , 𝑍𝑖 , 𝜆𝑖)] 𝑔∈𝐺𝑘∈𝐺\𝑗
]
−1
}  
= ln ( ∑ 𝑠𝑘(𝐻𝑘, 𝑌𝑖 , 𝑍𝑖 , 𝜆𝑖)
𝑘∈𝐺\𝑗
)
−1
= ln (1 − 𝑠𝑗(𝐻𝑗, 𝑌𝑖 , 𝑍𝑖 , 𝜆𝑖))
−1
= ln [
1
1 − 𝑠𝑗(𝐻𝑗, 𝑌𝑖, 𝑍𝑖 , 𝜆𝑖)
] 
ΔVj
IU(⋅) can be converted to interim WTP by dividing by 𝛾. Thus, the interim WTP to have 
access to physician 𝑗 ∈ 𝐺 is (equation 2.5): 
Δ𝑊𝑗
𝐼𝑈(𝐺, 𝑌𝑖, 𝑍𝑖 , 𝜆𝑖) =
Δ𝑉𝑗
𝐼𝑈(𝐺, 𝑌𝑖, 𝑍𝑖 , 𝜆𝑖)
𝛾
 
Suppose 𝑓(𝑌𝑖, 𝑍𝑖 , 𝜆𝑖) is the joint density of demographics, clinical attributes, and locations of 
patients homes and 𝑓(𝑍𝑖|𝑌𝑖, 𝜆𝑖) is the conditional density of clinical attributes given 
demographics and location of patient i, then patient i’s ex-ante WTP to include physician 
practice j in network 𝐺 is (equation 2.6): 
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Δ𝑊𝑖𝑗
𝐸𝐴(𝐺, 𝑌𝑖 , 𝜆𝑖) = ∫ Δ𝑊𝑗
𝐼𝑈(𝐺, 𝑌𝑖, 𝑍𝑖 , 𝜆𝑖)𝑓(𝑍𝑖|𝑌𝑖, 𝜆𝑖)𝑑𝑍𝑖
𝑍
=
1
𝛾
∫Δ𝑉𝑗
𝐼𝑈(𝐺, 𝑌𝑖 , 𝑍𝑖 , 𝜆𝑖)𝑓(𝑍𝑖|𝑌𝑖 , 𝜆𝑖)𝑑𝑍𝑖
𝑍
 
And summing equation 2.6 over all patients yields the population’s ex ante WTP to have 
access to physician practice 𝑗 ∈ 𝐺 (WTP for j). Equation 2.7: 
Δ𝑊𝑗
𝐸𝐴(𝐺) = 𝑁 ∫ Δ𝑊𝑗
𝐼𝑈(𝐺, 𝑌𝑖, 𝑍𝑖 , 𝜆𝑖)𝑓(𝑌𝑖|𝜆𝑖)𝑑𝑌𝑖𝑑𝜆𝑖
𝑌,𝜆
=
𝑁
𝛾
∫ ln [
1
1 − 𝑠𝑗(𝐺, 𝑌𝑖 , 𝑍𝑖 , 𝜆𝑖)
] 𝑓(𝑌𝑖 , 𝑍𝑖 , 𝜆𝑖)𝑑𝑌𝑖𝑑𝑍𝑖𝑑𝜆𝑖
𝑌,𝑍,𝜆
 
2.3.2 Bargaining Parameter Estimation 
Conceptually, a physician practice group’s price is a reflection of consumer’s WTP. The more 
desirable the practice group, the more surplus the practice group can extract from the insurer. 
Therefore, higher WTP to include a physician practice in a network translates directly into 
higher prices. This conceptual framework can be represented by a Nash bargaining model in 
which insurers and physicians agree upon a price such that the product of the profits of 
physicians and insurers is maximized, subject to the bargaining power each player possesses. 
Formally, price is chosen according to the following game (equation 2.8): 
max
𝑝𝑗
[𝑟𝑣𝑢𝑗(𝑝𝑗 − 𝑚𝑐𝑗)]
𝑏𝑗[𝛾𝜏Δ𝑊𝑖𝑗
𝐸𝐴 − 𝑝𝑗𝑟𝑣𝑢𝑗]
𝑏𝑚
 
Taking the log of both sides and looking at the first order condition with respect to 𝑝𝑗 
(equation 2.9), 
𝑝𝑗 =
𝑏𝑚
𝑏𝑚 + 𝑏𝑗
𝑚𝑐𝑗 +
𝑏𝑗
𝑏𝑚 + 𝑏𝑗
𝛾𝜏
ΔWij
EA
rvuj
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Thus, if MCO’s have all of the bargaining power (
𝑏𝑚
𝑏𝑚+𝑏𝑗
= 1) then 𝑝𝑗 = 𝑚𝑐𝑗 and if 
physicians have all of the bargaining power (
𝑏𝑗
𝑏𝑚+𝑏𝑗
= 1) then 𝑝𝑗 = 𝛾𝜏
ΔWij
EA
rvuj
 (they extract all 
of the surplus from bargaining). Let 𝛼 =
𝑏𝑚
𝑏𝑚+𝑏𝑗
𝑚𝑐𝑗 and 𝛽 =
𝑏𝑗
𝑏𝑚+𝑏𝑗
𝛾𝜏, then the equilibrium 
price can be represented by the following equation (equation 2.10): 
𝑝𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝛽
Δ𝑊𝑗
𝐸𝐴(𝐺)
𝑟𝑣𝑢𝑗
 
Assuming that the price index is measured with mean zero normally distributed measurement 
error, the equilibrium price can be estimated via an OLS regression of the form (equation 
2.11): 
𝑝𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝛽
Δ𝑊𝑗
𝐸𝐴(𝐺)
𝑟𝑣𝑢𝑗
+ 𝑢𝑗 
The key intuition here is that the sign and statistical significance of each of the parameter 
estimates of 𝛼 and 𝛽 is important in interpreting the results. A positive and statistically 
insignificant estimate, or an estimate of zero for 𝛼 in conjunction with a positive and 
statistically significant estimate for 𝛽 indicates that insurers have very little bargaining power 
relative to physicians, while the converse indicates that insurers possess most of the 
bargaining power relative to physicians. A positive and statistically significant estimate of 
both parameters indicates that both physicians and insurers have bargaining power. And, any 
negative and statistically significant estimate for 𝛽  is evidence against the option demand 
model or the specification used to estimate the model. 
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2.3.3 Simulation of Physician Practice Mergers 
This can be done by evaluating the increase in WTP associated with the merger of practice j 
and practice k as compared to the WTP of each practice separately. The method used here is 
identical to the method outlined in Capps et al. (2003). First the WTP to include practice j and 
k jointly is estimated by the following equation (equation 2.12): 
Δ𝑊𝑗+𝑘
𝐸𝐴 (𝐺) =
𝑁
𝛾
∫ ln [
1
1 − 𝑠𝑗(𝐺, 𝑌𝑖, 𝑍𝑖 , 𝜆𝑖) − 𝑠𝑘(𝐺, 𝑌𝑖 , 𝑍𝑖 , 𝜆𝑖)
] 𝑓(𝑌𝑖 , 𝑍𝑖 , 𝜆𝑖)𝑑𝑌𝑖𝑑𝑍𝑖𝑑𝜆𝑖
𝑌,𝑍,𝜆
 
The change in price is then estimated with the following formula (equation 2.13): 
Δ𝑝𝑗+𝑘 =
?̂?
𝑄𝑗+𝑘
[Δ𝑊𝑗+𝑘
𝐸𝐴 (𝐺) − (Δ𝑊𝑗
𝐸𝐴(𝐺) + Δ𝑊𝑘
𝐸𝐴(𝐺))] 
Where ?̂? is the coefficient estimated from equation 2.11 and 𝑄𝑗+𝑘 is the total number of 
services performed by practices j and k (in relative value units). 
Conditional of finding a positive and significant slope parameter from estimating equation 
2.11, the formula in equation 2.13 can be used to analyze the potential effect of a merger 
between two physician practice groups. 
2.4 Data 
A main reason for the lack of evidence regarding physician market power is the lack of 
sufficiently detailed data to allow for such analysis. Assessing market power for physician 
services requires the simultaneous identification of patient location, physician location, 
information on physician practice arrangements, and private prices (allowed amounts). The 
data sets used to overcome these limitations are described below. 
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2.4.1 Patient Level Data 
Estimation of the parameters of the utility specification in equation 2.1 makes use of the 
Research Identifiable Files (RIF) of the Medicare Part B claims data for the year 2009 that 
includes final action claims data submitted by non-institutional Medicare providers for a 20% 
sample of Medicare beneficiaries. Examples of non-institutional providers include physicians, 
physician assistants, clinical social workers, nurse practitioners, independent clinical 
laboratories, ambulance providers, and free-standing ambulatory surgical centers. Information 
contained in this _le includes diagnosis and procedure codes (ICD-9 diagnosis, CMS Common 
Procedure Coding System (HCPCS) codes), dates of service, reimbursement amount to 
provider and non-institutional provider numbers (e.g., NPI). Particularly important to the 
analysis is the availability in these data of beneficiary demographic information including a 5-
digit zip code, and provider location (including a 5-digit provider zip code) that allow for the 
inclusion of distance from patient zip code to provider zip code. 
The analysis data set was constructed at the patient claim level, containing patient 
demographic information, clinical characteristics of the patient, and provider characteristics 
for the group practice location. Only the subsample of patients that visited s given specialists 
are included. A provider’s specialty is based on the information provided at the claim level. 
For example, if a provider submitted two claims, one as a family practitioner and another as a 
cardiologist, then only the claim submitted as a cardiologist was included in the sample to 
estimate WTP for cardiology practice groups. 
2.4.2 Private Pricing Data 
Private pricing data was obtained from the FAIR Health Database, which is the largest 
collection of private medical claims in the United States. The database contains over 14 billion 
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billed medical and dental services for over 125 million insured plan participants. These data 
contain non-institutional provider numbers (NPI), physician location (zip code), diagnosis and 
procedure codes, and private reimbursements. The Medical Surgical claims data for 2009 was 
used to determine a private price index for three physician specialties (cardiology, oncology, 
and orthopedics). The price index uses the CMS Relative Value Units (RVUs) that are 
assigned to each procedure code. CMS assigns a practice expense RVU, a malpractice RVU 
and a physician work RVU. RVUs are designed to assign a standardized value to the services 
offered by physicians which CMS uses as basis for physician reimbursement. The private 
pricing data was limited to in-network claims to avoid anomalies inherent in out-of-network 
private insurance reimbursements. 
The use of RVUs to construct price measures has been used by Dove (1994) to construct a 
single price scaling factor for a private insurer. The use of RVUs to generate a single price 
index for physician practices is only valid if RVUs accurately reflect the cost differences 
across procedures. The use of RVU’s as a tool to assess prices has been both praised as a 
mechanism for assigning a standardized unit of value to physician services (Dove, 1994) and 
criticized for not reflecting cost variation across specialties (Cooper and Kramer, 2008). 
However, given my focus on individual specialties separately this is unlikely to present a 
problem. Furthermore, Ginsburg (2010) reports that RVU conversion factors are the basis over 
which insurers and physicians set prices. 
The private price index for each physician is computed by first taking the sum of the practice 
expense, physician work, and malpractice RVUs for each service performed by the physician 
and then summing this value over all services performed by the physician. The private 
reimbursement amounts over all services performed by the physician are then summed up for 
each physician. The price index is then calculated by dividing the total reimbursement for the 
 88 
physician by the sum of the RVU’s to get a dollars per RVU measure of private prices. 
Formally (equation 2.14): 
𝑝𝑗 =
∑ 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1
∑ (𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘 𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑘 + 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑘 + 𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑘)
𝐾
𝑘=1
 
Where 𝑝𝑗 is the case-mix adjusted price index for physician j, and k indexes the number of 
services offered by physician j. 
2.4.3 Private Practice Price Index 
In order to analyze patient choice over the physician group practice (and not the individual 
physician), I generate a single price index for the physician practice group. To construct this 
measure, I link the individual physician private price index to the Medicare claims by the 
provider NPI. A practice private price index was computed by aggregating the private price 
index over all physicians within the same employer identification number (EIN) and 
weighting by the RVUs for each physician.24 25 
2.4.4 Matching Medicare Data to Private Pricing Data 
The FAIR Health data requires validation of provider NPIs. The reason that one major 
metropolitan area was chosen for this analysis was that the market chosen had one of the 
highest percentages of private claims reporting a positive reimbursement with a valid NPI26 
that matched to the Medicare data. This percent match criteria was weighed against the 
                                                 
24 The use of EINs has been employed in previous studies of physician groups, and is used to identify 
group practices in Medicare demonstration projects (Pham et al., 2007; Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services, 2011, 2010). 
25 In the instances where I could not compute a private price index for a physician within a group 
practice, I used the private price indices from the other physicians in the same group to generate the 
practice private price index. This approach requires the assumption that physician practices negotiate 
with insurance companies for reimbursement at the practice level. 
26 NPIs were validated using the checksum algorithm. 
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number of claims reported in a Core Based Statistical Area (CBSA), and the CBSA chosen, 
with a 62.43% match rate for approximately 4.1 million claims, was chosen over several other 
CBSAs which had a higher match rate, but significantly less claims. The CBSA chosen 
provided a reasonable number of claims per physician required to develop a reliable price 
index for the specialty practice groups.27 
2.4.5 Caveats 
The use of the Medicare population to estimate market power in the private non-Medicare 
market requires a fairly strong assumption. The determinants of physician choice for Fee-for-
Service Medicare beneficiaries must be similar to the factors that determine physician choice 
in the private insurance market. This assumption may be violated if: 1) Medicare patients, who 
are mostly elderly, have different criteria by which they select physicians than younger 
patients who are insured through the private insurance market; 2) Determinants of physician 
selection is affected by Fee-for-Service Medicare patients generally having free choice of 
provider, thus not subject to financial steering that may be present in markets for privately 
insurance patients; 3) The absence of data on patients in the Medicare Advantage (MA) 
program creates a self-selection problem in that there may be significant differences between 
the FFS and the MA populations. Despite these strong assumptions, these data make the 
assessment of market power in physician markets feasible and more complete than has been 
previously implemented. 
2.5 Results 
This section describes the results from estimating the option demand model. The option 
demand model was estimated using claims from three physician specialties (cardiology, 
                                                 
27 The FAIR Health data was first limited to the chosen CBSA and then matched by the validated NPI. 
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oncology, and orthopedics) in a single large CBSA. Summary statistics of all patients included 
in the sample are described in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1: Patient Variables (N = 373,050) 
      
Variable Mean Standard Deviation 
Female 0.573 0.495 
Age 73.338 11.100   
White 0.867 0.339 
Inpatient/Outpatient 0.963 0.189 
Long Term Care 0.336 0.472 
Major Diagnosis 0.909 0.287 
Minor Diagnosis 0.985 0.120  
Notes: A history of a “Minor Diagnosis” is defined by any history of cataracts, glaucoma, COPD, 
osteoporosis, or arthritis. A history of a “Major Diagnosis” is defined by any history of Alzheimer’s 
disease, dementia, atrial fibrillation, congestive heart failure, ischemic heart disease, acute myocardial 
infarction, cancer (endometrial, breast, colorectal, lung, or prostate), diabetes, hip fracture, or stroke. 
“Long Term Care” includes skilled nursing facility stays and home health visits. 
Table 2.2 displays the list of variables included in the choice model by type and the estimates 
of the utility parameters are presented in Tables 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5. It is important to note here 
that the sign of the estimate for the coefficient on distance is negative and highly significant 
and most of the interactions terms are significant as well, indicating varying substitution 
patterns across patient types. The choice model was estimated at the claim per physician 
location level to allow patients to have preferences over multiple service locations within the 
same practice, while the WTP to include a practice was aggregated up to the practice level. 
Thus, the WTP measures included in Tables 2.6, 2.7, and 2.8 are reported at the practice level 
(and not just one specific location within a practice). The five types of variables in the choice 
model are provider characteristics common across all patients (𝑅𝑗) and their interactions, 
distance from patient to provider (𝑇𝑖𝑗) and its interactions with provider characteristics (𝑇𝑖𝑗 ⋅
𝑅𝑗), distance interacted with patient specific clinical and demographic variables (𝑇𝑖𝑗 ⋅ 𝑋𝑖), 
interaction of patient characteristics with hospital characteristics (𝑅𝑗
′ ⋅ Γ1 ⋅ 𝑋𝑖), and interactions 
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of diagnosis and procedure codes of patients with diagnosis and procedure codes performed by 
the practice (𝑆𝑗
′ ⋅ Γ2 ⋅ 𝑍𝑖). 
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Table 2.2: Predictor Variables Included in the Logit Demand Model, by Type 
      
Variable Type Variable Interaction Variable 
Provider Characteristics 
(𝑅𝑗) 
Number of services performed at practice location (# SRVC) N/A 
Number of providers at practice location (# PROV) N/A 
Share of primary care physicians at practice location (SHARE PC) N/A 
Location employs NPs and/or PAs (NP PA) N/A 
SHARE PC # SRVC 
SHARE PC NP PA 
SHARE PC # PROV 
# SRVC SHARE PC 
# SRVC NP PA 
# SRVC # PROV 
NP PA # SRVC 
NP PA SHARE PC 
NP PA # PROV 
# PROV # SRVC 
# PROV SHARE PC 
# PROV NP PA 
Distance Interacted with 
Provider characteristics 
(𝑇𝑖𝑗 ⋅ 𝑅𝑗) 
Distance (DIST) N/A 
DIST # SRVC 
DIST # PROV 
DIST SHARE PC 
DIST NP PA 
Distance Interacted with 
Patient Characteristics 
(𝑇𝑖𝑗 ⋅ 𝑋𝑖) 
DIST Sex 
DIST Age 
DIST Race 
DIST Patient used either inpatient or outpatient services in 
2009 (IP/OP) 
DIST Patient used long term care services in 2009 (LTC) 
DIST Patient has a history of a severe medical diagnosis 
(SEVERE) 
DIST Patient has a history of a less severe medical 
diagnosis (MINOR) 
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Notes: A “MINOR” diagnosis is defined by a history of cataracts, glaucoma, COPD, osteoporosis, or arthritis. A “SEVERE” diagnosis is defined by a history 
of Alzheimer’s disease, dementia, atrial fibrillation, congestive heart failure, ischemic heart disease, acute myocardial infarction, cancer (endometrial, breast, 
colorectal, lung, or prostate), diabetes, hip fracture, or stroke.
Table 2.2 (Continued) 
Provider Characteristics 
Interacted with Patient 
Characteristics (𝑅𝑗
′ ⋅ Γ1 ⋅
𝑋𝑖) 
SHARE PC Sex 
SHARE PC Race 
SHARE PC Age 
SHARE PC IP/OP 
SHARE PC LTC 
SHARE PC SEVERE 
SHARE PC MINOR 
# SRVC Sex 
# SRVC Race 
# SRVC Age 
# SRVC IP/OP 
# SRVC LTC 
# SRVC SEVERE 
# SRVC MINOR 
NP PA Sex 
NP PA Race 
NP PA Age 
NP PA IP/OP 
NP PA LTC 
NP PA SEVERE 
NP PA MINOR 
# PROV Sex 
# PROV Race 
# PROV Age 
# PROV IP/OP 
# PROV LTC 
# PROV SEVERE 
# PROV MINOR 
Patient and Provider 
Match     (𝑆𝑗
′ ⋅ Γ2 ⋅ 𝑍𝑖) 
Patient diagnosis code Provider diagnosis code 
Patient procedure code Provider procedure code 
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Table 2.3: Coefficient Estimates from Cardiology Logit Demand Model 
            
Utility Input Utility Coefficient Utility Input Utility Coefficient Utility Input Utility Coefficient 
Distance -0.19593 Share 
Cardiologists*Female 
-0.10447 N Services*NP and/or 
PA 
-0.00021 
(0.00317) (0.02118) (0.00000) 
N Services 0.00026 Share Cardiologists*Age -0.12501 N Services*N 
Providers 
0.00000 
(0.00001) (0.01521) (0.00000) 
Share Cardiologists 0.71948 Share Cardiologists*White 0.26717 NP and/or PA*Female 0.02706 
(0.11711) (0.03095) (0.01319) 
NP and/or PA 0.75802 Share Cardiologists*IP/OP -0.28763 NP and/or PA*Age -0.17019 
(0.07436) (0.05889) (0.00940) 
Match Diagnosis 25.81602 Share Cardiologists*LTC -0.01160 NP and/or PA*White -0.09032 
(1069.09700) (0.02218) (0.01858) 
Match Procedure 25.61170 Share Cardiologists*Severe 
DX History 
0.53942 NP and/or PA*IP/OP -0.09191 
(1022.54700) (0.04891) (0.03573) 
N Providers -0.01732 Share Cardiologists*Minor 
DX History 
0.14308 NP and/or PA*LTC -0.01918 
(0.00105) (0.08721) (0.01383) 
Distance*Female -0.00581 Share Cardiologists*N 
Services 
0.00000 NP and/or PA*Severe 
DX History 
0.28735 
(0.00051) (0.00000) (0.03136) 
Distance*Age -0.01257 Share Cardiologists*NP 
and/or PA 
0.57981 NP and/or PA*Minor 
DX History 
-0.09439 
(0.00036) (0.02674) (0.05332) 
Distance*White 0.06943 Share Cardiologists*N 
Providers 
0.01809 NP and/or PA*N 
Providers 
0.01363 
(0.00116) (0.00080) (0.00055) 
Distance*IP/OP 0.02722 N Services*Female 0.00000 N Providers*Female -0.00033 
(0.00149) (0.00000) (0.00016) 
Distance*LTC 0.00524 N Services*Age 0.00002 N Providers*Age -0.00304 
(0.00055) (0.00000) (0.00011) 
Distance*Severe DX 
History 
0.00880 N Services*White 0.00003 N Providers*White -0.00388 
(0.00135) (0.00000) (0.00025) 
Distance*Minor DX 
History 
0.00594 N Services*IP/OP -0.00004 N Providers*IP/OP 0.00628 
(0.00227) (0.00000) (0.00042) 
Distance*N Services 0.00000 N Services*LTC -0.00002 N Providers*LTC 0.00312 
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00017) 
Distance*Share 
Cardiologists 
0.00187 N Services*Severe DX 
History 
-0.00001 N Providers*Severe 
DX History 
0.00137 
(0.00016) (0.00000) (0.00040) 
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Table 2.3 (Continued) 
Distance*NP and/or 
PA 
-0.00048 N Services*Minor DX 
History 
0.00000 N Providers*Minor 
DX History 
-0.00005 
(0.00012) (0.00000) (0.00066) 
Distance*N 
Providers 
0.00000     
(0.00000)     
Observations: 28,065,128     
Pseudo R2: 0.4436           
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 2.4: Coefficient Estimates from Oncology Logit Demand Model 
            
Utility Input Utility Coefficient Utility Input Utility Coefficient Utility Input Utility Coefficient 
Distance -0.18280 Share 
Oncologists*Female 
0.28510 N Services*NP 
and/or PA 
0.00010 
(0.00640) (0.03220) (0.00000) 
N Services -0.00010 Share Oncologists*Age 0.13730 N Services*N 
Providers 
0.00000 
(0.00000) (0.02360) (0.00000) 
Share Oncologists 1.04400 Share Oncologists*White 0.21870 NP and/or 
PA*Female 
-0.04970 
(0.19180) (0.04600) (0.02930) 
NP and/or PA 0.42950 Share Oncologists*IP/OP -0.30970 NP and/or PA*Age -0.04030 
(0.17590) (0.13460) (0.02200) 
Match Diagnosis 26.16610 Share Oncologists*LTC -0.19980 NP and/or PA*White 0.28820 
(1099.52100) (0.03460) (0.04130) 
Match Procedure 25.50770 Share 
Oncologists*Severe DX 
History 
0.12470 NP and/or PA*IP/OP -0.69500 
(1100.56800) (0.06180) (0.11290) 
N Providers 0.06220 Share Oncologists*Minor 
DX History 
0.31100 NP and/or PA*LTC -0.44100 
(0.00190) (0.11020) (0.03240) 
Distance*Female -0.00210 Share Oncologists*N 
Services 
0.00040 NP and/or PA*Severe 
DX History 
0.41310 
(0.00100) (0.00000) (0.05670) 
Distance*Age -0.00800 Share Oncologists*NP 
and/or PA 
-0.25130 NP and/or PA*Minor 
DX History 
0.67940 
(0.00080) (0.06920) (0.10130) 
Distance*White 0.05620 Share Oncologists*N 
Providers 
-0.14420 NP and/or PA*N 
Providers 
-0.06070 
(0.00210) (0.00320) (0.00110) 
Distance*IP/OP 0.02900 N Services*Female 0.00000 N Providers*Female 0.00150 
(0.00430) (0.00000) (0.00030) 
Distance*LTC -0.01230 N Services*Age 0.00000 N Providers*Age 0.00060 
(0.00120) (0.00000) (0.00020) 
Distance*Severe DX 
History 
-0.01810 N Services*White 0.00000 N Providers*White -0.00050 
(0.00190) (0.00000) (0.00040) 
Distance*Minor DX 
History 
0.01940 N Services*IP/OP 0.00000 N Providers*IP/OP -0.00010 
(0.00420) (0.00000) (0.00120) 
Distance*N Services 0.00000 N Services*LTC 0.00000 N Providers*LTC -0.00010 
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00030) 
Distance*Share 
Oncologists 
-0.00500 N Services*Severe DX 
History 
0.00000 N Providers*Severe 
DX History 
-0.00840 
(0.00030) (0.00000) (0.00060) 
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Table 2.4 (Continued) 
Distance*NP and/or PA -0.00560 N Services*Minor DX 
History 
0.00000 N Providers*Minor 
DX History 
-0.00450 
(0.00040) (0.00000) (0.00100) 
Distance*N Providers 0.00010     
(0.00000)     
Observations: 5,558,144      
Pseudo R2: 0.5483           
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
 98 
Table 2.5: Coefficient Estimates from Orthopedic Logit Demand Model 
            
Utility Input Utility Coefficient Utility Input Utility Coefficient Utility Input 
Utility 
Coefficient 
Distance -0.16600 Share 
Orthopedists*Female 
0.08820 N Services*NP and/or 
PA 
-0.00050 
(0.00760) (0.04720) (0.00000) 
N Services 0.00050 Share 
Orthopedists*Age 
0.23660 N Services*N 
Providers 
0.00000 
(0.00000) (0.03150) (0.00000) 
Share Orthopedists -0.69940 Share 
Orthopedists*White 
0.20910 NP and/or PA*Female -0.06680 
(0.27470) (0.07650) (0.02860) 
NP and/or PA -0.94860 Share 
Orthopedists*IP/OP 
-0.13920 NP and/or PA*Age 0.15400 
(0.27470) (0.09630) (0.01950) 
Match Diagnosis 25.50820 Share 
Orthopedists*LTC 
-0.00900 NP and/or PA*White -0.10440 
(967.44260) (0.04940) (0.04740) 
Match Procedure 24.49200 Share 
Orthopedists*Severe 
DX History 
-0.30250 NP and/or PA*IP/OP -0.07600 
(998.77620) (0.05340) (0.05690) 
N Providers -0.08760 Share 
Orthopedists*Minor 
DX History 
-0.17470 NP and/or PA*LTC -0.00830 
(0.00450) (0.24710) (0.03000) 
Distance*Female -0.01550 Share Orthopedists*N 
Services 
-0.00020 NP and/or PA*Severe 
DX History 
-0.18180 
(0.00120) (0.00000) (0.03190) 
Distance*Age -0.00800 Share Orthopedists*NP 
and/or PA 
2.11680 NP and/or PA*Minor 
DX History 
-0.05200 
(0.00080) (0.05360) (0.14160) 
Distance*White 0.04210 Share Orthopedists*N 
Providers 
0.10680 NP and/or PA*N 
Providers 
0.07450 
(0.00280) (0.00240) (0.00240) 
Distance*IP/OP 0.01890 N Services*Female 0.00000 N Providers*Female -0.00380 
(0.00250) (0.00000) (0.00070) 
Distance*LTC 0.00590 N Services*Age 0.00000 N Providers*Age -0.00530 
(0.00120) (0.00000) (0.00050) 
Distance*Severe 
DX History 
-0.00470 N Services*White 0.00000 N Providers*White 0.00320 
(0.00130) (0.00000) (0.00130) 
Distance*Minor 
DX History 
0.00360 N Services*IP/OP -0.00010 N Providers*IP/OP 0.01370 
(0.00660) (0.00000) (0.00140) 
Distance*N 
Services 
0.00000 N Services*LTC 0.00000 N Providers*LTC 0.00160 
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00070) 
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Table 2.5 (Continued) 
Distance*Share 
Orthopedists 
0.00160 N Services*Severe DX 
History 
0.00000 N Providers*Severe 
DX History 
-0.00400 
(0.00030) (0.00000) (0.00080) 
Distance*NP 
and/or PA 
0.00060 N Services*Minor DX 
History 
0.00010 N Providers*Minor 
DX History 
-0.00920 
(0.00020) (0.00000) (0.00330) 
Distance*N 
Providers 
0.00000     
(0.00000)     
Observations: 7,691,004     
Pseudo R2: 0.5601         
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
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The underlying utility parameter estimates are then used to generate a WTP for the inclusion 
of each practice in a network. The WTP measure reflects the populations WTP for a specific 
group practice in “logit utils.” The relative scale of the WTP measure is thus meaningless. The 
importance of the measure is that the “logit utils” can be converted into a price. Recalling the 
assumption that utils are related to price through the constant 𝛾 allows for this transformation. 
Tables 2.6, 2.7, and 2.8 contain descriptive statistics and WTP estimates for the three 
physician specialties in a large metropolitan area. 
Table 2.6: Cardiology Practices and WTP Estimates 
                
ID 
N 
Providers 
Share 
Cardiologists NP/PA 
𝑊𝑇𝑃
𝑅𝑉𝑈
  𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 =
$
𝑅𝑉𝑈
  
𝑅𝑉𝑈
𝑄
 Medicare 
𝑅𝑉𝑈
𝑄
 Private 
1 2 1.00 0 0.57 34.43 2.91 3.37 
2 2 1.00 0 0.27 31.15 8.63 6.06 
3 1 1.00 0 0.83 31.06 1.13 1.80 
4 1 1.00 0 0.48 30.27 0.94 0.81 
5 1 1.00 0 0.12 32.70 2.60 3.61 
6 1 1.00 0 0.52 44.67 1.30 2.95 
7 9 1.00 0 0.22 29.67 3.70 5.34 
8 1 1.00 0 0.26 36.79 4.07 3.60 
9 1 1.00 0 0.09 18.35 3.02 3.01 
10 1 1.00 0 0.19 34.18 1.86 1.73 
11 4 1.00 0 0.01 19.93 9.54 4.77 
12 1 1.00 0 0.49 39.09 3.50 1.85 
13 4 1.00 0 0.60 38.04 2.07 2.40 
14 5 1.00 0 0.16 38.13 5.68 3.67 
15 3 1.00 0 0.07 30.39 8.95 9.72 
16 3 1.00 0 0.10 30.09 4.36 4.39 
17 4 1.00 0 0.28 33.98 5.30 5.33 
18 6 0.17 0 0.39 43.36 1.89 1.99 
19 4 1.00 0 0.24 30.15 4.54 5.13 
20 3 0.33 0 0.09 30.40 4.68 5.79 
21 3 0.67 1 0.20 40.27 5.95 5.17 
22 1 1.00 0 0.15 32.70 2.70 3.61 
23 13 0.15 0 0.05 31.40 2.33 2.31 
24 9 1.00 0 0.35 31.69 3.50 5.04 
25 6 0.83 0 0.13 32.93 4.89 4.05 
26 3 1.00 0 0.19 37.92 5.73 5.05 
 
Source: Author’s estimations.
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Table 2.7: Oncology Practices and WTP Estimates 
                
ID 
N 
Providers 
Share 
Cardiologists NP/PA 
𝑊𝑇𝑃
𝑅𝑉𝑈
  𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 =
$
𝑅𝑉𝑈
  
𝑅𝑉𝑈
𝑄
 Medicare 
𝑅𝑉𝑈
𝑄
 Private 
1 2 1.00 0 0.33 42.31 6.02 7.34 
2 1 1.00 0 0.34 19.25 7.36 7.70 
3 2 1.00 0 0.14 34.60 6.61 5.06 
4 3 1.00 0 0.08 18.73 4.61 4.30 
5 4 1.00 0 0.29 34.52 2.11 2.62 
6 4 1.00 0 1.27 38.25 2.37 1.69 
7 1 1.00 0 0.48 38.05 2.16 2.45 
8 2 1.00 0 0.82 39.81 1.70 2.06 
9 1 1.00 0 0.66 36.40 1.87 2.76 
10 9 1.00 0 0.56 39.16 1.92 1.72 
11 8 1.00 0 0.64 37.11 1.82 1.55 
12 9 1.00 0 0.58 36.67 1.83 2.41 
13 2 1.00 0 0.20 41.07 6.81 6.61 
14 6 0.67 1 0.37 39.35 2.00 2.16 
15 2 1.00 0 0.40 38.82 1.95 1.88 
16 4 0.75 1 0.56 37.17 1.66 2.51 
17 5 0.80 1 0.73 50.64 2.02 2.00 
18 2 1.00 0 0.15 17.27 5.36 5.30 
 
Source: Author’s estimations.
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Table 2.8: Orthopedic Practices and WTP Estimates 
                
ID 
N 
Providers 
Share 
Cardiologists NP/PA 
𝑊𝑇𝑃
𝑅𝑉𝑈
  
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 =
$
𝑅𝑉𝑈
  
𝑅𝑉𝑈
𝑄
 Medicare 
𝑅𝑉𝑈
𝑄
 Private 
1 7 1.00 0 0.75 46.94 2.00 3.46 
2 2 1.00 0 0.25 36.73 4.14 3.42 
3 3 0.67 0 0.30 35.17 3.75 3.86 
4 4 1.00 0 0.97 55.09 2.92 3.58 
5 4 0.50 0 0.42 38.53 2.58 3.56 
6 3 1.00 0 0.28 41.32 3.45 3.07 
7 7 0.43 1 0.15 36.67 4.24 5.35 
8 2 0.50 0 0.22 31.51 4.09 3.92 
9 1 1.00 0 0.23 37.52 2.02 2.46 
10 2 1.00 0 0.17 37.97 2.95 2.94 
11 9 1.00 0 0.25 43.14 3.14 2.49 
12 3 1.00 0 0.09 34.48 6.23 5.24 
13 3 1.00 0 0.60 36.64 2.23 2.09 
14 3 1.00 0 0.51 38.45 2.78 2.61 
15 7 0.57 0 0.26 36.00 5.86 5.55 
16 6 1.00 0 0.39 48.04 3.21 3.64 
17 2 1.00 0 0.05 36.50 4.88 5.34 
18 2 1.00 0 0.31 36.38 3.59 2.86 
19 6 0.83 1 0.27 36.88 3.16 3.71 
20 2 1.00 0 0.23 37.92 2.76 3.01 
21 9 0.78 0 0.26 37.90 3.20 3.05 
22 3 0.33 0 0.36 46.32 2.61 2.86 
23 18 0.72 1 0.24 34.79 4.56 3.67 
24 8 1.00 0 0.24 36.20 3.55 3.35 
25 16 0.88 0 0.32 35.37 3.52 3.49 
26 2 1.00 0 0.19 33.49 5.57 4.79 
27 10 0.60 1 0.22 43.47 4.38 3.63 
28 18 0.06 1 0.31 38.67 2.30 1.90 
Source: Author’s estimations.
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Table 2.9 displays the estimations of the bargaining parameter for each specialty by service 
intensity.  Figure 2.1 shows scatterplots of the relationship between normalized WTP and 
price for each of the three specialties. The rows delineate the specialty and the columns 
investigate the potential for market segmentation within physician specialties by average 
service intensity. The average service intensity is calculated for each practice group by 
calculating the average RVUs per service for both Medicare services and private services. The 
sample is then limited by first removing the top 5% and the bottom 5% of service intensity 
and looking at market power in the middle 90th percentile of service intensity. This process is 
repeated for the middle 80th percentile as well. Removing the tails of service intensity allows 
me to analyze a source of potential market segmentation. Specifically, removing service 
intensity outliers generates a sample of practices that are more likely to compete with each 
other. In fact, the strongest evidence of physician market power in all markets comes from 
examining the middle 80th percentile of service intensity. As to be expected, the results are 
sensitive to the inclusion of these outliers since practices that perform high intensity services 
may be competing in a separate product market. Limiting the market to physician practices 
performing similar services is an assurance that I am analyzing practices that are competing in 
the same product market.
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Figure 2.1: Scatter Plot of  
𝑊𝑇𝑃
𝑅𝑉𝑈
  and Price 
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Excluded from the scatterplots, are hospital based practices, practices that perform very few 
Medicare and private services in the dataset (fewer than 100 services), practices with less than 
10% of their providers being in the relevant specialty, as well as practices that performed 
significantly different services for Medicare verses private patients.28 29 
Table 2.9: Estimates of the Bargaining Parameter Dependent Variable: Price per RVU 
          
Specialty Market N α β 
Cardiology All 26 31.58 8.85 
   (1.83)*** (5.41) 
 5-95pct 24 31.65 9.70 
   (1.94)*** (5.75) 
 10-90pct 18 29.97 15.80 
      (2.25)*** (7.51)** 
Orthopedics All 28 32.93 18.18 
   (1.45)*** (3.92)*** 
 5-95pct 25 32.53 21.27 
   (1.45)*** (4.36)*** 
 10-90pct 20 32.11 21.92 
      (1.76)*** (4.90)*** 
Oncology All 18 28.73 14.20 
   (3.60)*** (6.48)** 
 5-95pct 15 30.30 12.91 
   (3.61)*** (6.43)* 
 10-90pct 11 21.43 33.46 
      (4.01)*** (8.82)*** 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
Analyzing the middle 80th percentile of the service intensity distribution yields results 
indicating substantial market power for both physicians and insurers in all three specialties. 
The estimates of both the intercept and the slope parameters in all regressions for this group 
were positive and statistically significant. It is important to note that these results are sensitive 
                                                 
28 Practices in which the difference between average RVU per service for Medicare patients versus 
private patients was greater than 1.5 times the standard deviation of the difference were removed. 
29 The results presented here are extremely robust to varying the levels of these restrictions. The 
restrictions here were chosen to balance the validity of the price index and WTP measure with the 
estimating power of the OLS price regression. 
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to including practices in the tails of the service intensity distribution, but the changes in 
estimates are relatively minor. The changes in my estimates when including practices that 
provide extremely low or extremely high level of service intensity is consistent with the notion 
that these outlier practices provide a different set of services than most of the practices in the 
data. The product market here is the market in which physicians compete over patients to 
provide similar services. Practices providing very high or very low intensity services are not 
competing over the same types of patients and thus should not be included in the relevant 
product market. The results including all practices, as well as the middle 90th percentile of the 
distribution are included as robustness checks. 
2.6 Conclusions 
The application of the option demand model to hospitals has been shown to be a reliable 
method for assessing market power in hospital inpatient markets, and this research is the first 
step to validating the model’s use in assessing physician practice market power. The results 
from the option demand model applied to physician group practices indicate the existence of 
market power in the specialty physician group practice market in the large CBSA chosen to 
conduct this analysis. While these results are based on only one CBSA, the results are of 
greater interest to future applications of the option demand model to physician markets. 
However, the methods used in this paper are not without limitations. First, it is implicitly 
assumed in this study that Medicare Fee-for-Service (FFS) beneficiaries select physicians 
based on similar criteria as younger privately insured patients. This assumption is violated if 
there is a self-selection problem with respect to Medicare enrollees selecting to enroll in 
Medicare FFS verses Medicare Advantage (MA), enrollees in the latter have opted into a 
system that more closely resembles private insurance with access to physicians through a 
network. Medicare FFS enrollees also have a greater freedom of choice when selecting 
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physicians, and are not subject to out-of-network charges (financial steering) that patients 
insured through the private sector may encounter. Second, while this study is the first to use 
actual transaction price data to infer physician market power, the price data is available for 
only 62% of the private insurance claims in the FAIR Health database. To the extent that these 
claims do not constitute a representative sample of insurers, the data may not accurately reflect 
the prices paid for primary care services in the analysis market. Lastly, this study shows the 
existence of physician market power in only one geographic area. Future work should apply 
these methods to other geographic areas. Despite these limitations, this analysis has made the 
assessment of market power in physician markets feasible and more complete than has been 
previously implemented.  
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CHAPTER 3                                                                                                                
THE IMPORTANCE OF VALUING HEALTH INSURANCE WHEN MEASURING 
AND ACCOUNTING FOR CHANGES IN THE INCOME OF WORKING AGED 
PEOPLE WITH AND WITHOUT DISABILITIES 
3.1 Introduction 
There is considerable debate over the importance of including the value of employer and 
government provided health insurance in income measures that attempt to capture the ability 
of households to consume good and services or to save for future periods (See for example: 
Burkhauser, Larrimore & Simon, 2013; and Aaron & Burtless, 2014). While employer or 
government provided health insurance does not have the explicit tradable value of cash wages 
or cash government transfers, it is possible to put a cash value on it for the purpose of 
measuring yearly income. In-kind compensation in the form of employer provided health 
insurance and in-kind government transfers in the form of Medicare and Medicaid directly 
provide access to health insurance and while these benefits cannot be traded, they have some 
value to those who receive it. Effectively valuing the consumption value of health insurance at 
zero by excluding it from income measures clearly undervalues it, and will do so move over 
time if its value increases as a share of wage compensation or the mix of government transfers 
provided households.  
Including the value of health insurance in an income measure theoretically moves the measure 
toward a definition of access to economic resources by adding up all expenditures on 
consumption.  This theoretical point was made by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
(2012, 2013) in their justification for including the market value of health insurance in their 
income measure beginning in 2012. This essay will measure the impact of including the 
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market value of health insurance on levels and trends in the median income of working age 
people (aged 18-64) with and without disabilities.   
Past measures of income that excluded the value of employer and government provided health 
insurance found a rising gap in the level of median income of these those without and those 
with disabilities. This was especially the case when only market income was included. While 
the inclusion of in-cash government transfers narrowed the gap somewhat, it still continued to 
grow over time. This finding is reversed when the market value of health insurance is 
included.  
This essay also shows what accounts for changes in this fuller measure of the median income 
of working age people with and without disabilities over the last three business cycles from 
1983-2011, using a shift share analysis.  Shift share analysis decomposes the growth in 
income into individual contributions from changes in demographics and source incomes. 
This analysis uses the public use March Current Population Survey (CPS), the most common 
data source researchers’ use to measure levels and long term trends in United States income 
and its distribution.  This essay compares four alternative measures of income using these 
data.  The first is market income (all private sources of cash income). Piketty & Saez (2003) 
and others in the income inequality literature use this measure of income but do so primarily 
with income tax records data (See: Atkinson, Piketty & Saez, 2011, for a review of this 
literature).  The second is market and government income (all private and public sources of 
cash income). This was the most commonly used income measure through the early 2000s 
(See: Atkinson & Brandolini, 2001; and Gottschalk & Smeeding, 1997, for reviews of this 
literature). It continues to be used by the Census Bureau (U.S. Census Bureau, various years) 
and by those tracking the resources available to those with and without disability (See for 
example: Houtenville et al., 2009; Burkhauser & Daly, 2011; and Stapleton, 2011).  The third 
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is disposable income (market and government income plus the value of in-kind transfers 
except employer and government provided health insurance minus taxes). The fourth is 
disposable income plus health insurance (disposable income plus the insurance value of 
employer and government provided health insurance) used by CBO since 2012 and by 
Burkhauser, Larrimore, & Simon (2012), Armour, Burkhauser, & Larrimore (2013, 
forthcoming), and Aaron & Burtless (2014). It is the fullest of the four yearly measures of the 
flow of resources available to individuals and their households.30 
Including the value of health insurance as income recognizes the policy shift of the United 
States government from providing in-cash transfers to providing more in-kind transfers.  This 
is especially true for health insurance with Medicare and Medicaid, and even more recently 
the Affordable care Act of 2010 (ACA).  The ACA both expands Medicaid and provides 
substantial subsidies for the purchase of health insurance through government run exchanges.  
The ACA along with the substantial rise in the cost of health insurance in both government 
and employer subsidized coverage underscores the importance of including this in-kind 
benefit in any measure attempting to capture access to material resources.  
This essay confirms findings by others who include health insurance in their measure of 
income in that doing so substantially increases median income and its growth for the 
population as a whole. This continues to be the case, but to a lesser degree for the working age 
population and much more for the working age population with disabilities. While the income 
gap between those with and without disabilities increases over time using the first three 
                                                 
30 Some would argue, based on a Haig-Simons principal of income, that capital gains should also be 
included.  The CBO includes realized capital gains in its measure of income as do some researchers in 
the top income literature.  However, numerous researchers have pointed out that accrued capital 
gains is more consistent with the Haig-Simons measure of income (Auerbach, 1989; Roine & 
Waldenstrom, 2012; and Armour, Burkhauser, & Larrimore 2013, forthcoming). Furthermore, Armour 
et al. (2013) demonstrate that taxable realized capital gains is not a very accurate measure of accrued 
capital gains to capture levels and trends in top income. 
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measures, it falls when the value of health insurance is included. More generally when the 
insurance value of health insurance is included, the share of people with disabilities in the 
bottom quintile of the working age population falls. Decisions to include or ignore the value of 
health insurance dramatically affect the level and the trend in the median income of the 
working age population with and without disabilities and the demographic make-up of the 
bottom part of the income distribution. 
This essay uses four definitions of income, some of which may be better classified as material 
resources.  Income definitions 3 and 4 include in-kind benefits, this essay recognizes that these 
measures include more than just cash income, and for simplicity in exposition, all measures 
will be referred to as “income.” Using the fullest measure of income in a shift share analyses, 
this essay shows that between 1983 and 2011, median household income of working age 
people with disabilities increased by 50.85 percent compared 31.46 percent for working age 
people without disabilities. Growth in the labor earnings of others family members is the 
single most important source of this increase followed by the growth in own labor earnings for 
working age people without disabilities—both market income sources. In contrast, growth in 
the insurance value of Medicare and Medicaid benefits for those receiving either Social 
Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) or Supplemental Security Income (SSI) is by far the 
single most important source of income for working age people without disabilities, with the 
labor earnings of other household members a distant second.  However the majority of this 
increase occurred between 1993 and 2004. 
3.2 Review of the Literature 
Market income (definition 1) does not fully capture the resources available to individuals.   
For instance, the United States provides categorical cash support to low income single mothers 
with children via the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program (TANF) as well as 
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access to in-kind support via government provided Food Stamps (SNAP).  Hence the 
traditional CPS-based income literature includes market and government income (income 
definition 2), but has only recently included some in-kind transfers and also accounted for 
taxes (subtracting federal and state taxes but adding the Earned Income Tax Credit and other 
tax based credits)—disposable income (income definition 3). It is only very recently that 
researchers have included the value of employer and government provided health insurance in 
their income measures—disposable income plus health insurance (income definition 4) and 
this continues to be controversial due to the debate over whether income or consumption is a 
preferable measure of economic wellbeing.  
Past analyses of the income of working age people with disabilities using a market and 
government cash income measure have found that, despite significant increases in SSDI/SSI 
program enrollment and costs, their income has steadily declined relative to working age 
people without disabilities (Burkhauser et al., 2009; Burkhauser & Daly, 2011; Stapleton, 
2011; and Weathers & Wittenburg, 2009).  However, a growing fraction of persons with 
disabilities are not only receiving cash support through SSI/DI programs, but also access to 
Medicare and Medicaid.  This essay shows that doing so matters and that it is appropriate to 
include these resources within a fuller measure of income. 
3.3 Inclusion of the Market Value of Health Insurance as Income 
Until recently, researchers did not include the insurance value of health insurance in measures 
of income (See: Atkinson & Brandolini, 2001; and Gottschalk & Smeeding, 1997, for reviews 
of this literature). The Census Bureau (U.S. Census Bureau, various years) still excludes the 
value of health insurance in its measures of median market and government income (definition 
2) and gives it no value for those in poverty in its fuller measures of income.  Burtless (2010) 
notes the importance of including government income in the analysis of income trends, 
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especially over recessions.   Tax policies and government in-cash and in-kind benefits are an 
important component of many households’ incomes.  Aaron & Burtless (2014) include the 
market value of health insurance in their measure of income (disposable income plus health 
insurance) to analyze the potential effects of the Affordable Care Act on income inequality.  
The Congressional Budget Office (2012, 2013) also uses a disposable income plus health 
insurance measure of income to analyze income inequality.  The Congressional Budget Office 
(2013) finds that income inequality has been growing rapidly at the top one percent of the 
income distribution while income inequality for those below the 99th percentile has remained 
largely unchanged over the past 30 years.  Burkhauser, Larrimore, & Simon (2013) include the 
market value of health insurance in their measure of income (disposable income plus health 
insurance) and find that income inequality decreases relative to a measure of disposable 
income alone.  Additionally Burkhauser, Larrimore, & Simon (2013) find that the benefit from 
the expansion of health insurance under the Affordable Care Act would be accrued mostly by 
the bottom 30th percentile of the income distribution.  This result reflects the fact that the 
market value of government provided health insurance has been growing faster than the 
market value of employer provided health insurance.  
Armour, Burkhauser, & Larrimore (2013, forthcoming) include the value of health insurance 
in their tables comparing trend results using their preferred measure of income (disposable 
income plus health insurance) with those of CBO (2013) and show that it is the CBO’s 
inclusion of taxable realized capital gains in their preferred measure of income (disposable 
income plus health insurance plus taxable realized capital gains) rather than other sources of 
income that accounts for differences in the two sets of income trend results.  
A full measure of the flow of economic resources to a household should include not only cash 
resources, but also access to goods and services such as housing, food and health care.  Hence 
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the market value of these goods and services should be included in any measure of their 
economic resources, regardless of whether access to these services is subsidized by the 
government or one’s employer.  An issue commonly confused with the including the value of 
health insurance as income is that individuals may not value in-kind benefits at their market 
value.  This is reflected in the way the Census Bureau censors the fungible value of Medicare 
and Medicaid at zero for persons who fall below a specific income threshold.  Because this 
essay attempts to measure the flow of resources to a household and not the individual 
valuation of the flow of resources, this issue is of no concern for this essay. 
This paper does not attempt to disentangle individuals’ idiosyncratic valuation of subsidized 
goods and services (e.g., Medicaid, SNAP (food stamps), housing subsidies), but instead 
measure the overall market value of earned income and subsidized goods and services.  One 
concern, sometimes confounded with including the value of health insurance as income, is 
whether increases in the price of health insurance reflect medical inflation, with individuals 
receiving the same level of health care at a higher cost, or improvements in the quality of 
health benefits.  The rising cost of health care affects all U.S. residents who desire to access 
medical services, independent of insurance status.  The issue of why health care costs are 
rising is separate from the market valuation health insurance.  Persons receiving employer 
sponsored health insurance or publicly sponsored health insurance do not pay the full market 
value because employers or the government subsidize the benefit (similar to SNAP or housing 
subsidies).  Therefore, individuals receiving public health coverage who are in poverty may 
not value their public health insurance benefit at the full market value (cost to the government 
of providing the health benefit), but without the benefit they would be left with the choice of 
purchasing insurance on their own in the private market or going uninsured.  Therefore, the 
market value of health insurance is a very important measure that directly affects economic 
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wellbeing.  As such, the subsidized market value of health insurance from both private and 
public sources should be included in any measure of economic wellbeing.         
3.4 Methods 
3.4.1 Introduction 
The goal of this analysis is to assess trends in the economic resources available to working age 
people with and without disabilities over the past three decades using a more encompassing 
resource definition that includes the market value of employer and government provided 
health insurance.  These trends are compared to the three alternative and less comprehensive 
income measures discussed above.   Including the market value of health insurance in the 
fourth and fullest measure of income results in substantially different level and trends in 
median income from those found in the previous literature comparing the income of those 
with and without disabilities.   
3.4.2 Data 
This essay uses CPS data for income years 1980 to 2012 supplemented with cell-means for 
top-coded incomes from Larrimore et al. (2008) to analyze income trends between persons 
with and without disabilities.  CPS data was, and continues to be, the most common data 
source researchers’ use to measure trends in income and income inequality in general (for 
example, see DeNavas-Walt, Proctor, & Smith 2008, 2013; Gottschalk & Danziger, 2005; 
Daly & Valetta, 2006; Blank, 2011), and the employment and economic resources of  working 
aged people with disabilities (for example, see Acemoglu & Angrist, 2001; Autor & Duggan, 
2003, 2006; Bound & Waidmann, 1992, 2002; Burkhauser, Daly, & Houtenville, 2001; 
Burkhauser et al., 2002; Daly & Burkhauser, 2003; Houtenville & Burkhauser, 2005; 
Hotchkiss, 2003, 2004; Jolls & Prescott, 2005, Burkhauser & Daly, 2011).     
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3.4.3 Identification of Working Aged Persons with Disabilities 
The CPS is the only data set that provides consistent information on the economic resources of 
persons with disabilities since 1981 (income year 1980).  We focus on working age (18 to 64) 
people who report having a work limiting condition.31  Researchers should be cautious using 
any self-reported measure.  Fortunately, the economics literature has specifically addressed the 
use of this work activity question as a proxy for disability status in the CPS.  Benita-Silva et 
al. (2004) find that self-reported work limitation responses are an unbiased indicator of SSDI 
eligibility decisions and Stern (1989) finds that the measure is close to exogenous.  Bound & 
Burkhauser (1999) find that the self-reported measure identifies populations with substantial 
differences in health status.  Burkhauser et al. (2002) argue that the CPS can be reliably used 
to monitor trends in the outcomes of those with disabilities using the self-reported work 
limitation indicator.   
3.4.4 Definition of Income 
As discussed above this essay uses four income definitions that are increasingly more all-
encompassing. Market income includes cash income from private sources.  Market and 
government income includes cash income from private and government sources.  Disposable 
income includes cash income from private sources and government sources plus some in-kind 
transfers (SNAP, housing subsidies, and school lunches) plus tax credits minus federal and 
state income taxes.  Disposable income plus health insurance includes disposable income plus 
the full cash value of employer sponsored health insurance and government provided 
(Medicare and Medicaid) health insurance. 
                                                 
31 The specific question asked to respondents is whether or not a person has “a health problem or 
disability which prevents work or which limits the kind or amount of work.” 
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Market and government income has been the main definition used in prior income trend 
analyses (for example, see Gottschalk & Danziger, 2005; Daly & Valetta, 2006; Blank, 2011).  
Disposable income is the preferred measure in EU and OECD studies.  Disposable income 
plus health insurance has been used to analyze income trends and inequality more recently in 
the literature (for example, see Aaron & Burtless, 2014; Congressional Budget Office, 2012, 
2013; Burkhauser, Larrimore, & Simon, 2013; Armour, Burkhauser, & Larrimore 2013, 
forthcoming; Sommers & Oellerich, 2013).   
The Census Bureau imputes the value of SNAP (food stamps), subsidized housing, and school 
lunches on an annual basis.  This essay uses these values for the cash value of in-kind 
government transfers.  The Census Bureau recognizes in-kind transfers as an important 
resource for low income households and has since included their market value in their 
Supplemental Poverty Measure (Interagency Technical Working Group, 2010).   
This essay imputes the value of tax credits and tax liabilities using the NBER TaxSim 9.0.  
Tax credits include the EITC. Tax liabilities include federal and state tax liabilities as well as 
FICA and SECA taxes based on the tax laws in effect in each year (see Feenberg and Coutts 
(1993) for more information on the TaxSim program).  The CPS samples households which 
can include multiple tax filing units, thus each household is divided into tax units prior to 
imputing tax credits and liabilities using the same procedure outlined in Burkhauser et al. 
(2012), which is based on the same assumptions on tax units first used by Piketty & Saez 
(2003). 
The Census Bureau also imputes the full market value of employer and government provided 
health insurance based on the cost of provision.  Employers’ contributions are imputed at their 
full cash value.  The Census Bureau first determines whether an individual is covered by an 
employer sponsored health insurance plan and whether the employer paid for all, part or none 
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of the plan premium.  Next, persons in the March CPS are statistically matched to persons in 
the National Medical Care Expenditure Survey or Medical Expenditure Panel Survey 
(depending on survey year) based on several demographic characteristics to impute the cash 
value of employer contributions.  Census uses this imputed value as its measure of the value 
of private insurance for covered workers.  Individual expenditures on employer sponsored 
health insurance plan premiums or expenditures on small-group/individual market health plans 
come from other income sources and are not included as income. 
The Census Bureau also imputes the fungible and market values of government subsidized 
health insurance (Medicare and Medicaid).  First, the Census Bureau determines the average 
government cost of providing Medicare and Medicaid by state and risk class.  The two risk 
classes for Medicare are aged and disabled.  The four risk classes for Medicaid are aged, 
disabled, children, and adults.32  Thus, the imputed average cost of government provided 
health insurance varies by state and means of accessing government insurance.   
The fungible values of Medicare and Medicaid are computed differently from the cash value 
of employer subsidies to health insurance.  Rather than assume, as in the case of employer 
provided insurance, that this non-wage compensation is a perfect substitute for wages and 
hence on the margin can be valued at its cost to the employer, the fungible value does not 
make this assumption. Instead it assumes that  persons whose income is not sufficient to 
purchase “basic food and housing requirements” as estimated by a poverty threshold are 
                                                 
32 The Medicare and Medicaid risk classes reflect the channel through which benefits were accessed.  
The Medicare risk class “aged” applies to all persons on Medicare aged 65 or older.  The Medicare risk 
class “disabled” applies to all persons accessing Medicare benefits through the SSDI program.  The 
Medicaid risk class “children” applies to children accessing Medicaid benefits through either traditional 
Medicaid or a state’s Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP).  The Medicaid risk class “adults” 
applies to all adults under the age of 65 accessing Medicaid benefits.  The Medicaid risk class “aged” 
applies to all persons accessing Medicaid aged 65 or older.  Lastly, the Medicaid risk class “disabled” 
applies to all persons accessing Medicaid benefits due to their qualification for SSI benefits.  
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deemed to put no value on government provided health insurance, and hence place a fungible 
value on it of zero.33  For persons not in poverty, the fungible value of government insurance 
is estimated at its full market value, as is the case for employer sponsored health insurance.   
Like Burkhauser, Larrimore, & Simon (2012) and Armour, Burkhauser, & Larrimore (2013), 
this essay uses the full market value of employer and government provided health insurance.   
For persons above the poverty line this is the Census imputed measure of the fungible value of 
government provided public insurance. For those at or below the poverty line, the Census 
Bureau’s imputation formula is used, this value is not replaced with a zero.  
The unit of analysis in this essay is the individual.  To account for economies of scale in 
household consumption, household income is divided by the square root of the number of 
persons in the household.  This size adjustment is common in US and international research 
studies of income trends and inequality (for example, see Gottschalk & Smeeding, 1997; 
Atkinson & Brandolini, 2001; Burkhauser et al., 2011, 2012; d’Ercole & Förster, 2012; 
Ruggles, 1990).  All incomes are subsequently adjusted to 2010 dollar amounts using the 
Consumer Price Index Research Series (CPI-U-RS) (Steward & Reed, 1999).  
3.4.5 Decomposition of Income Growth 
This essay disentangles changes in income due to short-run business cycle fluctuations 
from long run economic trends by analyzing income growth over similar trough points 
in the business cycle—1983-1993, 1993-2004 and 2004-2011.34  Using shift-share 
                                                 
33 See Census Bureau technical documentation http://www2.census.gov/prod2/popscan/tp-58.pdf  
34 Official NBER macroeconomic business cycle recession years are denoted in gray vertical bars in all 
figures. In these analyses, peak and trough business cycle years are defined by peaks and troughs in 
median market income with one exception. Because median income only slightly increased in 1983 and 
unemployment rates persisted above 10 percent for half of that year, this essay considers 1983 rather 
than 1982 to be the last year of that recession. 
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methods, this essay decomposes income and isolates factors that contribute to income 
changes over business cycle trough years.  These methods have been used by Burtless 
(1999), Iceland (2003), Daly & Valetta (2006), Larrimore, Burkhauser & Armour 
(2013), and Larrimore (forthcoming).  Shift-share analysis does not demonstrate 
causality, but can account for changes in income over time due to fluctuations in 
demographic characteristics and source incomes.  Using shift-share methods allows 
demographic composition and source incomes of the population to change one factor 
at a time, with the estimated contribution of each factor conditional on the previous 
factors. 
The decomposition of income growth uses two methods.  The first, from Atkinson 
(1998) and Burtless (1999), estimates income changes due to changes in the fraction 
of the population in subgroups.  For example, this method considers how declining 
marriage rates affect the overall income distribution.  This method compares one 
trough year to the next trough year (for example, 1983 and 1993), with observations 
from the base year (1983) reweighed so the fraction in each demographic group 
matches the fraction in the future trough year (1993).  For example, the weights of 
individuals in 1983 increase for demographic groups which become more prevalent in 
1993 and decrease for demographic groups that become less prevalent.  This method 
accounts for changes in income between two trough years from changes in the fraction 
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of demographic characteristics without altering the underlying income distributions 
within each demographic group.35   
The second method, from Burtless (1999), Daly & Valetta (2006) and Larrimore 
(forthcoming), considers changes in source level income distributions and correlations 
across income sources within population subgroups.  This technique allows the 
income distributions within demographic subgroups to change, and allows the changes 
in source level incomes to be correlated.  An individual’s income can be disaggregated 
into the sum of their source incomes.  Let 𝑌𝑖𝑘
𝑡  be the total income in year 𝑡 of 
individual 𝑖 from demographic subgroup 𝑘.  Equation 3.1 shows that total income is 
the sum of all person 𝑖’s income sources 𝑓1𝑖𝑘
𝑡  through (equation 3.1):  
𝑓𝑁𝑖𝑘
𝑡 .𝑌𝑖𝑘
𝑡 = 𝑓1𝑖𝑘
𝑡 + 𝑓2𝑖𝑘
𝑡 + ⋯ + 𝑓𝑁𝑖𝑘
𝑡  
To account for changes in the income distribution of the first factor 𝑓1𝑖𝑘
𝑡 , the method 
assigns a percentile rank 𝑝𝑓1𝑖𝑘to each individual for the first income source within 
each demographic group 𝑘.  It then matches the percentile for each person within a 
demographic subgroup in the base year (for example, 1983) to the income calculated 
from the matching percentile from that demographic subgroup in the subsequent 
trough year (for example, 1993).  Equation 3.2 then calculates a new income measure 
                                                 
35 The demographic characteristics used were age brackets 18-44 and 45-64, race categories white and 
non-white, marital status of the householder (Marital status is the marital status of the household head, 
who can either be married, a single male, or a single female.), employment (yes or no), and receipt of 
SSI/DI benefits (yes or no). 
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by replacing the first source income in the base year with the matched first source 
income from the subsequent trough year (equation 3.2): 
𝑌𝑖𝑘
𝑡′(𝑝𝑓1𝑖𝑘)
̂ = 𝑓1𝑖𝑘
𝑡′ (𝑝𝑓1𝑖𝑘) + 𝑓2𝑖𝑘
𝑡 + ⋯ + 𝑓𝑁𝑖𝑘
𝑡  
The new income measure 𝑌𝑖𝑘
𝑡′(𝑝𝑓1𝑖𝑘)
̂
 is an estimate of person 𝑖 from demographic 
subgroup 𝑘’s income in the subsequent trough year conditional on changes in only 
demographic characteristics and income from the first source. 
The next step uses Equations 3.3 and 3.4 to account for correlations between income 
sources by iteratively combining and assigning income sources a percentile based on 
the combined income source.  For example in Equation 3.3 a new income source is 
defined which is equal to the sum of income source 1 and 2 (equation 3.3): 
𝑔1+2𝑖𝑘
𝑡 = 𝑓1𝑖𝑘
𝑡 + 𝑓2𝑖𝑘
𝑡  
A percentile rank 𝑞1+2𝑖𝑘 is then assigned to each individual for the sum of income 
sources 1 and 2 within each demographic subgroup 𝑘.  The percentile for each person 
within a demographic subgroup in the base year (for example, 1983) is matched to the 
income calculated from the matching percentile from that demographic subgroup in 
the subsequent trough year (for example, 1993).  A new income measure is then 
calculated by replacing the sum of income sources 1 and 2 in the base year with the 
matched sum of source 1 and 2 income from the subsequent trough year (equation 
3.4): 
𝑌𝑖𝑘
𝑡′(𝑞𝑔1+2𝑖𝑘)
̂ = 𝑔1+2𝑖𝑘
𝑡′ (𝑞𝑔1+2𝑖𝑘) + 𝑓3𝑖𝑘
𝑡 + ⋯ + 𝑓𝑁𝑖𝑘
𝑡  
 127 
The new income measure 𝑌𝑖𝑘
𝑡′(𝑞𝑔1+2𝑖𝑘)
̂
 is an estimate of person 𝑖 from demographic 
subgroup 𝑘’s income in the subsequent trough year conditional on changes in only 
demographic characteristics, the level of source 1 and 2 incomes, and the correlation 
between source 1 and 2 incomes.  This process is iterated with additional incomes 
absorbed by 𝑔 until all source incomes have been considered.  For example, the 𝑔 
defined for income source 3 is 𝑔1+2+3𝑖𝑘
𝑡 = 𝑓1𝑖𝑘
𝑡 + 𝑓2𝑖𝑘
𝑡 + 𝑓3𝑖𝑘
𝑡 . 
After each step in the shift-share analysis, the shift-share algorithm calculates a 
theoretical income statistic based on only the considered factors changing.  For 
example, in step one, changes to income based on shifts in the age distribution are 
considered.  This step generates a theoretical income measure for the subsequent 
trough year that would prevail if only the age distribution changed.  The algorithm 
compares this measure to the actual observed income measure in the base year.  The 
difference between the two measures is presumably due to changes in the age 
distribution.  The next factor considered is race, this step estimates the impact from a 
change in the race structure between the two years conditional on the change in the 
age distribution.  The interpretation for changes in source incomes is very similar as 
well.  For example, the median of 𝑌𝑖𝑘
𝑡′(𝑞𝑔1+2𝑖𝑘)
̂
 for all 𝑖 and 𝑘 is generated.  The 
algorithm compares this statistic to the median of 𝑌𝑖𝑘
𝑡  for all 𝑖 and 𝑘.  The difference 
between the two is presumably due to changes in all specified demographic 
characteristics and changes in the level and correlation of sources 1 and 2.  Ultimately, 
these shift share techniques compare all of these differences to the true income statistic 
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in the subsequent trough year to determine the percentage point contribution of each 
factor to changes in the income measure. 
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Summary Statistics 
Table 3.1A and Table 3.1B respectively report demographic characteristics for those with and 
without a work limitation, our disability measure for each trough year of the analysis – 1983, 
1993, 2004 and 2011.  Persons with disabilities are on average older, less likely to be 
employed, less likely to be married, and far more likely to be receiving disability benefits 
through either SSDI or SSI.
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Table 3.1: Demographic Characteristics of People with and without Disabilities 
Year N Weighted N Age Male White 
Full 
Time 
Part 
Time 
Householder Married 
Receive 
SSI/DI 
Panel A - Without Disabilities 
1983 90,571.00 132,735,786 36.75 0.49 0.83 0.48 0.33 0.78 0.73 0.01 
1993 83,035.00 146,354,650 37.67 0.49 0.79 0.55 0.3 0.77 0.68 0.01 
2004 116,471.00 167,580,422 39.37 0.49 0.74 0.59 0.25 0.77 0.64 0.01 
2011 112,809.00 177,367,748 39.96 0.49 0.71 0.54 0.25 0.73 0.61 0.02 
Panel B - With Disabilities 
1983 6,999 10,365,064 46.92 0.51 0.79 0.13 0.22 0.8 0.61 0.27 
1993 6,952 12,753,461 45.41 0.52 0.73 0.11 0.24 0.76 0.53 0.35 
2004 9,461 14,536,005 46.85 0.49 0.71 0.09 0.18 0.75 0.46 0.44 
2011 9,449 15,777,357 48.37 0.49 0.7 0.06 0.16 0.75 0.44 0.48 
Source: Author’s estimation from March CPS data. 
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3.5.2 Trends in Median Income 
Figure 3.1A replicates, from 1980 to 2012, levels and trends in the size-adjusted household 
income of the median person in the United States using CPS data based on each of the four 
measures of income found in Armour, Burkhauser & Larrimore (2013, forthcoming).  Official 
NBER recession periods are shaded. As discussed above, rather than use these years to 
compare business cycle troughs years, Figure 3.1 and all subsequent figures and tables define 
a trough year as the last year in which median market income falls following a recession – 
1983, 1993, 2004 and 2011 – and peak years are defined as the highest median market income 
year between these troughs – 1989, 2000, and 2007. With the exception of 1983, the median 
market income trough years follow the official NBER recession ending years.  This is the 
case, because the major component of market income is labor earnings and it is a lag indicator 
of business recovery. 
The level of median income varies across its four definitions. As the sources of income 
increase, so does median income. Median market income (income definition 1) is below 
market and government income (income definition 2) in all years. But the difference has 
grown over time as the value of government transfers received by the average American 
increased.  Disposable income is a fuller measure of available resources and for the median 
American, its value lies below market income in all years. That is, when government taxes as 
well as government transfers are considered, median disposable income is below market 
income for the average American. However, this difference was much smaller during the 
Great Recessions years (2007-2011) than during previous recessions—a major finding of 
Armour, Burkhauser and Larrimore (2014) using this measure of income.  
Most relevant for this essay however is that adding the insurance value of employer and 
government provided health insurance to disposable income for people with and without 
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disabilities, not only increases median income in all years, but does so to such a degree that 
after trough year 1993, median income increases every year until 2006, the year before the 
start of the Great Recession. This period includes the years 2000-2004 over which median 
market income declined and 2001-2002, an NBER recession year. While median disposable 
income and disposable income including health insurance measures fell from 2006-2008, they 
stabilized thereafter at higher values relative to their peak years than the first two income 
definitions.
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Source: Author’s estimation from March CPS data. 
 
Figure 3.1: Trend in Median Size-Adjusted Household Income of Persons 
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3.5.3 Comparing Levels and Trends in the Incomes of Working Age People with and 
without Disabilities 
Figure 3.1B focuses on median income levels and trends for the working age (18-64) 
population. The trough years are unchanged. But because this is a working age population 
(older and younger persons are included only to the extent that they live in the households of 
working age persons and contribute to household income), the market income of the median 
person is considerably higher than was the case in Figure 3.1A. The levels of the other three 
measures of median income are also higher relative to their Figure 3.1A counterparts but to a 
lesser degree. As a result, the median household size adjusted income of the median person as 
measured by disposable income plus health insurance never exceeds the more traditional 
market and government income median values. But the difference between them lessens each 
year from 1993 through 2006.  
Figure 3.2 disaggregates the working age population into those with disabilities (Figure 3.2A) 
and those without disabilities (Figure 3.2B). The market income of the median working age 
person with disabilities is somewhat sensitive to general economic conditions over the first 
two full business cycles captured trough to trough in the data (1983-1993-2004) but less so in 
the third (2004-2011).  It rises slightly from its 1983 trough through peak year 1989 before 
plunging to an even lower trough in 1993. It then rises to a 1999 peak year high before 
returning to approximately its 1993 level during trough year 2004. It continues to fall in 2005 
but does rise slightly in 2006. It has fallen continuously since then to a record low during 
trough year 2011, well below its previous 2004 trough value. It fell again in 2012. Over the 
three full business cycles Figure 3.2A captures, median market income fell from $13,304 in 
1983 to $9,448 in 2011 with most of the decline occurring in the first and third business cycle.
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Source: Author’s estimation from March CPS data. 
 
Figure 3.2: Trend in Median Size-Adjusted Household Income of Persons with and without Disabilities 
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This substantial drop in market income has been offset by increases in other sources of 
income. Median market and government income is not only higher in all years, but the growth 
of government transfers has increasingly mitigated the drop in market income over time. 
Median disposable income is slightly lower than market and government income in all years 
but this difference is smaller in later years. The disposable income of the median working age 
person with a disability rose slightly over each of the first business cycles and fell modestly 
over the third.  Over the three full business cycles Figure 3.2A captures, median disposable 
income rose from $17,529 in 1983 to $18,009 in 1993, and again increased to $19,989 in 
2004.  Disposable income then fell from its 2004 level to $18,840 in 2011. 
Including the insurance value of employer and government provided health insurance 
dramatically changes median income levels and trends for this population. In 1983 there is 
very little difference between measured median disposable incomes including or excluding 
health insurance. But the substantial increase in the value of employer and government 
provided health insurance for this population profoundly affects median disposable income. 
Median income rises substantially over the first two business cycles, peaks in 2005 before 
falling to a low in 2008. The growth in the value of health insurance thereafter more than 
offsets the decline in other income so that median income rose from 2008-2010 and then fell 
reflecting the trend in the other three median income measures. Over the entire three business 
cycle period (1983-2011) however median disposable income plus health insurance increased 
from $19,978 to $30,137. 
Figure 3.2B is very similar in levels and trends to Figure 3.1B. This is not surprising since 
working age people without disabilities made up between 91.8% and 93.1% of the total 
working age population over this period. The market income of this population is much more 
sensitive to business cycles peaks and troughs than is median income for working aged people 
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with disabilities. However, in contrast to Figure 3.1A, the market income of the median 
working age person without disabilities grew substantially over the first two business cycles 
(from $31,117 in 1983 to $34,862 in 1993 to $39,336 in 2004). But, like working age people 
with disabilities, it fell over the last business cycle and was $36,213 in 2011. But, unlike 
Figure 1A, it increased in 2012 to $36,888. 
3.5.4 The Income Gap Between Working Age People with and without Disabilities 
Figure 3.3 focuses on levels and trends in the gap in median income of working age people 
with and without disabilities from 1980-2012. The figure simply subtracts the median income 
values by year for each income definition in Figure 3.2A from their counterparts in Figure 
3.2B.   The gap is largest for market income. It grew substantially over the first two business 
cycles, but especially during period of economic growth between 1983-1989 and 1995-2000. 
The gap remained the same over the most recent 2004-2011 business cycle. Over all three 
business cycles however the gap has grown from $17,813 in 1983 to $26,764 in 2011.  The 
gap is somewhat smaller for market and government income, but the trends are the same. Over 
the three business cycle the gap has grown from $12,908 in 1983 to $18,633 in 2011. The gap 
is even smaller for disposable income, but the trends are the same. Over the three business 
cycles, the gap has grown from $8,346 in 1983 to $13,260 in 2011.  
Not only is the gap smaller once the value of health insurance is added to disposable income, 
but the trends are different. While the gap increases during growth periods, similar to the other 
three median income measures, the decline after the peak year is smaller so that the overall 
gap remained the same for the business cycle of 1983-1993, and actually fell between 1993 
and 2004. There is almost no change between 2004 and 2011 for the same reasons.  Over the 
three business cycles, the gap has declined from $7,636 in 1983 to $6,164 in 2011.  
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Source: Author’s estimation from March CPS data. 
 
Figure 3.3: Trend in the Median Size-Adjusted Household Income Gap Between Persons with 
and without Disabilities 
3.5.5 Change in the Characteristics of those in the Lowest Income Quintile of the 
Population 
Figure 3.3 shows that once the value of health insurance is included in a fuller measure of 
disposable income, the gap in median income between working age people with and without 
disabilities falls from 1983-2011. Figure 3.4 uses this same fuller measure of disposable 
income to show that the share of the working age population in the lowest quintile also falls. 
In 1983 working age people with disabilities made up 12.66 percent of the working age 
population in the bottom income quintile of the population. Despite the fact that the 
prevalence of disability in the working age population rose slightly from 7.24 percent to 8.17 
percent, the share of people with disabilities in the bottom income quintile fell to 10.49 
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percent in 2011. Over the same period, the percentage of people with disabilities in the middle 
three quintiles rose with little change in the top quintile.   
 
Notes: The percent disabled reported in the legend represents the composition of the overall working 
aged population that is comprised of people with disabilities in the stated year. 
Source: Author’s estimation from March CPS data. 
 
Figure 3.4: Fraction of Trough Year Full-Income Quintiles Consisting of Persons with 
Disabilities 
3.5.6 Changing Portfolio of Income Sources for Persons with and without Disabilities 
Figure 3.3 shows that using a fuller measure of disposable income that includes the value of 
employer and government provided health insurance not only reduces the gap in the median 
income of working age people with disabilities, but also shows that the gap has been 
narrowing over the last three business cycles. Figure 3.4 shows, using this fuller measure of 
income, that the share of working age people with disabilities in the bottom quintile of the 
population has also fell over the last three business cycles.  Table 3.2 provides some insight 
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into the growing importance of health insurance in the income portfolio of working age people 
with disabilities. It does so by showing how the share of mean income, by income source, for 
working age people with and without disabilities across nine non-overlapping sources changed 
across the four trough years discussed above. This table takes advantage of the fact that mean 
income in any year can be divided into the sum of the mean of its sources when there are no 
negative sources of income.  
To do this, this essay focuses on estimated gross income in a household from private and 
government sources including the value of health insurance and divides it into its nine 
components. The first three (own labor earnings, the labor earnings of others in the household 
and private non-labor income) represent total in cash market income (income definition 1). 
The next two (SSDI/SSI cash transfers and all other government transfers) represent total in 
cash government transfers. These first five sources of income make up income definition 2. 
The next is government in-kind transfers excluding health insurance. The first six sources of 
income represent the total gross income before taxes used in disposable income (income 
definition 3). For the moment this essay does not consider the effect of taxes on this gross 
income measure. The last three (the value of employer provided health insurance, the value of 
government provided health insurance to those receiving SSDI/SSI, and the value of all other 
government provided health insurance) represent the value of employer and government 
provided health insurance used in income definition 4.  
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Table 3.2: Trends in Share of Gross Mean Income Including the Value of Health by Income Source for Persons with and without Disabilities 
year 
Mean 
Gross 
Income 
Own 
Labor 
Income 
Others 
Labor 
Income 
Private 
Non-
Labor 
Income 
SSI/DI 
Cash 
Transfers 
SSI/DI 
Health 
Insurance 
Other 
Public 
Health 
Insurance 
Public 
Non-
Labor 
Cash 
Transfers 
Public 
Non-
Cash 
Transfers 
Private 
Health 
Insurance 
Total 
Share Taxes 
                          
 With Disabilities 
1983 27,487.26 17.45 37.52 15.83 13.21 4.89 1.29 6.07 1.10 2.64 100.00 15.46 
1993 31,103.74 15.43 34.54 12.46 14.67 10.72 2.51 5.21 1.29 3.16 100.00 11.92 
2004 38,587.80 11.75 32.66 11.61 15.43 17.18 3.72 3.62 0.81 3.21 100.00 10.13 
2011 37,100.72 8.23 32.20 10.87 18.00 18.43 4.32 3.70 1.47 2.78 100.00 8.99 
 Without Disabilities 
1983 39,212.75 40.12 43.80 7.52 1.98 0.49 0.38 1.73 0.34 3.65 100.00 23.65 
1993 47,613.47 40.76 42.16 7.54 1.80 0.83 0.60 1.30 0.32 4.68 100.00 22.25 
2004 55,181.30 41.62 41.35 6.85 1.75 1.28 0.85 0.69 0.20 5.41 100.00 20.34 
2011 53,477.97 40.49 41.46 6.29 2.19 1.58 1.37 1.19 0.39 5.05 100.00 19.36 
Source: Author’s estimation from March CPS data. 
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When these nine values are summed they represent 100 percent of the gross income of the 
working age population which is disaggregated between working age people with and without 
disabilities in Table 3.2. The yearly mean of this gross income value is reported in column 1 of 
Table 3.2. The next nine columns report the share of each of these sources of gross income 
before taxes that are used in income definitions 3 and 4. The final column reports the share of 
gross income that was paid in taxes. But this essay separates this negative value from the four 
positive values that sum to 100 percent of gross income.  
For those without disabilities, market income provides the overwhelming share of gross 
income: 91.44 percent in 1983. While this falls slightly across the other three trough years 
90.46 percent in 1993, 89.82 percent in 2004 and 88.24 percent in 2011, market income is by 
far the dominant source of income for working age people without disabilities. Government 
in-cash transfers in these four trough years are 3.71, 3.10, 2.44, and 3.38 percent respectively. 
Government non-cash transfers are 0.34, 0.32, 0.20 and 0.39 respectively—small components 
of gross income that have varying importance over the four trough years. While private and 
government health insurance values are also small relative to market income they are more 
important than these government sources of gross income at 4.52, 5.60, 6.95 and 8.00 percent 
and they have been growing over time. As can be seen directly in Table 3.2, the primary 
source of this growth was employer provided insurance over the first three trough years but 
this value fell as a share of gross income by 2011.  A far more important government factor 
with respect to gains in disposable income of this population is the share of gross income that 
is taxed. It fell from 23.65 percent in 1983 to 22.25 in 1993 to 20.34 in 2004 and 19.36 in 
2011.    
The relative importance of these nine sources of gross income and their trends over this same 
period much more remarkable for working aged people with disabilities. Market income made 
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up 70.80 percent of gross income in 1983. This fell to 62.43, 56.02 and 51.30 over the next 
three trough years. Somewhat surprisingly while SSDI/SSI cash transfers increase to some 
degree over the period from 13.21 percent in 1983 to 15.43 percent in 2004 this is almost 
entirely offset by declines in other government cash transfers so that total government in-cash 
transfers only fell slightly from 19.28 to 19.05. However in 2012 SSDI/SSI jumps to 18.0 
percent, and total government in cash transfers increase to 21.70 percent. Government non-
cash transfers are 1.10, 1.29, 0.81 and 1.47 respectively—small components of gross income 
that have varying importance over the four trough years. But it is private and government 
health insurance whose share of gross income increased the most from 8.82 percent in 2003 to 
16.39 percent in 1993 to 24.11 percent in 2004 to 25.53 percent in 2011. As can be seen 
directly in Table 3.2 the rise in the share of income coming from government provided 
Medicare and Medicaid to SSDI/SSI recipients is driving this increase in share from 4.89 
percent in 1983 to 10.72 percent in 1993 to 17.18 percent in 2004 to 18.43 percent in 2011.  
To give some perspective on this rise in the share of income, in 1983 health insurance was the 
fifth most important source of income for working age people with disabilities behind the 
market income from others earnings, own earnings, and private non-labor earnings and 
SSDI/SSI cash transfers respectively. It remained in fifth place in 1993 but rose to second 
place behind only the labor earnings of others in the household by 2004 and at 18.43 percent 
remains in second place.  Taxes are a much smaller component of disposable income for 
working age people with disabilities but they also have fallen over time from 15.46 percent in 
1983 to 8.99 percent in 2011. 
Figure 3.5 provides additional insights into why the share of health insurance in these two 
working age populations has varied over the last three business cycles. Figure 3.5A reports 
levels and trends in the share of those with disabilities who are receiving their health insurance 
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as part of their SSDI/SSI benefit package. This has steadily grown from 27.5 percent in 1983 
to 47.5 percent in 2011. When those who are receiving other government provided health 
insurance are included the numbers increase to 37.2 and 58.8 percent, respectively. Note 
however, almost all of the increase is from those receiving insurance as part of their SSDI/SSI 
package of benefits. Dual entitlement to both Medicare and Medicaid has risen from 5 percent 
in 1983 to 13.5 percent in 2011.36 
                                                 
36 Dual entitlement or dual eligibility refers to persons who receive both Medicare and Medicaid 
benefits.  Persons with disabilities can qualify for both insurance benefits if they qualify for both SSI 
and SSDI.  This requires the person to have worked in a SSA qualified job and to be below specific 
asset limits (SSI is a means tested program). 
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Source: Author’s estimation from March CPS data. 
 
Figure 3.5: Trend in Health Insurance and SSI/DI Take-Up for Persons with and without Disabilities
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Over this same period employer provided health insurance fell from 33.5 percent in 1983 to 
21.3 percent in 2011. On net the uninsured population fell from 21 percent in 1983 to 15.4 
percent in 2011.  Figure 3.5B shows that for working age people without disabilities, 
employer provide insurance has been the dominant source of health insurance. But after rising 
to an all-time high of 75.8 percent in the peak year—1989 of the 1983-1993 business cycle it 
as trended downward. It fell from 72.1 percent in 1983 to 66 percent in 2011. While a small 
but growing percentage of working age people without disabilities have gained access to 
health insurance via government programs, the uninsurance rate among working age people 
without disabilities has grown relative to those with disabilities.   
While Figure 3.5 focuses on the types of health insurance held by working age people with 
and without disabilities, Figure 3.6 shows how the value of these types of health insurance 
have changed for the median person holding them.   Figure 3.6A shows that for working age 
people with disabilities the value of all sources of employer and government provided health 
insurance held by the median person increased over all three business cycles, but especially 
over the 1993-2004 business cycle while growth in the value of employer provided and SSI/DI 
cash benefits were far less pronounced. This is consistent with the trends in share of these 
sources of income discussed in Table 3.3. Figure 3.6B focuses on working age people without 
disabilities and displays the growth in the value of their employer provide health insurance 
premiums.  The median values of other sources of health insurance have been omitted for 
persons without disabilities because such a small fraction of this population relies on publicly 
provided health benefits (about 5 percent on average).  
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Source: Author’s estimation from March CPS data. 
 
Figure 3.6: Trends in the Market Value of Health Insurance and SSI/DI Benefits 
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3.5.7 Income Growth Decomposition via Shift Share Analysis 
Up to now, this essay has described how the income measure used affects income disparities 
between people with and without disabilities.  Recent literature has come to a consensus that 
disposable income (income definition 3) is preferred over market income or market plus 
government income (income definitions 1 and 2), when analyzing the flow of resources to a 
household.  There is some debate over whether disposable income plus health insurance 
(income definition 4) is preferable to disposable income.  As discussed above, using 
disposable income plus health insurance has recently been the preferred measure of income by 
the Congressional Budget Office (2012, 2013) and several academic researchers (Burkhauser, 
Larrimore, & Simon, 2012; Armour, Burkhauser, & Larrimore, 2013, forthcoming; and Aaron 
& Burtless, 2014).  This essay has presented evidence from analyses and past literature to 
support the use of disposable income plus health insurance as the preferred measure of 
economic wellbeing.  The change from disposable income to disposable income plus health 
insurance results in a dramatic change in income inequality results.  Using the first three 
definitions of income, disparities between people with and without disabilities were found to 
have grown over the last three business cycles.  Using disposable income plus health insurance 
reverses this finding. 
This section uses the results from the previous sections of this essay to determine the factors 
most responsible for the closing of the income gap between people with and without 
disabilities.  It does so by presenting the results from the decomposition of disposable income 
plus health insurance income growth over trough years in the three business cycles discussed 
above.  Figure 3.2A presented levels and trends for disposable income plus health insurance 
over the last three business cycles for working age people with disabilities. Figure 3.2B did 
the same for working age people without disabilities.  Using shift share analysis, this section 
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will estimate the contribution of changing demographic characteristics and income sources to 
overall median disposable income plus health insurance growth between business cycle trough 
years.   
Table 3.3 reports the factor growth decomposition between each trough year in the last three 
business cycles (1983-1993, 1993-2004, and 2004-2011) as well as the overall contribution of 
each factor from 1983 to 2011 for people with and without disabilities.  The first row reports 
the percentage point change in median disposable income plus health insurance values for the 
respectively labeled business cycles.   
Over the two business cycles where economic growth was positive, the growth in median 
disposable income plus health insurance was greater for those people with disabilities than for 
those without disabilities.  From 1983 to 1993 the income of the median American with a 
disability grew by 19.27 percentage points (1.75 percentage points annually) relative to a 
growth of 16.34 percentage points (1.49 percentage points annually) for those without a 
disability.  The difference in growth rates between the two populations was more pronounced 
over the 1993 to 2004 business cycle with median incomes increasing for those with 
disabilities by 29.06 percentage points (2.42 percentage points annually) compared to 17.31 
percentage points (1.44 percentage points annually) for those without a disability.  Over the 
last business cycle (2004-2011), while both populations experienced real income declines, the 
decline in income was less pronounced for working aged people with disabilities that for those 
without disabilities.  Overall, from 1983 to 2011 median incomes of people with disabilities 
increased by 50.85 percentage points (1.75 percentage points annually)  compared to an 
increase of 31.46 (1.15 percentage points annually) percentage points for working aged people 
without disabilities.  Hence, over the last 28 years and three business cycles, the median 
income of working aged people with disabilities increased in relation to the median income of 
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working aged people without disabilities, with the vast majority of the closing of the income 
gap between people with and without disabilities occurring over the 1993 to 2004 period.  The 
rest of Table 3.2 decomposes income growth into its factor components to identify the source 
of income changes and subsequently the factor(s) most responsible for closing the income gap 
between those with and without disabilities.    
The next 15 rows of Table 3.3 (rows 2-16) report the individual percentage point changes in 
median disposable income plus health insurance values accounted for by changes in 
demographics and source incomes for each of the three business cycles listed above and for 
the overall analysis period from 1983 to 2011.  The sum of the 15 values in each column 
equals the total percentage point change displayed in the first row.    
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Table 3.3: Factor Decomposition of Median Disposable Income Plus Health Insurance Growth for Persons with and without Disabilities 
 Median Incomes 
 1983-1993 1993-2004 2004-2011 1983-2011 
 
Without 
Disabilities 
With 
Disabilities 
Without 
Disabilities 
With 
Disabilities 
Without 
Disabilities 
With 
Disabilities 
Without 
Disabilities 
With 
Disabilities 
1. Actual 16.34 19.27 17.31 29.06 -3.68 -2.00 31.46 50.85 
2. Age 0.19 -0.36 1.73 0.45 0.71 0.39 2.29 0.32 
3. Race -1.48 -2.01 -1.85 -0.51 -1.24 -0.45 -4.41 -3.74 
4. Marriage -0.68 -2.31 -0.73 -2.11 -0.69 -0.54 -1.88 -6.68 
5. Own Employment 2.34 -0.77 0.76 -1.05 -1.66 -0.80 1.29 -3.65 
6. Own Labor Income 3.15 1.03 5.33 0.96 -0.46 0.09 7.50 1.99 
7. N Other Workers 1.55 0.48 -0.75 -0.50 -0.39 -0.39 0.69 0.02 
8. Other’s Labor Income 6.38 0.23 9.19 7.49 -0.89 -1.38 14.80 8.87 
9. Private Non-Labor Income 1.39 -0.17 0.21 0.34 -1.27 -1.11 0.10 -1.35 
10. Receive SSI/DI -0.11 3.24 -0.04 2.41 0.11 0.08 -0.13 5.38 
11. SSI/DI Cash 0.14 0.72 0.44 1.62 -0.43 -1.13 0.89 3.64 
12. SSI/DI HI 0.79 14.08 0.87 17.21 0.57 0.85 2.61 35.23 
13. Other Public HI 0.10 1.85 0.72 3.07 0.38 0.58 1.58 7.24 
14. Other Public Transfers -0.11 0.88 -0.54 -1.25 0.72 1.05 0.37 0.96 
15. Taxes -0.29 1.28 0.00 -0.42 1.39 0.96 1.25 0.51 
16. Private HI 3.01 1.10 1.94 1.36 -0.52 -0.03 4.51 2.10 
Source: Author’s estimation from March CPS data. 
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This essay first considers three important demographic trends: an aging population, a more 
racially diverse population, and declining marriage rates.  Tables 3.1A and 3.1B display these 
demographic trends for both those with and without disabilities.  Both working aged 
populations grew older.  The average age of a person with a disability increased from 46.92 
years in 1983 to 48.37 years in 2011.  The population of people without a disability similarly 
aged, increasing the average age from 36.75 in 1983 to 39.96 in 2011.  Furthermore, both 
populations experienced an increase in the distribution of non-whites over the last 30 years.  
The distribution of white people with disabilities fell from 79 percent in 1983 to 70 percent in 
2011, a decrease of 9 percentage points.  The corresponding decrease in the white population 
for people without disabilities was from 83 percent in 1983 to 71 percent in 2011, a decrease 
of 12 percentage points.  Lastly, marriage rates fell for both populations as well.  The percent 
of people with disabilities living in a household in which the head of the household is married 
fell from 61 percent in 1983 to 44 percent in 2011, a decrease of 17 percentage points.  The 
population people without disabilities experienced a very similar percentage point decline 
from 73 percent married in 1983 to 61 percent in 2011. 
 Table 3.3 (rows 2 through 4) report the changes accounted for by these demographic trends 
over each of the three business cycles, as well as for the entire analysis period from 1983 to 
2011.  The income changes attributed these demographic trends hold the underlying income 
distributions within each demographic subgroup constant at the base year income level.  Thus, 
these estimates capture only changes in the distribution of demographic subgroups from one 
trough year to the next, and not changes in the income distribution. 
The contribution of the ageing population to income changes across each business cycle varies 
for both those with and without disabilities.  From 1983 to 1993 age accounted for 1 percent 
(0.19 percentage points) of the increase in median incomes for people without disabilities, 
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while ageing of the population of people with disabilities decreased median incomes by 0.36 
percentage points.  From 1993 to 2004 aging contributed to an increase in median incomes of 
1.4 percent (0.45 percentage points) and  8.7 percent (1.73 percentage points) for those with 
and without disabilities, respectively.  From 2004 to 2011, despite a real decline in median 
incomes for both populations of people with and without disabilities, the aging of both 
populations accounted for a positive contribution to median income growth of 0.39 and 0.71 
percentage points, respectively.  Over the entire analysis period from 1983 to 2011, aging 
accounted for 0.5 percent (0.32 percentage points) and 6.1 percent (2.29 percentage points) of 
the increase in median incomes for people with and without disabilities, respectively.  Thus, 
over each business cycle, aging contributed to higher growth rates in median incomes for 
people without disabilities; however the magnitude of the contribution to median income 
changes for both populations was small relative to the overall change.  
The increasing racial diversity of Americans over the last three decades reduced growth in 
median incomes for both those with and without disabilities.  From 1983 to 1993, this factor 
accounted for 2.01 (41 percent of negative growth) and 1.48 (60 percent of negative growth) 
percentage points of reduced growth for people with and without disabilities, respectively.  
Similarly, the numbers for 1993 to 2004 were 0.51 (16 percent of negative growth) and 1.85 
(71 percent of negative growth), and from 2004 to 2011 were 0.45 (9 percent of negative 
growth) and 1.24 (17 percent of negative growth).  Over the entire analysis period, increasing 
racial diversity accounted for 3.74 and 4.41 percentage points of negative growth for those 
with and without disabilities, respectively.  These, changes accounted for 28 percent of 
reduced median income growth for those with disabilities and 70 percent of reduced median 
income growth for those without disabilities.  Therefore, the increase in the distribution of 
non-whites (relative to whites) over the past 30 years has contributed to reduced median 
income growth rates for both those with and without disabilities.  However, the impact of 
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increased racial diversity has a much stronger negative growth rate effect on people without 
disabilities, accounting for a majority of reduced median income growth in all business cycles 
(except 2004 to 2011 in which real income declined). 
Declining marriage rates served to slow income growth over the last three decades as well.  
From 1983 to 1993, this factor accounted for 2.31 (48 percent of negative growth) and 0.68 
(28 percent of negative growth) percentage points of reduced growth for people with and 
without disabilities, respectively.  Similarly, the numbers for 1993 to 2004 were 2.11 percent 
(67 percent of negative growth) and 0.73 percent (28 percent of negative growth), and from 
2004 to 2011 were 0.54 percent (11 percent of negative growth) and 0.69 percent (10 percent 
of negative growth).  Over the entire analysis period, increasing racial diversity accounted for 
6.68 and 1.88 percentage points of negative growth for those with and without disabilities, 
respectively.  These, changes accounted for 50 percent of reduced median income growth for 
those with disabilities and 30 percent of reduced median income growth for those without a 
disability.  Therefore, the decline in marriage rates over the past 30 years has contributed to 
reduced median income growth rates for both those with and without disabilities.  However, 
the impact of this decline had a much stronger negative growth rate effect on people with 
disabilities, accounting for almost half of reduced median income growth in all business 
cycles (except 2004 to 2011 in which real income declined). 
Next, this essay considers changes in employment and labor income.  The employment and 
labor earnings of the individual are considered along with the number of other employed 
persons and their labor earnings in the household.  Table 3.3 (rows 5-8) present the factor 
contributions from employment and earnings.  Figure 3.7 displays the trends in employment 
(part-time and full-time) for people with and without disabilities.  While the employment rates 
of people without disabilities remained steady from 1983 to 2011, the population of people 
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with disabilities experienced noticeable declines in employment rates.  Employment for those 
with disabilities fell from 35 percent employed in 1983 to 21 percent in 2011.    
 
Source: Author’s estimation from March CPS data. 
 
Figure 3.7: Trends in the Employment of Working Aged Persons (18-64) with and without 
Disabilities 
 
From 1983 to 1993 and from 1993 to 2004, declines in own employment accounted for a 
slowing of median income growth for people with disabilities of 0.77 percentage points and 
1.05 percentage points, respectively.  This slowed median income growth for those with 
disabilities due to declines in employment rates is in contrast to increased median income 
growth rates for those without disabilities.  People without disabilities experienced increased 
median growth rates of 2.34 and 0.76 percentage points in the first to business cycles (1983-
1993 and 1993-2004), respectively.  Over the 2004 to 2011 business cycle, people without 
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disabilities experienced negative growth in median incomes, and declines in own employment 
was the single largest contributor to this decline, accounting for 1.66 percentage points of 
negative growth.  For those with disabilities, the contribution of own employment declines to 
slowing of median income growth was not as meaningful, accounting for a reduction in 
growth of 0.80 percentage points.  Over the entire analysis period, employment of people 
without disabilities accounted for 1.29 percentage points of median income growth, while 
declines in the employment of people with disabilities accounted for a slowing of income 
growth by 3.65 percentage points. 
A change in the employment of people with and without disabilities is highly correlated with 
changes in labor market earnings.  Thus, this essay examines changes in median income due to 
changes in one’s own labor earnings, conditional upon changes in their demographic 
characteristics: age, race, marriage, and own employment status.  Over the first two business 
cycles, own earnings contributed to positive median income growth for both populations of 
people with and without disabilities.  Over these first two business cycles, own earnings of 
people without disabilities accounted for 3.15 and 5.33 percentage points of the overall growth 
in median incomes.  The population of people with disabilities experienced positive growth 
from own earning as well, accounting for 1.03 and 0.96 percentage points of positive growth 
in median incomes over the first two business cycles.  These positive contributions to median 
income growth are in contrast to the declining share of income attributed to one’s own labor 
earnings for people with disabilities (Table 3.2A).  From 2004 to 2011, real incomes for both 
populations fell with own earnings contributing to some of the decline for those without 
disabilities, 0.46 percentage points.  This slowing in the growth of median incomes of people 
without disabilities is in contrast to a small, but positive contribution of the own earnings 
factor for people with disabilities of .09 percentage points.  Overall, from 1983 to 2011, own 
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earnings contributed 7.50 percentage points of positive growth for people without disabilities, 
while this factor accounted for 1.99 percentage points of growth for those with disabilities.  
Due to the correlation between one’s own employment and earnings, the essay considers the 
contribution of own employment and earnings to income growth.  Over the first two business 
cycles, own employment and earnings was responsible for 29 percent of median income 
growth from 1983 to 1993, and 31 percent from 1993 to 2004 for people without disabilities.  
This is substantially greater than the contribution of these factors to growth in median incomes 
of people with disabilities.  These factors only accounted for 1 percent of income growth from 
1983 to 1993, and 3 percent of growth from 1993 to 2004. 
Next, this essay considers the contributions of the employment and earnings of others to 
median income growth for people with and without disabilities (Table 3.3, rows 7-8).  Over 
the first two business cycles, the employment and earnings of other household members 
increased the growth rate in median incomes for both people with and without disabilities.  
Over the 2004-2011 business cycle, declines in the employments and earnings of others 
contributed to a slowing in the growth rate of median incomes for both populations.  
Employment and earnings of other household members contributed 7.93 and 8.44 percentage 
points to median income growth people without disabilities over the first two business cycles, 
while accounting for 1.28 percentage points of negative growth from 2004 to 2011.  The 
positive growth over the first two business cycles attributed to the employment and earnings 
of other household members represents 42 percent of the overall growth in median incomes 
over both business cycles for people without disabilities.  The importance of the employment 
and earnings of other household members for the population of people with disabilities is 
relatively volatile and varies greatly over each of the three business cycles analyzed.  From 
1983 to 1993, these factors accounted for 0.71 percentage points of median income growth.  
 157 
And from 1993 to 2004 they were responsible for 6.99 percentage points of median income 
growth.  Lastly, over the 2004-2011 business cycle these factors contributed 1.77 percentage 
points to the slowing of median income growth.  The employment and earnings of other 
household members accounted for 3 percent and 22 percent of positive income growth over 
the first two business cycles, respectively. 
The employment and earnings of other household members were jointly the largest contributor 
to median income growth for the population of people without disabilities, which is not the 
case for those with disabilities.  Furthermore, the second largest joint positive contributor to 
income growth for people without disabilities were own employment and earnings.  From 
1983 to 2011, these four factors jointly were responsible for 64 percent of income growth for 
the people without disabilities, this is in comparison to those with disabilities, for which 
employment and earnings accounted for 26 percent of median income growth from 1983 to 
2011.  From 1983 to 2011, the highest share of gross mean income came from market income 
(own employment and labor earnings and the employment and earnings of other household 
members) which remained relatively constant for people without disabilities (Table 3.2B) 
while mean gross incomes increased.  Thus, the largest factor responsible for growth in mean 
gross incomes was the growth in market income. 
Next, this essay considers income from non-labor sources.  These non-labor income sources 
are: private non-labor income (Table 3.3, row 9); receipt and generosity of SSI/DI (Table 3.3, 
rows 10-12); the value of other public health insurance accessed outside of SSI/DI (Table 3.3, 
row 13); other public cash and non-cash transfers outside of SSI/DI cash and health insurance 
benefits (Table 3.3, row 14); tax liabilities (Table 3.3, row 15); and the value of employer 
contributions to health insurance premiums (Table 3.3, row 16). 
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Private non-labor income accounted for 1.39, 0.21, and -1.27 percentage points of median 
income growth over the three business cycles for people without disabilities.  Additionally, 
this factor accounted for -0.17, 0.34, and -1.11 percentage points of median income growth 
over the three business cycles for people with disabilities.  Overall, this factor accounted for 
less than 1 percent of median income growth for the people without disabilities, and was 
responsible for a relatively small reduction in the growth of median incomes for people with 
disabilities. 
Increases in the SSI/DI rolls for people with disabilities over each business cycle (Figure 
3.5A) accounted for a small percentage point growth in income (Table 3.3, row 10).  Overall, 
an increase in enrollment in these programs for people with disabilities was responsible for 
5.38 percentage points (8 percent) of income growth from 1983 to 2011.  The single largest 
contribution to growth in median incomes for people with disabilities over the first two 
business cycles was the value of health insurance obtained through SSI/DI (Medicare and/or 
Medicaid).  Table 3.2A supports this finding by displaying the share of income attributed to 
the value of SSI/DI health insurance for people with disabilities increased from 5 to 18 percent 
of mean income from 1983 to 2011.  The shift-share algorithm attributes 57 percent (14.08 
percentage points) and 49 percent (17.21 percentage points) of income growth over the first 
two business cycles to growth in the value of SSI/DI health insurance for people with 
disabilities (Table 3.3, row 12), respectively.  This is in stark contrast to the 4 percent 
attributed to this factor over the first two business cycles for people without disabilities.  
Figure 3.6 confirms this finding, and shows that the level and growth of insurance obtained 
through SSI/DI is greater than the level and growth in employer contributions to health 
insurance premiums.  From 2004 to 2011, changes in the value of SSI/DI health insurance 
were estimated to contribute a small, but positive, increase to income growth for both 
populations.  From 2004-2011 there was little change in the share of income attributed to 
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SSI/DI health insurance for both populations (Table 3.2 A and B).  Over the entire analysis 
period, growth in the value of SSI/DI health insurance was responsible for 35.23 percentage 
points (53 percent of income growth) of income growth from 1983 to 2011 for people with 
disabilities and 2.61 percentage points (7 percent of income growth) of income growth for 
people without disabilities. 
Cash benefits paid out to SSI/DI beneficiaries (Table 3.3, row 11) accounted for a small, but 
positive, increase in income growth for persons with disabilities.  Of particular note is the fact 
that generosity in SSI/DI cash benefits was responsible for a slowing of income growth over 
the 2004-2011 business cycle for both populations.  This could be due to a number of factors.  
For example, a change in the characteristics of SSI/DI beneficiaries coming onto the disability 
rolls, or the way in which SSI/DI cash benefits are calculated for new enrollees resulted in a 
decline in AIME due to the great recession (AIME is indexed to economy wide wage growth). 
This essay additionally considers the receipt and generosity of SSI/DI jointly (summarized 
from Table 3.3).  Over the three business cycles analyzed, increases in SSI receipt, generosity 
in payments, and the value of Medicare and Medicaid for people with disabilities were 
responsible for 18.04, 21.24, and -0.02 percentage points of income growth, respectively.  
Over the first two business cycles, SSI/DI accounted for 75 percent and 66 percent of all 
income growth for those with disabilities.  The negative growth over the 2004 to 2011 
business cycle for people with disabilities was due slower growth in SSI/DI cash benefits paid 
over the 2004-2011 business cycle relative to the growth over the previous two business 
cycles (Figure 3.6A). 
The contributions to income growth of public health insurance obtained outside of SSI/DI 
channels (Table 3.3, row 13), other public cash and in-kind transfers other than health 
insurance (Table 3.3, row 14), and tax policy (Table 3.3, row 15) were low in every business 
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cycle.  Public health insurance has a positive effect on income growth over all business cycles 
for both populations.  Other public transfers, varied in their contribution to income growth 
between populations and business cycles.  Other public transfers slowed income growth for 
people without disabilities over the first business cycles, while it increased income growth for 
people with disabilities.  Other public transfers then decreased both populations’ incomes over 
the 1993 to 2004 business cycle, followed by increases in both population median incomes 
over the 2004 to 2011 business cycle.  Tax policy affected those without disabilities more than 
those with disabilities.  Overall changes in tax policy increased income growth from 1983 to 
2011, with larger increases for people without disabilities. 
The growth in the value of employer contributions to private health insurance (Table 3.3, row 
16) increased median incomes for both populations over the first two business cycles and 
decreased median incomes for both populations in the last business cycle.  The positive 
contributions over the first two business cycles were due to increases in the real value of 
employer contributions (Figure 3.6).  The small, but negative contribution to income growth 
of this factor over the 2004 to 2011 business cycle was due to stagnation in the growth of 
employer contributions over this last business cycle (Figure 3.6). 
Overall, the largest contributors to income growth for people without disabilities were 
employment and labor earnings, while the largest contributors to positive income growth for 
people with disabilities were the SSI/DI programs.  The majority of growth in median incomes 
for people with disabilities was generated by real increases in the value of Medicare and 
Medicaid provided to SSI/DI beneficiaries.  The level and growth in the value of these public 
insurance programs far outpaced the growth in employer contributions to health insurance, 
resulting in a closing of the median income gap between people with and without disabilities. 
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3.6 Conclusions and Discussion 
This essay shows how dramatically levels and trends in the median income of working age 
people with disabilities increase both absolutely and in comparison to the median income of 
working age people without disabilities when the value of employer and government provided 
health insurance is included as income.  The median income gap between people with and 
without disabilities has been closing over the past three decades, mostly due to increases in the 
value of public health insurance provided to SSI/DI beneficiaries.  Using a shift share 
algorithm, this essay found that the SSI/DI programs (receipt, generosity in cash payments and 
the value of health insurance) were responsible for almost 70 percent of the total median 
income growth experienced by people with disabilities from 1983 to 2011.  This is in contrast 
to people without disabilities, for which employment and earnings were responsible for almost 
65 percent of median income growth.   
Additionally, when the insurance value of health insurance is included, the share of people 
with disabilities in the bottom quintile of the working age population falls.  The reduction in 
the fraction of people with disabilities in the bottom quintile resulted in an increase in the 
fraction of people with disabilities in the middle three quintiles.  Thus, the make-up of the 
bottom quintile changes dramatically when a fuller measure of income including the value of 
health insurance is used. 
This essay compared four alternative measures of income using the March CPS data:  market 
income (all private sources of cash income); market and government income (all private and 
public sources of cash income); disposable income (market and government income plus the 
value of in-kind transfers except employer and government provided health insurance minus 
taxes); and disposable income plus health insurance (disposable income plus the insurance 
value of employer and government provided health insurance).  Using these four measures, 
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this essay was able to replicate the results from prior research which concluded that the 
income gap between persons with and without disabilities has been growing, thus leading to 
the conclusion that those with disabilities are relatively worse off now than they were three 
decades ago.   
The conclusion from prior research that people with disabilities are relatively worse off today 
than they were thirty years ago is based on measures of income that include some government 
cash and in-kind transfers, while excluding the most valuable government in-kind transfer – 
health insurance.  Including the value of government cash and in-kind transfers reflects the 
flow of resources available to individuals and their households.  The value of Medicare and 
Medicaid is higher in level and in growth rate over time relative to employer premium 
contributions. In addition, there has been a growing fraction of disabled persons accessing 
Medicare and Medicaid benefits through the SSI/DI programs.  Thus, any measure of income 
not including the resources accessed by people on Medicare, Medicaid, or employer sponsored 
insurance will underestimate the overall level of resources.  Moreover, the income gap 
between those with and without disabilities will be overestimated due to disproportionally 
higher levels and growth rates in the value of Medicare and Medicaid relative to employer 
premium contributions, in addition to the growing fraction of disabled persons accessing 
Medicare and Medicaid benefits through the SSI/DI programs.        
The essay argues that the fourth measure (disposable income plus health insurance) is a more 
appropriate measure of the flow of resources available to individuals and their households than 
the three other income definitions used in this essay.  Using this more encompassing measure 
of income, this essay finds that the income gap between persons with and without disabilities 
has been closing over the past thirty years.  This result signifies that people with disabilities 
have gained greater access to public health insurance, the value of which has been increasing 
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rapidly.  Thus, persons with disabilities have gained access to more health resources (increases 
in SSI/DI provided Medicare and Medicaid) resulting in higher government spending, overall 
and per-enrollee on SSI/DI beneficiaries.   
The analyses presented in this essay serve to give researchers a better understanding of how 
sensitive income inequality results are to the definition of income.  More recently, economists 
and the US Government have been concerned with measures of income that better capture the 
flow of resources to people and households, rather than focusing solely on labor or market 
income.  This essay updates the results from the past literature by extending the use of these 
kind of measures to compare the overall flow of resources to people with and without 
disabilities.  By replicating the results in the past literature regarding the income gap between 
persons with and without disabilities, this essay was able to show how important the inclusion 
of the value of public and private health insurance as income is to income inequality results. 
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